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Strategic Models in Supply Network Design
Roger D. Lederman
This dissertation contains a series of essays intended to introduce strategic modeling tech-
niques into the network design problem. While investment in production capacity has long
been approached as a critical strategic decision, the increasing need for robust, responsive
supply capabilities has made it essential to take a network view, where multiple prod-
ucts and sites are considered simultaneously. In traditional network planning, models have
rarely accounted for the behavior of additional players - customers, competitors, suppliers -
on whom a firm can exert only a limited influence. We analyze a set of models that account
for the dynamics of the firm’s interaction with these outside actors.
In Chapters 2 and 3, we develop game-theoretic models to characterize the allocation
of resources in a network context. In Chapter 2, we use series-parallel networks to model
the arrangement of producers whose output is bundled. This structure may arise, for
example, when various components of the production process are outsourced individually.
We study supply-function mechanisms through which producers strategically manage scarce
capacity. Our results show how network structure can be analyzed to measure producers’
market power and its effect on equilibrium markups. Chapter 3 looks at the network design
problem of a vertically integrated firm with the ability to flexibly allocate resources across
markets. We consider optimal design of the firm’s production network as an upper-level
decision to be optimized with respect to competitive outcomes in the lower stage. We find
that optimal strategies regarding the location and centralization of production will differ
across firms, depending on their competitive position in the market.
The final two chapters discuss practical issues regarding the availability of model inputs
in a multi-product context. In Chapter 4, we propose a method to construct competitor sets
through estimation of a latent-segment choice model. We present a case study in a hotel
market, where demand is distributed both spatially and temporally. We show how widely
available data on market events can be used to drive identification of customer segments,
providing a basis to assess competitive interactions. Chapter 5 provides a further example,
in the setting of urban transportation networks, of how user behavior on a network can
be estimated from partially observed data. We present a novel two-phase approach for
performing this estimation in real time.
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Our concern in this dissertation is with the design of a firm’s supply network. The supply
network may encompass the whole of the firm’s procurement, production, and distribution
functions, and is the fundamental blueprint that determines the firm’s production capabil-
ities. Capabilities are dictated by the physical limits of the production process, expressed
through production capacities at each stage, as well as through the overall structure of
the network, which captures the degree to which resources can be reallocated in response
to variable market conditions. For the latter capabilities, network analysis by traditional
methods becomes challenging, since the effectiveness of a given configuration is often depen-
dent on the behavior of additional players - customers, competitors, suppliers - on whom
the firm can exert only a limited influence. Our motivation is to propose suitable models for
network analysis that account for the dynamics of the firm’s interaction with these outside
actors.
The desire to integrate production processes tightly with markets is not a new phe-
nomenon. Since the first introduction of just-in-time methods as an alternative to make-to-
stock inventory planning, the trend in operations management has been towards increasingly
demand-driven practices. Enabled by information technology and an explosion of available
market data in recent years, this has translated to increasingly precise control over pro-
duction and distribution decisions. According to Gartner Research, the goal of today’s
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demand-driven supply network should be to “enable organizations to sense and respond to
real-time demand across a network of suppliers, employees, and customers (RR Donnelley
2007).” In such an environment, evaluation of proposed supply network configurations de-
pends mightily on the firm’s ability to model external dynamics of customer choice and
competitive response.
As supply networks have become more reactive, additional factors have contributed to
making the strategic viewpoint critical. The prevalence and, ultimately, the specialization of
outsourcing models, has made firms increasingly interdependent, while enabling substantial
variation in approach to managing the supply chain. In this context, supply chain struc-
ture can differentiate competitors, dictating a firm’s geographic footprint, along with order
leadtimes, reliability, and versatility. While those developments have played out largely
over the last quarter century, recent events have raised important new strategic concerns
among managers. Growing consumer markets in Asia have altered the logic of cost-driven
globalization, while volatility in fuel prices has enhanced the risks of offshore production
models. The result has been increased scrutiny of supply chain practices from a network
perspective.
This dissertation contains a series of essays intended to introduce strategic concerns
into the network design problem. In the network setting, the challenge is to manage the
complexity of multiple products and/or production locations simultaneously. Often, when
faced with inherently complex decisions, as of those arising in network planning, the ap-
proach is to approximate the true, strategic, problem, with a stand-alone approximation
that simplifies the market’s response to planning decisions. In our work, we attempt to
demonstrate where such approaches fall short, and takes steps toward a more integrated
approach.
We consider several important sources of complexity in our work. In particular, we em-
phasize connections between individual markets, through demand as well as supply links,
that make responses difficult to predict when modeling these markets in isolation. In ana-
lyzing competition, as we do in Chapters 2 and 3, one finds that market power is difficult to
quantify in the network context, and so investments in network design cannot be easily val-
ued. A further source of complexity is constraints on the availability of data that is needed
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to accurately characterize customer behavior. In a multi-product context, the observed allo-
cation of customers is a function, not only of customer preferences, but of network structure
and the process through which capacity can be allocated to meet demand. Accordingly, we
discuss methods to recover the true distribution of customer types in Chapters 4 and 5.
In all we present four chapters following this introduction. Chapter 2, “Pricing with
Markups under Horizontal and Vertical Competition”, presents a model to study the ar-
rangement of component suppliers, in an environment where those suppliers compete with
one another for the firm’s business. Chapter 3, “Facility Network Design with Equilibrium
Outcomes”, looks at the network design problem of a vertically integrated firm, but models
competition across multiple markets. In Chapter 4, “Identifying Competitor Sets in the
Hotel Industry”, we study competition in the hotel industry through a characterization of
customer choice from among a series of spatially distributed hotel options. The final chap-
ter, “Real-Time Traffic Estimation using Data Expansion”, jumps to the setting of urban
transportation networks to provide a further example of how user behavior on a network
can be estimated from partially observed data.
1.2 Themes in Network Design
1.2.1 Operational Flexibility
A critical distinction between alternative configurations of the supply network is often the
way in which flexibility is introduced into the firm’s decision-making process. Indeed, this
work is motivated largely by the need for models compatible with the prevalence and diver-
sity of flexible firms in today’s marketplace. As business processes are refined to bring more
fine-tuned control over pricing and allocation of goods, the proper context for evaluating
the supply network is continually changing in accordance. In the chapters that follow, we
address operational flexibility through a variety of means.
In modeling competition between producers, the two canonical models of Cournot and
Bertrand are distinguished from one another by their view of operational flexibility. In
the Cournot setting, production quantities are set in advance of prices, resulting in a model
that is roughly consistent with price flexibility. The reverse is true of Bertrand competition,
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where the level of output must be adjusted to what the market dictates. In Chapter 2, we
model suppliers who exhibit a combination of both price and production flexibility. Rather
than committing in advance to a price or a production quantity, our suppliers compete
by specifying price functions relating price to output. The model is consistent with the
reality of firms who may adjust their initial production plans, but incur additional costs
from the use of short-term labor and facilities, and then look to pass these costs on to their
customers.
The notion of flexibility also motivates our study of facility networks in Chapter 3.
In particular, we consider firms that engage in responsive transhipment between regional
markets as a measure to address supply imbalances as they arise. Without such capabilities,
it is reasonable to consider individual markets in isolation to determine competitive effects.
In our setting, firm’s invest in capacity to provide themselves a set of capabilities, but
determine actual production outcomes in a later stage. Furthermore, the existence of flexible
competitors means that market output may also shift between regions to reflect the current
conditions.
1.2.2 Multi-stage Decision Structure
The models that we consider are complicated by the presence of multi-stage decision struc-
tures. While the precise decision structures vary across chapters, we are generally concerned
with modeling the impact of a firm’s network design on the actions of some outside parties.
At a high-level, we can model all such settings through a two-stage structure; networks are
chosen in the first stage and responses determined in the second stage. This is a simplistic
view, but it underscores a major analytical and computational challenge that we face. That
is, often, the structure of the second-stage responses is not conducive to analysis of the
first-stage actions.
In such multi-stage decisions settings, it is often a challenge to make the upper-level
problem tractable, while faithfully representing the dynamics of the lower-level response
problem. We use a variety of approaches to achieve this balance in the chapters herein. No-
tably, both the capacity investment problem in Chapter 3, and the offline traffic estimation
in Chapter 5, are modeled as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC).
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Such models present some well-known computational difficulties (see Dempe (2002) for fur-
ther background). Optimizing over upper-level and lower-level decision variables in a single
optimization problem can easily produce a feasible region that is non-convex. Alternatively,
one can model lower-level outcomes as an implicit function of upper-level decisions, but the
resulting optimization problem over the upper-level variables is generally non-convex and
non-differentiable.
In Chapter 3, we present analytical results that characterize the optimal network con-
figuration. This requires the use of certain modeling assumptions, which effectively restrict
the feasible region to a convex set, and so allow closed-form solutions for the optimal
capacities. To obtain numerical results with the assumptions relaxed, we employ a branch-
and-bound procedure over lower-level constraints (similar to that proposed in Bard (1990))
that computes the exact solution for moderately-sized problem instances. The offline esti-
mation problem in Chapter 5 is intended for large-scale problem instances, and so requires
a heuristic approach. Here we use sensitivity analysis of the lower-level equilibrium problem
(based on the approach of Patriksson (2004)) as the basis for a descent approach over the
non-convex upper-level optimization problem. To contrast, the real-time estimation prob-
lem in Chapter 5 uses a linearized approximation of the equilibrium problem and so meets
significantly tighter computational standards.
In Chapter 2, we model a game between producers, where equilibrium analysis is required
to evaluate the outcome of any set of actions. To make the upper-level game, in which
producers choose their respective markups, tractable, some structure is needed from the
solution of the bi-level optimization problem that characterizes each firm’s best response.
We use a series-parallel network model that allows for quite general market definitions, while
assuring that the lower-level game admits a closed-form solution. Our producer model is
then such that optimal markups can also be obtained in closed form, and furthermore,
posses the continuity and monotonicity properties needed for a game-theoretic solution in
the upper level. Additionally, we exploit monotonicity of the optimal producer markups to
compute equilibrium markups algorithmically using an iterated-best-responses procedure.
Finally, in chapters 4 and 5 we further address some of the practical difficulty that arises
when deploying a multi-stage decision model. Namely, we discuss the ability of the first-
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stage actor to predict lower-level behavior from observable data. In both cases, we select an
appropriate structural model - a segmented multinomial logit in Chapter 4, and Wardrop
equilibrium and traffic splitting probabilities models in Chapter 5 - so that the full range
of responses can be estimated without observing all of the upper-level actions explicitly.
1.2.3 Estimation from Observable Outcomes
A potential difficulty with our approach comes in the firm’s ability to obtain the data
necessary to construct the proposed market-response models. In contrast to a one-stage
modeling approach, where a direct link between firms’ actions and observed market out-
comes is required, the data needed in our setting is often intermediate data on customer
preferences or competitor positioning. This information may not be directly observable, in
which case some estimation is required. In both Chapters 4 and 5, our lower-level models
require knowledge of the distribution of customers/users across various types. This is not
observable, but, as we show, can be inferred from market outcomes if some structure is
assumed.
In the settings we consider, we must further account for the interaction of customers
with the supply network itself. This is an important distinction from most econometric
models, in which customer choices can be taken as a direct reflection of preferences. In a
long-run economic situation, one may assume the capacity of each firm, and of each product,
adjusts to meet the market’s demand. Our interest is instead in modeling the short-run
behavior of customers, subject to the constraints a fixed supply network. In Chapter 4,
we discuss the censoring effect of capacity constraints that results from customer spillover.
Chapter 5 deals with similar behavior, this time resulting from road capacity limits. Here,
the constraints are not absolute, but users reallocate themselves as travel times on a road
begin to increase.
1.3 Overview of Chapters
Pricing with Markups under Horizontal and Vertical Competition. In this chap-
ter, we study the effect of competition on markups for producers of both substitutes and
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7
complements. We model a market for a single product, or product bundle, where producers
compete to provide all or some portion of the product. In our game, each firm adopts a
price function proportional to its per-unit costs by deciding on the size of a markup. Cus-
tomers then choose a set of providers that offers the lowest combined price. For quadratic
production costs and general series-parallel market structures, a producer’s optimal markup
corresponds to the price in a redefined market, which we derive explicitly. We characterize
equilibrium markups for inelastic and elastic demand. When bundle demand is inelastic, a
unique equilibrium exists if and only if the market has a 3-edge-connected network structure.
We study comparative statics of equilibria with respect to changes in the market design.
When production is divided among decentralized firms that compete vertically, markups
increase throughout the market. Reduced competition in the market for any bundle com-
ponent leads to a higher bundle price, but social efficiency in component markets need not
coincide with overall efficiency of production. Furthermore, the effect on an individual pro-
ducer’s profit is seen to depend on its market position.
Facility Network Design with Equilibrium Outcomes. In this chapter we model
capacity investment decisions that rely on an explicit model of market outcomes. Capacity
expansion may impact the product mix and pricing decisions of a firm’s competitors, and
thus alter prevailing market conditions. In the context of global supply networks, the effects
are felt across regions, and can influence the preferred location of facilities. To account for
this effect, we study capacity investment by firms that compete in multiple markets. The
allocation of resources and prices obtained are determined as the equilibrium of a game
amongst capacity-constrained producers. Within this framework, we look at optimal design
of a firm’s production network as an upper-level decision to be optimized with respect to
competitive outcomes in the lower stage. We discuss the computation of optimal capacities
for a general network structure, and then present a special case involving only an ’offshore’
and an ’onshore’ investment option. The latter setting provides insights connecting the
intensity of competition and the nature of uncertainties to the structure of the optimal
network design.
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Identifying Competitor Sets in the Hotel Industry. In this chapter, we present
an empirical approach to estimating the closest competitors of a given hotel. The basis
for this approach is to identify those hotels that compete for the same pool of customers.
To accomplish this, we develop a latent-segment choice model that can be estimated from
aggregate occupancy and price data. To account for the time-varying composition of hotel
demand, latent class size estimates are tied to data on demand-generating events taking
place in the relevant geographic market. The model is tested using daily occupancy and
price data obtained from a set of 21 hotels in the Washington D.C. market. Sample com-
petitor sets are generated and analyzed to determine the impact of location and price in
grouping hotels. We find for this study that location is the largest determinant of com-
petitor relationships. Average price and the temporal pattern of a hotel’s price fluctuations
are also impactful. We also address the problem of unobserved customer spillover that may
distort customer preferences, as inferred from the occupancy data. An iterative procedure is
introduced to simulate spillover, and results based on this allocation process are contrasted
with the initial choice model estimates.
Real-Time Traffic Estimation using Data Expansion. This chapter presents a method
for estimating missing real-time traffic volumes on a road network using both historical and
real-time traffic data. The method was developed to address urban transportation networks
where a non-negligible subset of the network links do not have real-time link volumes, and
where that data is needed to populate other real-time traffic analytics. Computation is split
between an offline calibration and a real-time estimation phase. The offline phase deter-
mines link-to-link splitting probabilities for traffic flow propagation that are subsequently
used in real-time estimation. The real-time procedure uses current traffic data and is effi-
cient enough to scale to full city-wide deployments. Simulation results on a medium-sized
test network demonstrate the accuracy of the method and its robustness to missing data
and variability in the data that is available. We observe that the use of real-time data can
reduce the percentage root mean square error by as much as 20%.
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Chapter 2




Classical models of competition, through either prices or production quantities, have fo-
cused predominantly on markets of a single good. In this setting, producers of substitutes,
either perfect or imperfect, compete horizontally for the same pool of customers. Recently,
there has been increasing recognition that in some industries competition among customers
has a significant combinatorial component, beyond the scope of traditional single-market
models. In such industries, producers whose goods may be purchased in combination com-
pete vertically. Vertical competitors, while sharing the same customer base, compete for
the ability to extract larger markups, and thus claim a larger stake of profits from their
combined product. In this chapter, we study these markups through a framework where
each producer chooses a price schedule, having in mind both the actions of vertical and hor-
izontal competitors. Each producer sets its pricing schedule according to a price function
that is specified as a constant percentage markup over per-unit production costs. Producers
set the pricing schedule for individual products and customers choose a bundle of products
CHAPTER 2. PRICING WITH MARKUPS UNDER HOR. & VERT. COMPET. 10
at minimum price. Customers are interested in bundles composed of products given by any
path of a series-parallel network. Producers on parallel links compete horizontally, while
connections in series represent vertical relationships.
Industries with our structure include those where a physical or geographic network is
explicitly present, as in the airline industry, as well as those where a network structure
is defined implicitly by the available bundles. Our model allows for many infinitesimal
customers, or a single, centralized buyer. This latter case applies to decentralized assembly
supply chains, where a monopsonistic manufacturer purchases components from multiple
suppliers. The assembly paradigm applies naturally to the increasingly modular production
of, e.g., automobiles and airplanes, among other products. Granot and Yin (2008) discuss
further applications related to the bundling of media products, transportation, and health
care services.
In all of these examples, there is a question of the extent to which producers of each
product in the bundle may exercise market power. For example, according to Dedrick et al.
(2010), who study supplier data for the Hewlett-Packard nc6230 Notebook PC, Toshiba’s
gross profit margin for its display component was 28% of net sales, while Intel’s processors
had a gross profit rate of 59%, indicating a substantially stronger market position. Intel’s
position reflects the strength of its proprietary technology and brand status, which make
it difficult to replace in the Notebook PC supply chain. Additionally, each firm’s profit
margins depend on the structure of the complementary markets. For example, as AMD
emerges to challenge Intel in the CPU market, prices may shift throughout the industry
(see Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2010) for a discussion regarding Microsoft Windows). To
the extent that intense competition will lower the price of CPUs, Toshiba stands to benefit
with increased sales. What, however, is the effect of a stronger AMD on Toshiba’s market
power?
For a general set of market configurations, allowing varying degrees of integration among
competitors, our formulation addresses these questions of market power. Furthermore, our
analysis of the optimal producer markups provides a useful decomposition of the inter-
component competitive effects illustrated above. For a given producer and its complemen-
tary market, there is a vertical effect that shifts the residual demand curve up as competition
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is added (Toshiba benefits from reduced CPU prices), and an additional horizontal effect,
that increases its elasticity, and so lessens equilibrium profit margins (a stronger AMD
weakens Toshiba). Our decomposition represents these two effects explicitly for a pro-
ducer facing an arbitrary configuration of vertical and horizontal competition, as captured
through a series-parallel network representation. We then exploit these structural proper-
ties to compute equilibrium markups, and compare the size of both competitive effects for
various changes to the market structure.
In contrast to models of purely price competition, here market power derives from
each producer’s knowledge that competitor prices will adjust along a price schedule in
response to its own pricing decision. When competitor markups are high, the response
is more dramatic, and outcomes more closely reflect quantity competition. Notice that
strict quantity competition does not provide an obvious mechanism for dividing revenues
among the products in a bundle. By considering price functions, we capture the producers’
reactions to varying demand levels, which in turn determines the distribution of revenues
when the market clears. In practice, the reactions that we model are often embodied
implicitly in a producer’s pricing strategy. While in some cases, such as in electricity or
bond markets, there is a market mechanism that allows an explicit price function to be
posted, we are in general interested in any case where producers react to competitors in
part through price adjustments. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) provide further discussion of
the organizational mechanisms by which such price functions may be implicitly defined.
This work highlights the strategic interaction between producers whose output may
be bundled together. There are several threads of literature involving complementarities.
In the model of Cournot (1838), price-setting monopolists of copper and zinc, which are
combined to make brass, split profits equally among them. Multi-market oligopoly theory,
dating back to Bulow et al. (1985), also incorporates complementary goods, but not within
the bundling framework we consider. Closer to our setup is the literature on decentral-
ized assembly systems (see, e.g., Granot and Yin (2008), Wang (2006), and the references
therein), in which an assembler purchases a set of components from multiple strategic suppli-
ers. In particular, Jiang and Wang (2010) model competition within individual component
markets, which relaxes Cournot’s equal-profit result when competition is asymmetric. In
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their model, competition is Bertrand, as suppliers compete by fixing their wholesale price.
Constant marginal costs ensure that a single firm produces each component. Others, such
as Nagarajan and Bassok (2008), look at alliance-formation among suppliers. We consider
a fixed network structure, but the generality of our network should be useful for evaluating
such alliances. In an airline context, Lederer (1993) studies competitive network design,
and shows that equilibrium prices may not exist if legs from competing airlines can be bun-
dled. Netessine and Shumsky (2005) look at management of seating inventory on vertically
competing flight legs. Finally, the model of Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2010) expands on
Cournot’s original model by allowing competition and vertical differentiation in one of the
markets.
There is also a growing literature on competition in networks, motivated largely by ap-
plications involving a physical network. The focus has been the role of prices in guiding
users towards efficient paths through the network. There is a large literature concerning
centralized pricing, and a more recent body of work on price competition by decentralized
firms. See, e.g., Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007a), Correa et al. (2008), Acemoglu et al.
(2009), Johari et al. (2009), Johari and Tsitsiklis (2010) for the case of substitutes, or Ace-
moglu and Ozdaglar (2007b), Chawla and Roughgarden (2008), Papadimitriou and Valiant
(2010) for more general market structures. A feature of physical networks is often that
customers experience costs due to congestion, with the effects increasing in the number of
customers sharing a path. Our model is more in line with traditional models of competition
in that customers experience no costs outside of the price that is paid to the producer.
However, producers themselves experience costs that are marginally increasing, and pass
this cost structure on to the customers through their price schedules. In this way, demand
is encouraged to spread across multiple paths as in a network with congestion.
Competition in price functions is an example of supply function equilibrium (Grossman
1981, Klemperer and Meyer 1989). The supply function equilibrium concept is a general-
ization of Cournot and Bertrand models of competition. In each of these cases, producers
commit to either prices or production quantities before observing their competitors’ choices,
leaving only one of these as a possible lever for responding to the market. In the case of
supply function equilibria, producers choose a function relating the price to the quantity
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produced (i.e., the inverse of the price function). Then, after all such functions have been
chosen, the firms can adjust to the market conditions by choosing a point along this supply
function. In equilibrium, each producer sells according to a single quantity/price combi-
nation, selected from its supply function so that the market clears. In this way, supply
function equilibria model the common scenario where both price and quantity are adjusted
in response to the market conditions. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show that, in the case
of a duopoly, competition in supply functions leads to equilibrium prices and quantities
intermediate between those of Bertrand and Cournot competition. In related research,
Akgün (2004) analyzes mergers of firms with quadratic cost functions in a market of sub-
stitutes using the framework of Klemperer and Meyer (1989). For a market of substitutes
with a deterministic demand and nonlinear cost functions, Correa et al. (2008) identify an
equilibrium where price functions have the same structure as cost functions and study its
properties, particularly the efficiency of the resulting market. In this work, we focus on more
general market structures and use supply functions to smooth price/quantity competition
in a tractable way for markets involving both horizontal and vertical competition.
As in Correa et al. (2008), our producers are assumed to select a price function that main-
tains the same shape as their cost function. This model is consistent with cost-plus pricing
policies that are often employed in practice. Furthermore, such behavior simplifies analy-
sis by reducing each producer’s decision to a single parameter, which we call its markup.
We refer to supply function equilibria where each firm is restricted to playing a markup
over its cost function as markup equilibria. As additional motivation for the restriction to
markup equilibria, we show that even when producers may choose any non-decreasing price
function, any markup equilibrium remains an equilibrium in the unrestricted game. This
generalizes a result of Correa et al. (2008) for the case of substitutes. In addition, Klem-
perer and Meyer (1989) consider the game with general supply functions in the symmetric
duopoly case, and show that of the many equilibria existing when demand is deterministic,
uncertainty eliminates all but the unique markup equilibrium. See Appendix A.1 for our
result on the robustness of markup equilibria.
An important feature of our model is that per-unit costs of production, and thus price
functions, are increasing, so that demand is allocated to multiple competitors where they
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exist. Marginally-increasing costs are a common assumption in industries where capac-
ity is constrained or costly to increase in the short term. Even when long-term capacity
investments exhibit economies of scale, it is often the case that quantity decisions for spe-
cific product lines are made subject to prevailing capabilities. Short-term adjustments,
such as bringing on temporary workers, will then entail additional marginal expense. In
practice, the number of competitors producing positive quantities is often limited by the
presence of substantial fixed costs of production. In our model, there are no fixed costs.
Rather, we consider that in the time scales we study, long-term decisions of market entry
and capacity investment are made exogenously. We thus include only those competitors
that actually produce, and consider pricing decisions subject to capacity restrictions. This
assumption allows a tractable characterization of the demand allocation through a system
of equations, rather than the complementarity problem that results when entry decisions
are incorporated. Other literature assuming negligible fixed costs includes, e.g., Acemoglu
and Ozdaglar (2007a) and Johari and Tsitsiklis (2010).
The equilibrium outcome is simplified further by an assumption that all producers face a
quadratic cost function. While the shape is thus constant, we allow for heterogeneity among
producers by applying an efficiency parameter that scales each cost function according to the
specifics of the firm’s production technology. The restriction to quadratic cost functions is
used to enable a closed-form derivation of a producer’s optimal markup, which sharpens our
insights relating market structure and producer markups. In particular, the link between
optimal markups and the degree of horizontal competition is made explicit. Much of our
analysis does in fact extend to general monomial cost functions, and this case is discussed
further in the conclusion. Linear marginal costs, as we impose in the body, are often
assumed for tractability in the literature on supply function equilibria. Baldick et al. (2004)
categorize work in the area into those assuming duopoly (e.g., Green and Newbery (1992),
Laussel (1992)) and those assuming linear marginal costs (e.g., Baldick et al. (2004), Green
(1996), and more recently Akgün (2004)). Recent exceptions are Correa et al. (2008), who
consider convex cost functions initially before restricting to a monomial form, and Johari
and Tsitsiklis (2010), who allow convex costs but place other restrictions on the form of
supply function chosen. In a broader context, multi-stage games often require relatively
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restrictive assumptions regarding costs to ensure tractability (see e.g., Engel et al. (2004),
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007a), Wichiensin et al. (2007), Xiao et al. (2007), Johari et al.
(2009)).
In this chapter, we present the first study of supply function equilibria in markets with
both substitutes and complements, analyzing the two-stage game in which producers select
price functions, anticipating the allocation game occurring in the second stage. We observe
that markups of vertical competitors are strategic complements, and that a sufficient degree
of horizontal competition is needed for markups to stabilize to an equilibrium. Formalizing
this, we present a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria, and
show that the equilibrium is unique when it exists. For a fixed, inelastic demand, an
equilibrium exists only in networks that are 3-edge-connected (see e.g., Ahuja et al. (1993)
for background on graph connectivity). Notice that this condition depends entirely on the
topology of the network, and is independent of the cost parameters. For a network of
substitutes, this is equivalent to requiring at least 3 producers to compete in the market
(Correa et al. 2008). Interestingly, this matches results of existence of equilibria in related
models (Kyle 1989, Johari and Tsitsiklis 2010). For general series-parallel networks, this
condition rules out the case in which two producers within a bundle act as ‘monopolies’ in
that no other firm can replace them in that bundle. A similar problem was discussed in
the network competition model of Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007b), and both scenarios are
reminiscent of double marginalization, which is widely recognized as a source of inefficiency.
When demand is elastic, the outside option provides sufficient horizontal competition, but
a weaker existence condition is still needed to address the potential for vertical instability.
The best-response functions of producers have a highly intuitive structure: the per-unit
price equals the per-unit cost plus a markup whose functional expression depends only on
the markups of everybody else. For each producer, we provide a procedure by which the
network structure is pivoted to represent its unique set of substitute bundles. Equilibrium
prices in this redefined market then measure the producer’s market power and determine its
markup. For a fixed set of competitor markups, the best-response markup decreases with the
introduction of horizontal competitors and increases with the number vertical competitors
required to produce a bundle. Both relationships are intuitive, and serve to validate our
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representation of market power. In particular, the effect of additional complementarity is
consistent with that of Wang (2006) for assembly systems.
The generality of our network structure sheds light on some intriguing inter-market
relationships. Our sensitivity analysis of equilibria first shows that an increase in any
producer’s costs will increase the markups of all producers in the network. While this
is intuitive for horizontal competitors, it may contrast with intuition about the merits of
enabling complementors to innovate. Furthermore, while it is often thought that intense
competition among its complementors will yield a producer the greatest market power, the
result indicates that this may not be the case. We do note that, as our decomposition
approach makes clear, reduced pricing power can be balanced by increased market share,
yielding a positive net effect in these cases. These simultaneous effects make analysis of
producer profits more complex than that of markups. As in Jiang and Wang (2010), the
addition of competition within component markets allows an unequal division of profits in
our model. However, in markets with price flexibility and multiple active producers, we
observe some additional dynamics. While in their model, each producer benefits from an
efficiency gain that increases downstream competition, we see that such changes can alter
the balance of power between direct competitors. In particular, we show that while the
most efficient producers always gain share in this case, their less efficient competitors may
lose share and so see their profits decrease. Interestingly, this suggest that while market
leaders are likely to encourage any innovations by complementors, secondary players may
actually benefit by preserving inefficiency elsewhere in the supply chain.
We explore the effect of network structure on overall market efficiency. Intuitively, we
show that the bundle price increases when direct competitors merge, but mergers of ver-
tical competitors actually decrease the bundle price. In addition, for production that is
split among vertical competitors, we find that if one component market is dominated by
a monopoly, it is most inefficient when the cost parameter for that component is small.
For an assembler that can structure its network of suppliers, this suggests that a strategy
where components are relatively equal in value may be favorable to an asymmetric split.
Furthermore, when production costs for a component do not increase quickly, it is benefi-
cial to cultivate multiple suppliers for the purpose of distributing market power. Besides
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bundle price, we also compare the production cost realized at equilibrium to the cost when
customers are allocated optimally with respect to producer cost functions. Here, the loss of
efficiency results from the fact that markups distort the cost structure, leading customers
to purchase less from those producers with high markups than they would in an optimum
allocation. In contrast to what we observe with price, we discuss an example where, sur-
prisingly, a horizontal merger in the market for a component can actually reduce the overall
cost of producing a bundle.
We proceed in Section 4.3 with a description of our model and analysis of the second-
stage game that follows the choice of markups. Section 2.3 then discusses equilibria of the
markup game played by producers. Section 2.4 looks at sensitivity of equilibrium outcomes
for individual producers, while Section 2.5 studies market efficiency with respect to mergers.
In Section 2.6, we compare our full model to a model that considers only direct competitors,
and discuss the benefit to a component producer of understanding its vertical competition.
We then close in Section 2.7 with a look at some future directions.
2.2 Model and Game Structure
We model a market for complementary goods by considering demand for a single good that
we will call a bundle. Customers face multiple options for purchasing a bundle, and while
each is equivalent in the eyes of the customer (they are considered perfect substitutes), they
may be the result of production from a number of separate producers, each selling some
portion of the good. We recognize that there need not be any single definitive way to divvy
up production of a bundle, and so our model is general enough to allow each purchase option
to be subdivided among any number of producers. Furthermore, each subdivision defines a
production niche that multiple producers may compete to fill. Finally, among the various
options for filling any particular niche, we consider that each may be further subdivided in
some fashion and split among more specialized producers.
In general, we look at markets that take a series-parallel (SP) structure. The class of SP
networks are exactly those that can be constructed recursively through link subdivisions in
series and in parallel. That is, through repeated application of the operations DivS(·) and
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DivP(·), pictured in Figure 2.1. DivS(a) subdivides a link a into two links, connected in
series, with a newly created node joining the head of a′ and tail of a′′. DivP(a) subdivides
a link a into two links, a′ and a′′, each connecting the same two nodes as the original link a.
Seeing as we do not limit the number or arrangement of subdivisions, SP networks provide
a great deal of generality.
Figure 2.1: Operations defining a series-parallel network.
We model the set of available purchase combinations as paths from the source s to the
sink t of an SP network, G, comprising a set of links AG = {1, . . . , n}. Each link a ∈ AG
represents a producer, and each path through G a bundle that customers may purchase.
Thus, denoting the set of available bundles by B := {B1 . . . Bm}, we say for producer
a ∈ AG, that a ∈ Bi if link a appears along path Bi in the network representation. In
this way, the network defines a mapping of producers to purchase bundles. Each customer
chooses a complete bundle, so that
∑m
i=1 fi = 1 where fi is the proportion of customers
choosing bundle Bi. Then, the proportion of demand produced by producer a, is equal
to xa =
∑
Bi3a fi. Because we interpret fi and xa as proportions, the total demand is
normalized to one. We assume that individual customers are small so that demand is
divisible among them, and each acts as a price taker. Although the discussion is for the
case of inelastic demand, most results extend to the elastic case (see Section 2.3.1.1).
Figure 2.2 illustrates this network formulation for a stylized model of competition in the
market for computers. The market contains five producers, and customers may choose a
CPU-monitor combination from separate producers or opt to purchase an integrated model
containing both. There is a single option for purchase of an integrated computer, but
customers can create any of four distinct bundles by choosing from among duopolists in
the markets for CPUs and monitors, respectively. In this case, in addition to the usual
horizontal competition, manufacturers of CPUs and monitors compete with each other
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vertically so as to determine the profit each gets from the bundle they jointly provide
1. Thus, manufacturers of CPUs and monitors face conflicting interests. While they both
benefit from the demand induced by low prices on their joint offering, each seeks to maximize
their own share of the profit. Note that the graphical ordering of component markets is
arbitrary, and not indicative of any temporal ordering. In fact, the game we consider is
static.
The per-unit production cost for each producer a ∈ AG is a function ua : R+ → R+
that depends on the production level xa. We assume that all producers make use of similar
‘technology’ but some are more efficient than others. This is modeled by a cost function of
the form ua(xa) := cau(xa) where the function u(xa) is an indication of the industry’s unit
cost for production level xa, and the parameter ca > 0 measures the efficiency of producer
a ∈ AG. We assume that per-unit costs are linear, i.e., u(x) = x (see Section 2.2.2.1).
More generally, the model may assume that u is increasing, differentiable, and bijective
(i.e., evaluates to zero at zero and grows to infinity). Furthermore, xu(x) is convex; in
other words, industries face increasing marginal production costs, which is the case, e.g.,
when labor or production capacity is scarce or when there is congestion. Putting all the
elements together, the total cost to producer a of producing xa units is κa(xa) := xaua(xa) =
caxau(xa), which is quadratic in this chapter, and convex in general.
We consider a two-stage game, where producers determine a pricing structure in the first
stage, and customers choose a bundle of producers to purchase from in the second stage.
In the first stage, producers commit to a price function pa(xa) specifying the per-unit price
to be charged at a specific level of production. Thus, both prices and production quantities
are determined in the second stage, where the market clears. We assume that the price of
a bundle is additive so that a customer purchasing bundle Bi pays a total of
∑
a∈Bi pa(xa).
Note that in the case of complementary items produced by the same producer, we would
model purchase of both items by a single link. Thus, we are assuming additive pricing
here only in the case of items purchased from competing producers. A critical feature of
1To allay confusion, we note the orientation of our diagrams, in which demand flows left to right, is
such that producers who compete ‘vertically’, by virtue of the complementary nature of their products, are
aligned horizontally on the page, and vice versa.
CHAPTER 2. PRICING WITH MARKUPS UNDER HOR. & VERT. COMPET. 20
Figure 2.2: Example of SP network structure applied to the market for computers. The market g1 for CPUs
is a submarket, as defined in Section 2.2.1. The network g2 is not a submarket.
this structure is that the price a customer pays for a unit of production from producer a
depends on the total quantity that producer a produces, which itself is dependent on the
consumption choices of all customers. This gives the second stage its interpretation as a
game between customers.
We simplify the first-stage game by restricting the set of price functions a firm may
choose. We consider only markups, in the sense that the producer a’s price function pa(xa) =
αaua(xa) for some positive factor αa ≥ 1 that is chosen by the producer. We interpret αa as
a markup, due to the fact that αa represents the ratio of price to production cost for producer
a2. Within this framework, the shape of all price functions is determined exogenously
through the cost structure, and producers compete by selecting a single parameter. This is
not as restrictive an assumption as it may seem. Even in the setting where producers may
choose any non-decreasing price-function, it can be shown that while there are in general
many equilibria for the game, at any equilibrium in price-functions it is a best response
to play a price function that is a markup of the producer’s cost function. This robustness
result was shown for a network of parallel links in Correa et al. (2008). In Appendix A.1,
we present an extension to the setting of SP networks. By exogenously setting the shape
of all price functions as we have, we allow each to be described completely by a single price
multiplier wa := caαa. The actual unit price for product a is then given by wau(xa).
We seek to analyze the assignment of demand to specific producers. An assignment
is described through either consumption decisions, using the vector ~f ∈ Rm+ , or through
2One could also consider additive markups to the cost. This would give rise to models related to the area
of congestion pricing. For background on this literature, see e.g., Lawphongpanich et al. (2006).
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production quantities, as represented by the vector ~x ∈ Rn+. The heterogeneity in our
problem is across producers only, and so we will be primarily concerned with the production
assignment ~x. Note that for a given assignment ~x, there may be multiple consumption
allocations that give rise to ~x. In particular, when we discuss uniqueness of an optimal
or equilibrium production assignment, this need not imply uniqueness of the consumption
assignment. We denote the set of possible production-consumption pairs by
F :=
{
(~x, ~f) ∈ R(n+m)+ :
m∑
i=1
fi = 1, xa =
∑
Bi3a
fi ∀a ∈ AG
}
.
We say that a production allocation ~x is feasible if there exists a consumption assignment
~f such that (~x, ~f) ∈ F .
2.2.1 Submarket Structure
We now define the concept of a submarket. It will be helpful to introduce the composition
operations S(·) and P (·), each of which takes as input a set G of SP networks, and returns
a single SP network. In the case of S(G), the input networks are composed in series with
the sink of one network doubling as the source node of the next. In the case of P (G), the
input networks are composed in parallel so that all share a common source and sink.
As our market connects the source and sink nodes of an SP network, so a submarket is
defined by a subnetwork connecting two nodes of G. Formally, a submarket g, composed
of producers Ag, is a connected subnetwork of G, with two terminal nodes, a source and
sink, chosen from among the nodes in G, and the property that for any non-terminal node
in g, all incident links are included in g as well. See Figure 2.2 for an example. The
submarket g is self-contained in that it defines a product offering such that the output
of any producer within g can be purchased only as part of that larger offering. The full
market G is a submarket, as is any individual producer a. The flow into the source node
of g represents the demand for the product this submarket produces. Were this quantity
fixed, then competition on g would fit the form of our general model. As it is, a submarket
strictly smaller than G faces an elastic demand, decreasing in the price of its offering. The
price-sensitivity of this demand is determined by the price functions chosen by producers
in AG \Ag.
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The SP structure of G dictates that submarkets are arranged in a nested fashion. Each
submarket g can be characterized as either a series submarket, indicating that g = S(G)
for some set G of submarkets, or a parallel submarket, composed as g = P (G). We can give
the set G of component markets comprising g an explicit name, denoting this set by ψ(g).
To avoid ambiguity, we require when g is a series submarket that all elements of ψ(g) be
parallel submarkets, and vice versa, so that ψ(g) represents the largest (by cardinality) set
of submarkets from which g can be formed in a single composition. In defining ψ(·), we
have implicitly defined a tree structure that captures all submarkets; see Figure 2.3 for an
example. Beginning with G as the root, ψ(·) determines a set of successors for each node.
Every submarket appears as a node in this tree representation, with each producer a ∈ AG
appearing as a leaf node. By convention, we will think of individual producers as series
(parallel) submarkets, when their predecessor is parallel (series). We can assume, without
loss of generality, that G is a parallel submarket, because markets in series, subject to a
fixed demand, have no interaction and can thus be considered independently.
We call this tree structure the submarket representation of G. It is clear from the
submarket representation that any properties possessed by a single-producer submarket,
and which are preserved by the operations S(·) and P (·), can be attributed to G. This
type of induction argument will be helpful in the remainder. Secondly, the submarket
representation provides a means of formalizing the position of a submarket. Each sub-
market is uniquely represented as the endpoint of a nested sequence of submarkets, be-
ginning with G. For submarkets g, g′ with Ag ⊆ Ag′ , let ψg(g′) be a restricted form
of the mapping ψ(·), returning only the component market of g′ that contains g. Then
ν(g) := (G,ψg(G), ψ2g(G), . . . , ψ
dg
g (G)) returns the path through the submarket tree to g.
Here dg is the depth of g in the submarket tree, and ψ
dg
g (G) is equal to g itself. The ele-
ments of ν(g) are increasingly specific descriptions of the submarket’s relative position. For
instance, using the model of Figure 2.2, if producer a is a CPU manufacturer, then ψa(G)
returns the market for CPU-monitor combinations, and ψ2a(G) is the market for CPUs,
labeled g1. The full submarket representation is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
For an arbitrary vector ~v ∈ Rn defined on the full set of producers, we use the notation
~vA for the vector restricted to some set A ⊆ AG. When g is an SP network representing





Figure 2.3: The submarket representation of the computer market in Figure 2.2.
some market, we abuse notation by referring directly to ~vg, with the understanding that
this vector contains values for producers in Ag. In this respect, for two markets g and g′,
we have g′ ⊆ g if Ag′ ⊆ Ag, and g \ g′ denotes the set of producers contained in Ag, but not
in Ag′ .
2.2.2 Optimal and Equilibrium Assignments
To quantify the quality of an assignment, we consider the total production cost C(~x) :=
∑
a∈A caxau(xa) as a social cost function. This function captures whether customers are
matched to the producers that are most efficient. Notice that payments are not considered
in this function because they are internal transfers. The socially optimal assignment, ~x =
xOPT, is the unique production assignment minimizing C(~x). In other words,
(xOPT, fOPT) := arg min
(~x, ~f)
{
C(~x) : (~x, ~f) ∈ F
}
. (2.1)
The production assignment is unique because u(·) is such that xau(xa) is strictly convex
for all a ∈ AG.
An equilibrium for producers is a vector of markups ~α that maximizes the profits of all
producers simultaneously, and an equilibrium for customers is an assignment ~f such that all
customers are buying at minimal price. These two games are played sequentially, making
it a Stackelberg game. It will be convenient to think of the producers as setting price
multipliers, leaving markups defined implicitly. So, in the markup game, producers first
choose ~w, followed by a second stage in which customers determine ~f(~w), and consequently
determine a production assignment, denoted ~x(~w). For a fixed ~w, producer a realizes profits
πa(~w) := (wa − ca)xa(~w)u(xa(~w)). (2.2)
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The equilibrium conditions imply that a tuple (~w, xNE) representing the two stages is at
equilibrium if and only if xNE = ~x(~w), and
wa ∈ Φa(~wa) := arg max
w≥0
{πa(w, ~w−a)} for all a ∈ AG (2.3)
where Φa(·) is the best response function of producer a to the price multipliers of all other
producers, denoted by ~w−a. Here, the second stage assignment (~x(~w), ~f(~w)) ∈ F is defined





for all Bi, Bj ∈ B such that fi(~w) > 0. The above inequality says that in any equilibrium
of the second-stage game, all bundles sell, if at all, at a single minimal price.
The uniqueness of equilibrium markups is established later on, but at this point it is clear
that ~x(~w) is unique for any ~w because the function u(·) is strictly increasing (Beckmann
et al. 1956). Notice that price distortions driven by producers with market power, as well
as potential negative externalities in the second stage, make it such that the markups ~w
may not give rise to the most efficient equilibrium assignment. Rather, it is likely that
C(xNE) > C(xOPT).
2.2.2.1 Linear Unit Cost Functions
Recall our assumption that total cost functions are quadratic. In this case, we have that
u(x) = x. Hence the total cost for producer a has the form κa(xa) = cax2a. From a
technical point of view, this assumption allows us to explicitly characterize the optimal
assignment and the unique assignment corresponding to a given vector of markups. Indeed,
in this situation C(~x) is a convex function and the absence of any fixed costs ensures that
all producers are active under both assignments. An immediate consequence is that the
inequalities in the conditions of (2.4) become tight, and so all bundles sell for the same
price. Furthermore, the restriction to linear unit costs is sufficient to ensure that customers
are efficient in the sense that for fixed ~w, ~x(~w) minimizes
∑
a∈AG xawau(xa). Thus, their
behavior in the game is consistent with that of a centralized buyer with the ability to split
consumption optimally among the bundles.
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Seeing as customers behave efficiently, any inefficiency in the assignment is the result
of distortion of the true cost functions due to producer markups. It follows that when
markups are not distortionary, the equilibrium assignment will match the socially optimal
assignment. (Proofs of all statements are provided in the appendix.)
Proposition 1. The unique socially optimal assignment xOPT is equal to ~x(~c).
Thus, the optimal assignment matches the second stage equilibrium that results when pro-
ducers charge their actual costs without markup. In the next section, we characterize the
second-stage equilibrium assignment for any fixed set of price functions, which will include
the optimal assignment as a special case.
2.2.3 Analysis of Second Stage
In this section we present a precise functional form of the second-stage assignment ~x(~w),
where ~w is a fixed vector of price multipliers. Its own markup aside, each firm’s production
increases with the markups of substitute products, while abating in response to those of
vertical competitors. The parametrization below encapsulates both of these effects, resulting
in an efficient characterization of the production assignment.
To start, we introduce the network price multiplier Rg(~wg), which generalizes wa to a
submarket g. When a demand of xg is assigned to g according to (2.4), the market price
for a bundle is Rg(~wg)xg. As ~w is fixed prior to the assignment game, we use the notation
Rg with the understanding that the multiplier reflects the combined effects of a set of price
functions selected by individual producers in the first-stage game. Since demand for market
G is normalized to one unit, RG is also the equilibrium price of a bundle under ~w.
For an individual producer, Ra is equal to wa. For a larger submarket g, Rg depends
ultimately on the proportions in which customers choose from among the bundles in g. A
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full characterization is obtained inductively by:3
RS(G) =
∑




which follows from (2.4) since customers allocate to parallel submarkets in inverse proportion
to their price multipliers.
The nested structure of our model allows us to characterize inductively the total demand
of a given producer. Let νP (a) = (G1, G2 . . . Gd) be the sequence of parallel submarkets
within which producer a is nested (these are the odd elements of ν(a), beginning with
G). Then, the proportion of customers that choose a submarket ψa(g) of g, out of those
customers that choose g, is given by the fraction Rg/Rψa(g). Multiplying, we get that the
demand for producer a is xa(~w) =
∏
g∈νP (a) Rg/Rψa(g). We say that a producer a spans the
market if link a connects s and t directly. In this case, all other bundles are substitutes for
a, and xa is increasing in the multipliers of all competitors. If, on the other hand, producer
a faces vertical competition, the residual demand for product a is shifted downwards as the
markups on complementary items increase. Both effects can occur for a competitor b 6= a,
and so the impact of wb on xa(~w) is not clear a priori.
2.2.3.1 Producer Best Response Function
The above expression of xa(~w) encodes producers’ demand, but is hard to manipulate
directly to understand how producers will set their markups. In this section, we provide an
alternative formula that is more amenable to analysis. In particular, we now express xa(~w)
in terms of aggregate measures of the horizontal and vertical competition faced by a. Our
approach is to redefine the market by pivoting G so that the nodes incident to a become the
source and sink. In this reformulation, denoted G¯a, a spans the market and all competition
with a is horizontal. To interpret, the market spanned by a is one in which all customers
come to market in possession of a bundle that is perfectly complementary to a. To complete
3Equation (2.5) matches that used for electrical circuits to compute the equivalent resistance when placing
resistors in series and parallel. Ohm’s law, Voltage = Current · Resistance, is analogous to the price function
pa = xaRa. Although the equations describing both systems are identical, the difference is that we impose
a nonnegativity restriction on flows, whereas in electricity networks this is not needed. It is precisely those
restrictions that complicate the analysis of a general network as we will discuss in Section 2.3.4.
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their bundle, customers may purchase from a or one of its direct competitors. In addition,
there is the option to ‘sell back’ the complementary items and purchase a new bundle. Any
such action can be represented as a path through G ¯ a. In the course of pivoting G, any
complementary links to a; i.e., those on a path from s to a or a to t, are reversed in direction
to reflect that these products are sold back to producers at the prevailing market price. Any
combination of sales/purchases that forms a path through the pivoted network will leave
the customer with a complete bundle, and is in effect a perfect substitute to a. Accordingly,
we call the network created by removing a from G¯ a, the substitute network for producer
a. The substitute network is denoted by G ª a, and its construction is demonstrated in
Figure 2.4. The example in (c) contains vertical competition and so requires pivoting.
(a) Producer a has a monopoly.
(b) Producer a faces only horizontal competition.
(c) Producer a competes horizontally and vertically. Links in g1 are
reversed to form Gª a.
Figure 2.4: The producer’s substitute network Gª a.
The uniqueness of the niche that producer a fills will determine the multitude of paths
in Gªa, and play a key role in determining market power. A measure of this is Rªa, defined
for Gª a according to (2.5). If producer a is a monopolist, then Gª a is empty, indicating
that customers have no choice but to purchase from a. Since there is no price at which a
substitute can be purchased, we say Rªa = ∞ in this case. In general, Rªa measures the
market power of producer a in equilibrium, with a higher multiplier indicating a relative
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absence of attractive alternatives to producer a. The multiplier Rªg is defined analogously
for any submarket g ⊆ G.
The effect of a producer’s markup on its own profit is captured through the ratio of
wa to Rªa. To isolate this effect, we express demand as the product of two factors. One
factor depends entirely on this ratio, and the other is a scaling factor, independent of
wa, that measures the demand for producer a when wa = 0. This factor, referred to by
µa(~w−a), captures the vertical, rather than horizontal, competition faced by a, and in doing
so accounts for the position of a in the market, prior to pivoting.
To simplify notation, we will generally suppress the dependency on the fixed vector ~w.
When a faces purely horizontal competition, µa = 1 for any value of ~w. In the case of
vertical competition, the factor will be strictly less than one, and decreasing in the markups
demanded for complements of a. In general, the factor µa may be increasing, decreasing, or
unaffected by wb, depending on whether b is largely a substitute or a complement of a. If
νS(a) = (G1, G2 . . . Gd) is the sequence of series submarkets within which a is nested (these







For example, in Figure 2.4c, νS(a) contains a single element, S(g1, P (a, b)), and µa =
Rg2/(Rg2 + Rg1). For a competitor b 6= a, there can be at most one level l such that
b ∈ Gl \ψa(Gl), indicating a dampening effect of wb on producer a’s demand, which results
because ψa(Gl) and ψb(Gl) are bundled. An analogous scaling factor, µg is defined for xg(~w)
on any submarket g ⊆ G.
To summarize, for a fixed vector ~w−a, the parameters µa and Rªa measure, respectively,
the vertical and horizontal competition facing producer a. In Proposition 2, we express
xa(~w) in terms of these two quantities and producer a’s own multiplier. In this formulation,
µa determines the intercept of producer a’s residual demand, and Rªa determines the slope
with respect to wa.
Proposition 2. For a market G with price functions fixed according to ~w, and for any
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Setting the derivative of the profit function with respect to wa to zero, we can charac-
terize the best response of any producer. The size of producer a’s markup in the first stage
will depend on its market power.
Proposition 3. In the markup game, the best response function for any producer a satisfies
Φa(~w−a) = 2ca + Rªa . (2.8)
In terms of Rªa, the per-unit price that producer a will charge in equilibrium is pa(xa) =
waxa = 2caxa + Rªaxa. Producer a’s costs are given by κ(xa) = cax2a, yielding a marginal
cost of ∂κ(xa)/∂xa = 2caxa. Thus, equilibrium prices can be interpreted intuitively to
consist of marginal costs of production, plus a markup of Rªaxa. Furthermore, using Rªa
as a measure of market power, the markup that can be extracted is directly related to the
level of competition faced. As the competition faced by producer a increases, Rªa will
decrease. In the extreme case when Rªa tends to zero, the price will approach the marginal
cost, in accordance with the interpretation as a competitive market. If Rªa becomes small
for all producers, then the markup vector approaches 2~c, so that the equilibrium assignment
approaches xOPT. That is, perfectly competitive markets are efficient.
To further quantify the efficiency of a market, we write the total production costs as a












From Proposition 1, we know that xOPT is precisely ~x(~c). Recalling that RG is the price of
any bundle, the optimal production cost is:
C(xOPT) =
∑
i:Bi∈B(RG|~w=~c)fi = RG|~w=~c . (2.10)




In general, it is not the case that C(~x(~w)) = RG, since some portion of these payments is
kept by the producers as profit. To study efficiency of an assignment ~x(~w), we compare the
cost C(~x(~w)) to C(xOPT). Ultimately, the degree of inefficiency will depend on ~α, which is
the outcome of the strategic choices taken by producers in the first-stage game.
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2.2.4 Example of Markup Equilibrium
To illustrate the concepts put forth in this section, a simple example of competition with
markups for a market of substitutes is discussed here.
Figure 2.5: Example of a market of substitutes.
The market in Figure 2.5 consists of three producers of perfect substitutes. Producers
2 and 3 face cost functions κa(xa) = 2x2a, while producer 1 is more efficient, with costs
κ1(x1) = x21. Producers choose markups ~α, leading to price functions p1(x1) = α1x1,
p2(x2) = 2α2x2, and p3(x3) = 2α3x3 with price multipliers w1 = α1 and wa = 2αa for
a ∈ {2, 3}. In this setting, Rªa = (
∑
b6=a 1/wb)
−1 for a ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Producers do not
compete vertically, so that µa = 1 for all a. The assignment for producer a is then xa =
(1/wa)(1/w1 + 1/w2 + 1/w3)−1. In equilibrium, markups satisfy the system:






1/α + 1/2α2 + 1/2α3
)2}
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1/α1 + 1/2α + 1/2α3
)2}
,






1/α1 + 1/2α2 + 1/2α
)2}
.
This system can be solved numerically, as is shown in the next section. Solving for the
equilibrium gives α1 = 5.56, while α2 = α3 = 3.56. All products sell at a price of 2.17.
This outcome is summarized in Table 2.1. We note that producer 1 takes advantage of its
Pr. 1 Pr. 2 Pr. 3 Market (G)
Efficiency (c) 1 2 2 .5
Markup (α) 5.56 3.56 3.56 4.34
Multiplier (R) 5.56 7.12 7.12 2.17
Market Share (x) .39 .305 .305 1
Cost (cx2) .152 .186 .186 .525
Table 2.1: Equilibrium outcome for the game in Figure 2.5
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relative efficiency by charging markups higher than those of its competitors. This makes
price functions, as experienced by consumers, more symmetric than the true cost functions.
Because of this distortion, less customers purchase from producer 1 in equilibrium than
would do so in a socially optimal assignment. The socially optimal assignment xOPT, which
solves min{x21+2x32+2x23 : x1+x2+x3 = 1 and ~x ≥ 0}, equals the vector (1/2, 1/4, 1/4) and
the optimal social cost is C(xOPT) = 1/2. In comparison, C(xNE) = .525 = (1.05)C(xOPT).
In this case, distortions driven by producer markups lead to a 5% increase in the total costs
of production.
2.3 Equilibrium of Markup Game
In this section, ~w refers to an equilibrium of the markup game. Each producer selects wa
to satisfy the best-response map Φa(~w−a) = 2ca + Rªa. A Nash equilibrium is a vector ~w
satisfying wa = Φa(~w−a) for all a ∈ AG. It is clear from (2.5) that Rªa(·) is a continuous
function, and so Φa(·) is continuous and single-valued. Combining the producers’ individual
best response functions yields a continuous vector-valued function Φ(~w) whose fixed points,
if any exist, correspond to equilibrium markups. If the image of Φ(·) over the domain
~w ∈ Rn+ is contained within X =
∏
a∈AG Xa with Xa ⊂ [2ca,∞), we can, without loss
of generality, define markup equilibria as fixed points of the function Φ̃ : X → X where
Φ̃a(~w) := Φa(~w−a). Making use of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, a sufficient condition
for existence of a fixed point of Φ̃(·) is compactness of X (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). If
producer markups are bounded so that wa ≤ w̄ < ∞ for all producers, then we define Xa by
the compact set [2ca, w̄], and apply the fixed point theorem. We proceed in this section by
deriving conditions which guarantee the existence of w̄. Essentially, an equilibrium requires
sufficient competitive pressure to prevent any producer from continually increasing the size
of their markup.
2.3.1 Local Markup Equilibria
If many options exist to produce some offering g, its markup, represented in the aggregate by
Rg, will be relatively insensitive to the markups of substitute bundles. Here we formalize the
CHAPTER 2. PRICING WITH MARKUPS UNDER HOR. & VERT. COMPET. 32
impact of a given submarket gF on competition in the remaining partial market Gª gF . It
follows from (2.8), and the recursion in (2.5), that the impact of producers in gF on the other
producers is determined entirely by the network price multiplier RgF . As ~w captures the
decisions of all producers in the first-stage game, we let ~wªgF |gF (RgF ) represent the decisions
of producers in G \ gF in a markup game played with RgF held fixed. As the dynamics
of competition within gF are ignored, we call this vector a local markup equilibrium. The
proofs in Section 2.3.2 hinge on the sensitivity of local markups to changes in RgF . We will
show that a sufficient level of redundancy in the structure of G limits this effect so that
markups cannot grow too large, and an equilibrium exists. In Section 2.6, we revisit local
markup equilibria in the context of a component producer who assumes constant markups
for all but its direct competitors.
For a submarket g ⊆ G ª gF , Rg|gF (~wg, RgF ) is defined analogously to Rg(~w) and
computed in the same inductive manner, with the distinction that gF is considered a
leaf of the submarket tree for the local market G ª gF . For producer a ∈ G \ gF , the
best-response function in the local market game becomes Φa|gF (~w{ªgF \a}|gF , RgF ) = 2ca +
Rªa|gF (~w{ªgF \a}|gF , RgF ). The first-stage decisions, ~wªgF |gF (RgF ), then satisfy:
wa = Φa|gF (~w{ªgF \a}|gF , RgF ) for all a ∈ G \ gF . (2.11)
Clearly, when RgF = RgF (~wgF ), the markups selected in the local markup equilibrium
match those of the full first-stage game. Furthermore, when RgF = ∞, so that the presence
of alternatives outside of Gª gF has no bearing on the market power of firms in the local
market, the equilibrium is precisely that resulting from a full game played on G ª gF . In
general, the distinction between the full game and that corresponding to some finite RgF
is that demand in the local game may be elastic, with a small parameter RgF indicating
the existence of attractive options outside of the market defined by Gª gF . Thus, as RgF
shrinks, competition in the local game becomes more intense, and this fact is reflected in
the equilibrium vector ~wªgF |gF (RgF ).
In general, the competitive pressure that a submarket gF exerts on any disjoint submar-
ket g through the choice of multiplier RgF is captured by a submarket response function,
φg|gF (RgF ) := Rg|gF (~wªgF |gF (RgF ), RgF ) , (2.12)
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whose value reflects the competitive interaction of producers in g, in the context of the
local game in which RgF is held fixed. (For completeness, we note that the same definition
may apply when gF ⊆ g, but φg|gF (·) is undefined when g and gF overlap partially). As
defined, φg|gF (RgF ) relies on the existence of a unique local equilibrium vector, which is
not guaranteed. Conditions for existence of both local and full market equilibria will be
developed in the following section.
For convenience, when gF is not specified, we will interpret φg(·) to depend on a fixed
multiplier Rªg. For the case of a single producer a, Φa(~w−a) = φa(Rªa) = 2ca + Rªa, so
that φg(·) generalizes the best response function Φa(·) while making the dependence on the
substitute network, Gªa, explicit in the definition. Accordingly, we can redefine a markup
equilibrium as a vector ~w such that wa = φa(Rªa) for all producers a ∈ AG.
2.3.1.1 Extension to Elastic Demand
The network multiplier RG is itself the result of a response function φG(·) whose argument
is set exogenously, and reflects the price multiplier of an option outside of the market.
To this point, by assuming that no alternatives to G exist, we have used implicitly that
RªG = ∞. By choosing RªG < ∞ we allow for an elastic demand. The price of an outside
alternative, g0, and by extension the willingness to pay for market G, can be defined by a
fixed multiplier RªG applied to the function u(1 − xG) where xG is the demand assigned
to market G. With linear unit costs, the demand takes the form pG = RªG(1 − xG), or
xG = 1− pG/RªG, yielding a model of linear demand and quadratic total costs.
2.3.2 Graph Connectivity and Existence of Equilibria
In this section, we explore the existence of an upper bound on ~w in markets with inelastic
and elastic demand, respectively. In both cases, we will see that the critical property in
establishing a bound is the degree of connectivity of the network structure. A set of links
whose removal disconnects the graph is a cut. A graph is k-edge-connected if there are
no cuts containing less than k links (Ahuja et al. 1993). For example, Figure 2.6 shows a
2-connected network. The intuition for studying connectivity was provided in Section 2.2.3,
where we noted that a producer’s market power is directly related to the uniqueness of
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Figure 2.6: A 2-connected network. Producers a and b make up a cut.
the producer’s niche, which is reflected in the number (and ultimately, price) of alternative
paths available for joining the nodes that the producer connects in G. The connectivity
of the graph indicates the smallest set of producers such that one must be used in any
path connecting some pair of nodes in the network. A high degree of connectivity should
translate to some bound on the market power of any individual producer. In this section
we formalize this idea.
For a submarket g, the connectivity Q(g) is the largest k for which g is k-edge-connected.
A directed cut is one that divides the graph so that the source and sink are disconnected. A
cut that does not separate the source and sink is a vertical cut in that the producers in the
cut belong to some common bundle and compete vertically. If Q(g) = k, then there can be
neither any directed cuts, nor any vertical cuts, that contain less than k links. As such, link
directions play no role in determining Q(g). Redefining connectivity in terms of vertical
cuts alone gives the vertical connectivity V (g). In general, composing g with producers in
parallel can increase Q(g), but V (g) provides an upper bound on the connectivity of any
market within which g is nested.
It is clear from the response functions that in the case of a duopoly, the combined
sensitivity of the producers leads to an infinitely increasing sequence of markups. This
applies as well to any network with Q(G) < 3. Although G is directed, instability can
result from both directed and vertical cuts. Essentially, stability requires that the substitute
network for any producer is 2-connected in its directed form. The cause of instability in
any case where Gª a is not 2-connected is similar to that of the duopoly case, where Gª a
consists of a single link for either producer. In the general case, it is producer a and the
producer that disconnects Gª a that combine to drive the instability.
We will show that when the graph is 3-connected, there is enough competition to ensure
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that markups are bounded. We begin with local markets for which some outside competition
exists.
Proposition 4. For Rªg finite, a local markup equilibrium ~wg|ªg(Rªg) exists if and only
if V (g) ≥ 3. In this case, ~wg|ªg(Rªg) is unique and φg(Rªg) is continuously differentiable.
The key to establishing existence in G is that producers are arranged into submarkets
in such a way that their sensitivity, in the aggregate, to competitors’ markups diminishes
with the size of those markups. When G is 3-edge-connected, we show, for any producer
a, that φ′ªa(wa) → 0 as wa gets large. At equilibrium, wa is a fixed point of the function
ha : ha(wa) → φa(φªa(wa)). That h′a(wa) diminishes for large markups is sufficient to
guarantee a finite fixed point, and so establish a finite bound on ~w.
Theorem 1. A markup equilibrium exists in G if and only if the network is 3-edge-
connected.
By bounding ~w, we restrict the image of Φ̃(~w) to a compact set, assuring the existence of
a markup equilibrium. We observe further that Φa(~w−a) is increasing in wb for all b 6= a. As
a result, any sequence {~w τ} with ~w τ = Φ̃(~w τ−1) will be increasing element-wise. Starting
at ~w 0 with w0a = 2ca for all a ∈ AG, we generate a sequence of markups that must converge
to a markup equilibrium. Applying iterated best responses, we are able to compute a
markup equilibrium in this way for any game that satisfies the 3-connectivity condition.
Corollary 1. If a markup equilibrium exists, it can be approximated by iterating best re-
sponses.
Remark 1. Monotonicity of the sequence {~w τ} results because markups of all produc-
ers are strategic complements. Indeed, in Proposition 17, in the appendix, we show that
log(πa(wa, ~w−a)), has increasing differences in (wa, ~w−a). When markups are bounded, the
markup game is log-supermodular. (In addition to complementarity, X is then compact
and in combination with the standard ordering defines a complete lattice.) This gives an
alternative proof of existence via Tarski’s fixed point theorem (Topkis 1998).
Furthermore, we show that the markup equilibrium that we compute is indeed the
only equilibrium of the first-stage game. At an equilibrium, ~w, we have φa(Rªa)/Rªa =
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wa/Rªa = wa/φªa(wa). In Theorem 2, we show that the first and last ratios in the equality
are monotonically decreasing and increasing in Rªa, respectively. This ensures that an
equilibrium can exist for at most one value of Rªa, and so for at most one value of wa.
Theorem 2. If a Nash equilibrium exists in the markup game, then it is unique.
When demand is elastic, a weaker existence condition is imposed on G. In particular,
directed cuts of size k < 3, as exist in monopoly or duopoly models, may be present without
introducing instability. Using the demand model of Section 2.3.1.1 and Proposition 4, it
is immediate that an equilibrium exists in an elastic demand market for which the vertical
connectivity is at least 3.
Theorem 3. If the market G is subject to an elastic demand of the form xG = 1−pG/RªG,
for finite RªG, a markup equilibrium exists if and only if V (G) ≥ 3. When it exists, this
equilibrium is unique.
The conditions of Theorem 3 imply the possibility that an equilibrium does not exist,
even in an elastic demand market. The presence of an outside option provides stability
when there is a shortage of purchase options, as with a monopoly or duopoly, by assigning
some value to not purchasing. If, on the other hand, there is a lack of competition vertically
within some bundle, instability will result and persist in the elastic case. Accordingly, the
existence of equilibria in an elastic demand market is tied to its vertical connectivity.
For both elastic and inelastic demand markets, V (G) must be at least 3 for an equi-
librium to exist. However, if there is some vertical instability, but the directed network
from s to t remains 3-connected, there may still be an equilibrium on some subnetwork
spanning the market (this holds trivially for an elastic demand market, because the price
never exceeds RªG). In the next section, we see that in such cases we can simply ignore
the paths with vertical instability.
2.3.3 Irrelevance of Inefficient Submarkets
When the competition in a market is insufficient, then producers will continually have an
incentive to increase markups, so that no equilibrium exists. Yet, because we allow for
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asymmetric market structures, it may happen that some producers face sufficient competi-
tion while others do not. Intuitively, if some subnetwork of producers, spanning the market
vertically, supports an equilibrium, while other producers raise their markups infinitely, we
expect that eventually all customers will abandon the unstable producers and adopt the
equilibrium assignment consistent with the stable set of production bundles.
This observation allows us to study some markets that are not 3-connected, but do have
a 3-connected substructure embedded within. That is, we consider a market G+ that is
an extension of a 3-connected market G. To ensure that G spans the market vertically,
we define an extension as the addition of competition in parallel to a submarket of G.
Formally, we form G+ by replacing some submarket g∗ of G with P (g∗, g+), where g+ is an
SP network.
First, we consider the case where G+ remains 3-connected, but costs for producers in
g+ are prohibitively large. We take a sequence, indexed by j, of extended networks with
costs on each link b in g+ given by a sequence cjb, and assume that c
j
b →∞ as j →∞. For
every j, an equilibrium is induced on G+, with an equilibrium price multiplier Rj
g+
for g+
in aggregate, and an equilibrium n-vector ~wj for producers in G. The point to observe here
is that because Rj
g+
must grow large with the costs on g+, the response functions on G+
converge to the original response functions as j →∞, ensuring that ~w, the equilibrium on
G, is recovered in the limit. Thus, g+ can be ignored when costs are large enough.
Theorem 4. Let ~w be the unique equilibrium of the markup game on G, and G+ be a
3-connected extension of G, with cjb →∞ simultaneously for all b ∈ G+ \G, when j →∞.
Then, the sequence (~wjG, ~w
j
G+\G) of extended equilibria converges to (~w,∞) as j →∞.
In Theorem 4, G+ is 3-connected, so each instance of the extended network is one that
we can analyze on its own. In contrast, we look next at the case where g+ introduces some
instability into the market through its competitive structure. We note that g+ need not
be 3-connected for G+ to be so. For instance, adding a single link to G cannot reduce the
connectivity. However, it may be the case that g+ is vertically unstable, in that removing
two producers from g+ disconnects g+ into three disconnected markets. In this case, no
extension formed from g+ will produce an equilibrium. The extended network is no longer 3-
connected, and when best-responses are iterated, it must be that ~wτG+\G →∞, where τ is the
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number of iterations applied. (Unlike in Theorem 4, costs in the extended network remain
constant throughout.) We will show that while the sequence {~wτG+\G}τ is unbounded,
~wτG → ~w, with the limit an equilibrium in G. In this way, we expand the set of networks
we may analyze to include all extensions of 3-connected networks.
Theorem 5. Let ~w be the unique equilibrium of the markup game on G. If G+ ª G is
vertically unstable, then multipliers on G converge to ~w when best responses are iterated on
G+.
The result supports the use of iterated best responses to analyze any market in which
there is an embedded 3-connected network spanning from source to sink. We have defined
an extension as the addition of a single submarket, but repeated application of Theorem 5
allows for more general structures.
2.3.4 General Network Structures
As the following example will demonstrate, Theorem 1 does not immediately generalize
to networks that are not Series-Parallel. Figure 2.7 presents a very simple network struc-
ture that is 3-edge-connected, but violates the restriction to SP structure. No markup
equilibrium exists for this network.
Critically, when the network is not SP, we cannot guarantee that all producers are
active in equilibrium. In Figure 2.7, producer 3 is offering a contribution to the bundle
that is evidently being offered by producers 1 and 4 as well. Here producer 1 is offering
the equivalent of products 2 and 3 in combination. Similarly, producer 4 is offering the
equivalent of products 3 and 5 in combination. If the markups and demand allocation are
such that the prices for products 1 and 4 are less than the prices of products 2 and 5,
respectively, then producer 3 is in effect excluded from the market. There is no markup
that producer 3 can choose for which customers will purchase product 3. When this is the
case, the price function for product 3 does not influence the second stage results, and as
such does not factor into the profits of other producers. Consequently, when producer 3 is
not active, we can eliminate it from the analysis entirely, with no affect on the equilibrium.
The remaining producers then constitute a series-parallel network that is not 3-connected.
There is no equilibrium in such a network, so producer 3 must be active in any equilibrium.
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Figure 2.7: A 3-connected network that is not series-parallel.
For producer 3 to be active, the price of the bundle B4 = {2, 3, 5}, must be equal to
that of B1 = {1, 5}, B2 = {2, 4}, and B3 = {6}. For a given set of multipliers ~w, the
consumption assignment ~f satisfies:
f1w1 + (f1 + f4)w5 = (f2 + f4)w2 + f2w4 =f3w6 = (f2 + f4)w2 + f4w3 + (f1 + f4)w5
f1 + f2+f3 + f4 = 1 .
(2.13)
Solving this system for ~f yields the consumption and production assignments for a second-
stage equilibrium. After constructing the profit functions for each producer, we find that
each producer’s optimal markup is again of the form, Φa(~w−a) = 2ca + Rªa, where Rªa is
the price of an equilibrium assignment in a substitute network.
Structurally, the network in Figure 2.8 is entirely symmetric, in the sense that G ª a
has the same structure for any choice of a. The graph of G ª 1 is pictured in Figure 2.8,
and the logic to follow will apply symmetrically to each producer’s markup. For a given set





f̂1w2 + f̂1w3 = f̂2w5 + f̂2w6 if f̂3 = 0
(f̂1 + f̂3)w2 + f̂3w4 + (f̂2 + f̂3)w5 if f̂3 > 0,
where f̂ is a consumption assignment satisfying f̂1 + f̂2 + f̂3 = 1. If f̂3 = 0, then Rª1 =
((w2 +w3)f̂1 +(w5 +w6)8̂f2)/2 ≥ min{w2, w3, w5, w6}. If f̂3 > 0, then Rª1 ≥ w2f̂1 +w4f̂3 +
w5f̂2 ≥ min{w2, w4, w5}. Employing the symmetric arguments, Φa(~w−a) > minb∈AG{wb}
for all a ∈ AG, which is a contradiction. It follows that there are no markup equilibria for
which producer 3 is active, and consequently, no markup equilibria in the market represented
by the 3-connected network, G.
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Figure 2.8: Substitute network for producer 1.
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Producer Outcomes
In this section, we study the effect of changes to market parameters and structure on the out-
comes experienced by a producer a in equilibrium. As observed in Section 2.2.3, competitor
markups can impact a through their effect on Rªa, which measures horizontal competition,
or through µa, which measures vertical competition. The impact of any perturbation is
understood as a combination of its effects on each of these terms. Here, we analyze these
effects for a perturbation of a producer’s own efficiency parameter, as well as for changes
in the structure of its competition. In the latter case, we distinguish between competitors
positioned vertically to a (whose markups decrease µa), and those positioned horizontally
(whose markups increase µa).
When its competitors become less efficient in their production, producer profits may
move in either direction, depending on the relative position of the producer to the altered
market. Among our findings, summarized in Table 2.2, are that:
(i) an increase in any producer’s cost of production increases the markups of all competi-
tors in equilibrium.
(ii) an increase in a producer’s own costs can increase that producer’s equilibrium profits.
(iii) an increase in the costs of production for complementary items decreases market share
for efficient producers, but their less efficient competitors may actually gain share.
At a high level, the relationships we observe depend on whether the producers in question
compete in a fashion that is ‘more horizontal’ or ‘more vertical’.
In general, the changes we consider take the form of a shift in the response function for
a single producer or some subnetwork of producers. By a shift, we mean that φg(Rªg) is
replaced by a function φ̂g(Rªg) such that (for an upwards shift) φ̂g(R) ≥ φg(R) for all R in
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the domain. For a single producer, a shift in φa(·) can result only from a change in ca, but for
a submarket g it can be the result of any number of structural or parametric changes within
g. For example, in Section 2.5 we show that a merger of horizontal competitors results in
an upshift, while a merger that increases vertical integration results in a downshift.
A first observation concerns the sensitivity of price multipliers. As price multipliers of
any producers are strategic complements, we are able to show that an upwards (downwards)
shift in φg(·) induces an increase (decrease) in the equilibrium multiplier Rg, and in the
equilibrium price multipliers of all competitors.
Lemma 1. For any submarkets g ⊆ G and g′ ⊆ G satisfying g ⊆ g′ or g′ ⊆ G ª g, an
upshift in φg(Rªg) leads to an increase in the equilibrium multipliers Rg and Rg′.
The conditions placed on g′ in Lemma 1 exclude only subproducts of g, as their behavior is
dependent on the nature of the structural change that causes the shift in φg(·). Furthermore,
while an upshift in φg(·) raises all competitors’ price multipliers, the effect is the greatest
for Rg. Corollary 3, in the appendix, implies that the ratio Rg/Rg′ increases with the
shift. In what follows now, we analyze the sensitivity of producer outcomes where vertical
competition, as measured by µa, also plays a prominent role.
2.4.1 Own cost perturbation
Consider an increase in ca, and the corresponding upshift that is brought about in φa(·).
In Lemma 1, we show that this drives up wb for all producers b. For b 6= a, this implies
an increase in αb. On the other hand, producer a’s own markup decreases. Among direct
competitors, this implies the intuitive result that more efficient producers apply larger
markups.
Proposition 5. For any producer a, αa decreases in equilibrium when ca is increased.
While the percentage markup decreases, the size of the absolute profit margin increases.
Increasing ca by ∆ makes wa increase by ∆a = 2∆+∆ªa, where ∆ªa is the resulting change
in Rªa. Since φªa(·) is unchanged, Rªa = φªa(wa) increases, so that ∆a > 2∆. So, for any
fixed production quantity x, the profit margin, (wa − ca)x, increases. On the other hand,
the market share, xa, will decrease following the upshift.
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Proposition 6. For any producer a, xa decreases in equilibrium when ca is increased.
This follows from repeated application of Corollary 3, which indicates that each subproduct
containing a applies a proportionally larger increase in its multiplier than do its competitors.
We are most concerned with the change in profits, πa = (wa − ca)x2a. As it turns out,
depending on the relative size of the effects on markups and market share, an increase in ca
can result in either an increase or decrease in profits (the numerical example in Table 2.4
illustrates both cases). This in itself is an intriguing phenomenon, as it suggests that it may
in some cases be to a producer’s advantage to be less efficient. We note that this effect is not
unique to models with vertical competition. The critical observation is that for sufficiently
inelastic demand, the overall level of profits may be higher in a market where the aggregate
cost is larger. Decreasing efficiency weakens a producer’s competitive position, but may
also increase the overall profits, and this increase may dominate the individual effects. The
same effect can occur in a Cournot model, although the cost shock must affect at least 3
producers (Février and Linnemer 2004). In fact, the presence of vertical competitors makes
a profit decrease more likely. As ca increases, the corresponding increase in markups from
producers of complementary items contributes to the decrease in producer a’s market share.
Although we observe that profits can shift in either direction, we now show that, re-
gardless of the structure of vertical competition, the price pa can only increase with ca.
Proposition 7. For any producer a, pa increases in equilibrium when ca is increased.
Two responses, the reduction of producer a’s markup and the reallocation of demand to
competing producers, both serve to dampen the effect of a cost perturbation. However,
some portion of the cost increase is ultimately reflected in the new equilibrium price.
2.4.2 Competitor perturbation
Also of interest is the impact of the producer’s position in relation to a competitor who
may alter its efficiency. Here, the impact on profits will depend on the extent to which
the producer competes horizontally or vertically with the perturbed producer. There is
an aspect of horizontal competition to each producer relationship, with the exact nature
captured by the substitute network. (The exception is the case in which two full markets
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compete serially for a fixed demand, so that producers in one market have no effect on
demand for producers in the other). Any increase in a competitor’s cost structure will
deintensify horizontal competition in the sense that Rªa increases. This increases wa − ca
as a result, and because φ′a(Rªa) < wa/Rªa (see Corollary 3), xa/µa increases with any
competitor’s upshift. The result is that πa/µ2a increases.
In general, πa can move in either direction, with the determining factor being the direc-
tion of the change in µa and its size in relation to horizontal effects. With the exception of
a producer who spans the market vertically, all producers have some vertical aspect to their
relation with competitors. Although, the effect on µa can be positive or negative. For more
insight, we specialize to a producer a at depth 3 in the submarket tree. The general market
of this type is illustrated in Figure 2.9. The producer faces some local parallel competition,
depicted as GL. In addition, the competition outside of the localized market is divided into
vertical and horizontal competition (depicted by the submarkets GV and GH , respectively).
We allow generality in that GL, GV , and GH can be arbitrary submarkets, but limit the
depth of a to 3 for simplicity.
Figure 2.9: General representation of horizontal and vertical competition for a producer at depth 3.
An upshift in φGH (·), positioned horizontally to producer a, leads to an increase in RGH
that is proportionally larger than the increase in RGV . This implies and increase in µa, and
thus in πa.
Proposition 8. Using the notation of Figure 2.9, any upshift in φGH (·) increases the
equilibrium market share xa, prices pa, and profits πa for producer a.
Similarly, an upshift in φGV (·), positioned vertically to producer a, leads to a decrease in
µa. Here, the conclusions in terms of market share and profits for producer a are not clear
a priori, and will depend on the structure of the individual submarkets. For instance, an
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efficient producer will lose market share when the cost of complementary items increases (see
Proposition 18, in the appendix). However, we observe that the most inefficient producers
of a component may stand to gain market share, as this deintensifies local competition.
Furthermore, in a market for small-enough components, all producers lose market share
when the cost of complements increases, as the vertical effects tend to dominate.
submarket cost c price mult. w markup α demand x price p profit π
a ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ l
GV - ↑ ↑ l l l
GH - ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Table 2.2: Sensitivity analysis of model’s outputs for a cost increase in a submarket. The rows refer to a
perturbation of ca, and for producers in the vertical and horizontal markets, respectively. Arrows point to
the possible directions of change of each of the model’s outputs for producer a.
Table 2.2 summarizes this section’s sensitivity analysis by pointing out the direction of
change of each output of the model for producer a. Each row, a, GV , or GH , indicates
the location of the perturbation. To interpret, the last entry for GV indicates that, e.g.,
a CPU manufacturer may gain or lose profits from additional inefficiencies in the market
for monitors, and that both outcomes are seen to occur under specific conditions. The
last row shows that a cost increase for a producer of integrated computers allows a CPU
manufacturer, modeled by a, to increase markups while gaining demand, and so increase its
prices and profits. In the case of a producer’s own price, this quantity moves in the same
direction as the cost perturbation, although market share, and in some cases profits, move
in the opposite direction. Note that the directional changes for perturbations within GV or
GH apply for any type of upshift.
2.5 Effect of Mergers on Market Outcomes
Here we will focus on the effect of changes to network structure that leave the overall
production capacity fixed. Thus, we see how network structure dictates the intensity of
competition, as measured by the effect on total producer profits and the social cost of
production. We start in Section 2.5.1 by looking at the overall markup applied to a bundle.
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Recalling Lemma 1, structural changes that either intensify or relax competition locally
within a particular submarket have the corresponding effect on the overall bundle price,
and so we analyze these local effects. In Section 2.5.2, we observe that the connection
between local and global effects does not extend to the social cost criterion. In this case,
the full market structure should be considered to assess the impact of a structural change.
For this analysis, recall that RG is the market price in equilibrium for a given network,
and C(xOPT) = RG|~w=~c is the cost of satisfying demand in a socially optimal manner. A
comparison of these terms gives a measure of the extent to which bundles have been marked
up. In particular, RG/(RG|~w=~c) measures the ‘average’ markup, and RG−RG|~w=~c is equal to
the total producer profit. In terms of social cost, C(xNE) evaluates an equilibrium markup
vector ~w, and the ratio C(xNE)/(RG|~w=~c) determines the inefficiency of that vector. As
such, we are particularly interested in ‘mergers’; i.e., changes to the market structure for
which RG|~w=~c remains constant. In this case, the effects on profits and efficiency can be
observed through RG and C(xNE) alone.
We define a merger as a change in the network structure where multiple links are
combined in a way that preserves the aggregate cost structure. The cost of the new link
should match the cost of using the subnetwork that it replaces, assuming that flow is
allocated optimally within the original subnetwork. We denote the optimally aggregated
cost of a submarket g by cg. The procedures for aggregating costs optimally are identical
to those for aggregating price multipliers:
cS(G) =
∑




In this setting, any changes in market outcomes result entirely from changes in the way the
producers interact.
2.5.1 Industry Markups
Lemma 1 illustrates a consistency between the local competitiveness of subproducts and the
markups of the market as a whole. A change in network structure that causes an upshift
in a local response function will increase RG as well. In the case of a merger, this implies
an increase in the overall industry markups. In this section, we highlight the local effect of
both horizontal mergers and vertical integration.
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2.5.1.1 Horizontal Mergers
We first look at horizontal mergers, where two parallel links, a1 and a2 are combined to
form aP . We denote the cost of the merged producer by c. Letting θ = ca2/(ca1 + ca2), we
have ca1 = c/θ and ca2 = c/(1 − θ). Any horizontal merger can be described in this way
for some θ ∈ (0, 1). We show that any such merger results in an upwards shifted response
function, φaP (·) relative to the aggregated response function φgP (·), where gP = P (a1, a2).
This is consistent with intuition since a merger reduces the competition in the market.
Theorem 6. Horizontal mergers increase the equilibrium price of a bundle.
With respect to any fixed RªgP , the two producers prior to merging behave equivalently
to the elastic duopoly studied in Akgün (2004). There, the equilibrium for the duopoly is




increase as θ gets further from 1/2. In a series-parallel setting, we can apply Lemma 1 to
extend this parametric relationship to the market price RG (equations (A.4) and (A.5) in the
appendix show that the result for φ′gP (RªgP ) can also be extended to larger submarkets).
We conclude that not only does any horizontal merger increase the equilibrium price, but
the size of the price increase is increasing in the symmetry of the merging firms. That is,
for two parallel links with a given aggregate cost, c, the configuration leading to the lowest
prices (equivalently, the largest upshift in φgP upon merging) is that of c1 = c2 = 2c. Prices
increase as the distribution becomes less symmetric, with the highest prices coming from
complete asymmetry in which one link is eliminated altogether.
2.5.1.2 Vertical Integration
We complete our discussion of mergers with the case of mergers involving vertical competi-
tors. Two producers in series is an unstable configuration, so we will not analyze mergers
originating from this structure. Rather, we look at the case of a single producer in series
with a set of producers who compete with each other horizontally because it is the simplest
configuration with vertical competition. We consider the effect of consolidating all of these
producers to a single one. We interpret this as a scenario where the production being offered
by the parallel competitors is carried out in-house by the producer occupying a single link.
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In this way we study the effect of vertical integration.
Let c be the cost of the integrated producer aS . We consider parallel producers a1 and a2,
comprising a submarket gP . The submarket gP is connected in series with a third producer
aV to form gS = S(aV , gP ). We require cgS = c, and in particular, for θP , θV ∈ (0, 1), let
ca1 = (1− θV )c/θP , ca2 = (1− θV )c/(1− θP ), and caV = θV c. For any choice of θP and
θV , φaS (·) is a downward shift of φgS (·), so that vertical integration results in a lower price
than the subcontracting setup.
Theorem 7. Vertical integration decreases the equilibrium price of a bundle. The size of
the effect is decreasing in θV .
The theorem establishes that the markup of an integrated producer aS provides a lower
bound on φgS (RªgS ). In the limit as θV nears 1, the behavior of gS resembles that of
the integrated producer. The response function then shifts up monotonically as θV is
decreased. Looking at the competitive portion of the network, gP , the competition among
these producers is most intense when this local market is relatively small. As gP grows larger
relative to it substitutes, the sensitivity φ′gP (RªgP |ªgS ) to competitor markups, notably
those of the monopolist aV , increases, so that the dynamic of competition within gS begins
to resemble more closely that of serial monopolies. The implication is then that vertical
integration produces the largest decrease in bundle price when the local monopolist, aV ,
incurs a small portion of the production costs in market gS . Thus, a lack of competition in,
e.g., the market for keyboards, can drive large markups on the price of computers. Though
less extreme, the notebook PC example of Dedrick et al. (2010) has Intel’s production
costs at a relatively small (roughly 16%) proportion of the total. In the absence of direct
competition from AMD, we expect Intel’s strength to have a large effect on PC prices.
2.5.2 Social Cost of Production
In contrast to industry markups, the social cost of production may decrease following a
horizontal merger that consolidates market power locally. Relative to total profit, social cost
depends on the symmetry, rather than the size of markups. So, when a bundle consisting of
product g is inherently more expensive to produce than substitute bundles, likely leading
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to high markups on those substitutes, what is perceived locally as an inefficiency in the
market for g may be a force that drives markups on g closer to those on substitutes, in
effect reducing the degree of distortion in the overall market. We proceed with an example
to demonstrate this possible effect.
Figure 2.10: Total production cost in this market is smaller when producers 3 and 4 are merged.
Consider the market G in Figure 2.10, with submarket g. The market for product g is a
duopoly, and for a fixed multiplier Rªg, the two producers face an elastic combined demand.
Considering this market for g alone, the most efficient configuration would appear to be the
symmetric one (indeed, this is shown for an elastic duopoly model in Akgün (2004)). For
comparison, we consider the efficiency that results in G when producers 3 and 4 are merged
into a single producer with efficiency parameter cg = [1/c3 + 1/c4]−1, so that the aggregate
cost structure is maintained.
When costs in g are symmetric, c3 = c4 = 9. In this case, the optimal allocation has
83.3% of customers purchasing from producers 5 and 6. The average cost of a bundle under
the optimum is 0.83. The equilibrium allocation is presented in Table 2.3. Producers 5 and
6, each being more efficient than the other purchase combinations, apply relatively large
markups of α5 = α6 = 5.1 to their products. In comparison, the price of a combination
purchase from the other producers is only 3.1 times larger than the cost of 10. This distortion
encourages a larger proportion of costly combination purchases, and the average cost of a
bundle in equilibrium is 0.87.
In another scenario, producers 3 and 4 are merged into a single producer with parameter
cg = 4.5. Studying g in isolation would suggest that this arrangement is inefficient. Yet, the
merged producer applies a larger markup, that raises the price of a combination purchase to
4.9 times the cost. This shifts some demand back to producers 5 and 6, so that the average
cost of a bundle falls to 0.84, despite the market power of the merged producer. Although
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Social
Optimum
Pr. 1 Pr. 2 g Pr. 5 Pr. 6 Market
(G)
Efficiency (c) 1 1 4.5 2 2 .833
Market Share (x) .083 .083 .167 .417 .417 1
Cost (cx2) .007 .007 .126 .347 .347 .833
Symmetric
Producers
Pr. 1 Pr. 2 Pr. 3 Pr. 4 Pr. 5 Pr. 6 Market
(G)
Efficiency (c) 1 1 9 9 2 2 .833
Markup (α) 6.96 6.96 2.70 2.70 5.08 5.08 4.60
Market Share (x) .123 .123 .123 .123 .377 .377 1
Cost (cx2) .015 .015 .135 .135 .285 .285 .870
Merged
Producer
Pr. 1 Pr. 2 g Pr. 5 Pr. 6 Market
(G)
Efficiency (c) 1 1 4.5 2 2 .833
Markup (α) 8.12 8.12 4.21 5.90 5.90 5.64
Market Share (x) .102 .102 .204 .398 .398 1
Cost (cx2) .010 .010 .187 .317 .317 .842
Table 2.3: Social cost comparison for symmetric and asymmetric costs in g.
the difference in social cost between these two scenarios is rather small, the direction of
change is surprising as it goes contrary to what a local model of market g suggests. Social
cost is discussed further in Appendix A.2, where we bound the inefficiency of equilibrium
production costs in comparison to the optimal allocation of production.
2.6 Effect of Ignoring Vertical Competition
We have directed particular attention towards insights gained from the vertical component of
our model. To that end, this section is concerned with model misspecification. We show how
misconceptions may form if a substantial vertical aspect is ignored. For instance, consider a
CPU manufacturer evaluating a decision to invest in more efficient capacity. This investment
will likely trigger smaller markups from producers of other components (i.e. monitors, per
the model of Figure 2.2) and integrated computer models. If the producer restricts analysis
to the CPU market, using a localized model (as described in Section 2.3.1), then these
markups are implicitly assumed to remain at their pre-investment levels, neglecting the
competitors’ responses.
Formalizing this concept, for a producer a competing in a parallel submarket g of G,
that is g = P (G) with a ∈ G, an alternative to a full model of G would be to estimate the
parameters µg and Rªg, or equivalently to estimate the demand function for the submarket
g, and treat g as a market of exclusively horizontal competition, subject to an elastic
demand. This approach may be reasonable, and is in line with the way in which producers
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choose their markups in our model (actually we assume an even more restricted viewpoint
in which Rªa is held fixed to generate a residual demand). However, a localized approach
of this type can yield misleading results with regard to the sensitivity of producer profits
to model primitives.
Consider a perturbation of producer a’s own efficiency parameter by ∆, as described
in Section 2.4.1. By altering φ′GV (·) and φ′GH (·) we demonstrate estimation errors in both
directions arising from a localized view (the localized model treats both of these sensitivities
as zero). Figure 2.11 provides two examples; a horizontally sensitive market in (a) and a
vertically sensitive market in (b). In both, we fix cGH = cGV = 2. However, in (a), GH
contains a single link, while GV is a symmetric pair (note that a single link is more sensitive
than any parallel pair), and in (b) we model the reverse. Table 2.4 summarizes the original
equilibrium in each market, as well as the equilibrium when ca is increased by ∆ = 1. Lastly,
we look at a localized model, where RªGL+ remains fixed to RGV + RGH as computed with
the original costs, and summarize the equilibrium in this localized model when costs are
perturbed.
We observe that the profits estimated by the localized model are too high in the vertically
sensitive market and too low in the horizontally sensitive market. Furthermore the example
in (a) demonstrates that even the direction of the change in profits may differ between the
two models. These flaws are problematic for a producer evaluating a decision to invest in
more efficient technology (i.e. decreasing the efficiency parameter). As such, they provide
producers with motivation to explicitly model their vertical competition.
(a) A horizontally sensitive market. (b) A vertically sensitive market.
Figure 2.11: A localized model underestimates profits in (a) and overestimates profits in (b).





ca wa Rªa RV RH µa xa πa
2 13.1 9.1 9.6 20.1 .678 .278 .854
3 16.0 10.0 9.9 21.5 .685 .263 .898
3 15.6 9.6 – – .678 .258 .842
Market (b)
ca wa Rªa RV RH µa xa πa
2 13.1 9.1 20.1 9.6 .322 .132 .193
3 16.0 10.0 21.5 9.9 .315 .121 .190
3 15.6 9.6 — — .322 .123 .191
Table 2.4: Summary of perturbed equilibria.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a model of competition for producers of substitutes and complements,
within the context of the supply function equilibrium paradigm. By restricting to quadratic
cost functions, we provide a precise description of producer markups, characterized by a
network representation of substitute purchase options for each producer. This intuitive
form helps to highlight the relationships between market structure, equilibrium prices, and
the cost of production.
An important element of our analysis is the assumption of quadratic cost functions;
i.e. increasing marginal costs. For alternate cost functions in which economies of scale
are present, we expect results to differ qualitatively. In particular, all customers in the
lower-level game choose the same, cheapest path. Certainly our conclusions in this case
may differ. In particular, insofar as complementary markets are concerned, only those pairs
of firms that are both part of the favored path would exhibit sensitivity to small-scale
perturbations of each other’s efficiency. Thus, the overall competitive balance of producers
in complementary markers will be far less important than the cost structure of that market’s
most efficient producer. As the convexity of our cost functions arises from the inflexibility
of capacity in the time scales we consider, the alternative view may be a more appropriate
for time scales during which capacity can be easily adjusted.
A number of interesting extensions to our work remain. We have so far focused on time
scales where market structure is considered exogenously, and developed a means to analyze
the resulting outcomes. This characterization can be used to evaluate a number of long-term
decisions that are outside of the current scope. If strategic selection of network structure is
allowed on the part of producers, the model provides a context to study competitive alliances
and the effects of bundling complementary items. These decisions amount to restrictions
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on the set of links that may connect to certain nodes. In the context of assembly supply
chains, network design may be carried out centrally by the assembler, with the objective
of minimizing the bundle price. We provide insight to these strategic sourcing decisions by
modeling the result of competition between the chosen suppliers.
Some technical conditions may be relaxed to provide a closer fit to a greater number of
applications. Our analysis of the second-stage assignment will extend in a similar manner to
monomial per-unit cost functions of the form, ua(x) = caxq, and an analogous decomposition
of horizontal and vertical effects follows. However, for q 6= 1, best response functions are not
obtained in closed form, but implicitly through a polynomial equation. When an equilibrium
exists, markups can be computed iteratively. For q < 1, response functions are less sensitive
then those studied here, and 3-connectedness remains a sufficient condition for existence.
A stronger condition is needed for q > 1. For a market of substitutes, Correa et al. (2008)
show existence if and only if more than q+1 producers compete.
Also of interest is the case where production bundles are imperfect substitutes. Among
other phenomena, this will allow for inherent preferences among customers for either inte-
grated or self-assembled product offerings. Heterogeneity of preferences, or an oligopsony
setting, in which customers vary in their market power, are other possible directions. For
the second-stage game on its own, oligopsonistic outcomes have been considered in, e.g.,
Cominetti et al. (2009). We hope to enable future work on the dynamics of producer
competition in the presence of these and other market considerations.
Lastly, it is important to follow this study with empirical work that can verify both the
assumption of markup equilibrium behavior and the qualitative insights we have derived as
a result.
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Chapter 3
Facility Network Design with
Equilibrium Outcomes
3.1 Introduction
This chapter will contribute to the literature on facility network design by considering the
role of competition in the evaluation of capacity investment decisions. As firms have turned
to global supply networks to satisfy multiple regional demands, strategic decisions concern-
ing the location and centralization of production must be made to balance a number of
important factors: differentials in the cost of labor and inputs, proximity to key markets,
and uncertainty in economic and regulatory conditions all play a critical role. Furthermore,
responsive pricing and transhipment of products have enhanced the economic linkages be-
tween regional markets, making them increasingly difficult to analyze in isolation.
We are motivated by problems of network design in capacity-intensive industries, such
as chemical processing, technology and auto industries. In such industries, capacity invest-
ment represents a large portion of costs, and the economics dictate that resources, once
brought online, must be used at a high rate. Such industries are especially vulnerable to
market uncertainties, and over-investment in capacity can spur intense competition, with
the subsequent drop in prices making up-front investments difficult to recoup. Such price
depressions have famously been observed in the paper, hard-drive, and auto industries,
among others.
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Globalization offers one measure of protection against such uncertainties by facilitating
the pooling of production capacity for use in serving multiple markets, and thus reducing
the associated risks. Dong et al. (2010) cite the example of the chemical manufacturer So-
lutia, who, after making investments for its U.S. and European markets, uses transhipment
between the two markets to balance out its mismatched demand. If the cost of transhipment
is not too dear, then this flexibility will reduce risks and further enable the centralization
of production to where it can be done most profitably.
While there has been much focus on flexibility in the design of supply networks (see
Kouvelis and Su (2005) for an overview of various design frameworks), it remains to incor-
porate the effect of such flexible production strategies on global market conditions. When
one considers that optimal plant locations and capacity investment decisions are linked di-
rectly to the relative profitability of regional markets, such analysis becomes crucial. There
are two important dependencies here to address:
(i) A firm’s own investments in production and distribution capacity can alter the equi-
librium prices in the markets that it serves.
(ii) The ability to redistribute resources between markets introduces supply-side links that
affect the prevailing prices and elasticities in regional markets.
Despite these considerations, it is common practice in the literature on facility network
design to either assume a deterministic set of market demands and aim exclusively at
minimizing costs, or assumes a fixed price in each market while addressing the producer’s
ability to respond to uncertainty in relative market sizes.
Our study asks the question of how the nature of competition in global supply chains
impacts decisions of facility location and production centralization. We study a stylized
example with a foreign (offshore) and domestic (onshore) market, that allows firms to
choose both their production location and the extent to which supply for the two markets is
integrated. As with monopolistic firms, transportation costs and differentials in production
costs and market size will play a critical role. However, our framework allows us to consider
additional factors relating to the relative competitive response across markets. We find that
the optimal network configuration is influenced by the overall size of competitors, location
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of competitors’ production facilities relative to the foreign and domestic markets, and the
extent to which competing supply can be flexibly allocated to the two markets.
Our analysis takes advantage of a separation in profits attached to the overall level of
worldwide production, and those driven by the firm’s ability to target profitable markets.
The former drives investment in lower-cost production and distribution, while the latter
drives an emphasis strategic positioning in each of the markets.
In general, the impact of competition comes both from cuts to the overall quantity that
a firm can profitably produce and through a challenge to the firm’s of control of it’s desired
markets. We find that the presence of large competitors should shift the firm’s focus from a
cost-centric view, to one that produces the most favorable allocation of production between
markets. On the other hand, competition makes it more difficult for the firm to achieve
its ideal allocation of resources. The tension between these effects means that competition
may affect firms differently. A larger firm may choose to offshore, thus reducing overall
production costs, while a smaller competitor may opt to locate near the onshore market,
accepting some additional production costs in exchange for a larger revenue per unit.
Since competition makes for a less profitable allocation of pooled resources, firms may
respond with a less flexible strategy, placing capacity in both markets that is dedicated
entirely to local product lines. There is a strategic advantage to this approach, and as a
result, competition will indeed discourage flexibility in many cases. There are however,
exceptions where the impact of a competing firm is enough to push for centralization in
a less competitive market. Furthermore, if competing firms choose the same location, the
similarity in their cost structures will make the markets appear more symmetric, eliminating
incentives to heavily target either market. In this case, the value of a flexible design as a tool
in responding to uncertainty is likely to outweigh any strategic advantages to dedicating
capacity. These tradeoffs are explored in Section 5, and further demonstrated by numerical
analysis in Section 6.
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3.2 Literature Review
Our model of capacity investment is intended to integrate three heretofore loosely related
areas of study: facility network design, production flexibility, and multi-market oligopoly.
We categorize the existing literature on the basis of its approach to these three topics.
Along with some seminal works in each category, we cite several studies that succeed in
contributing across two of the three areas. In each case, we discuss the way in which a fully
integrated approach can provide additional insights.
3.2.1 Facility Network Design
The rise of global supply chains has brought academic attention to various aspects of facility
network design. As practical interests have evolved from a strictly cost-driven focus on
offshoring to encompass integrated global logistics networks, the literature has similarly
expanded its focus.
A popular framework proposed by Ferdows (1997), categorizes a firm’s foreign facto-
ries by their strategic roles, and describes the way in which these roles may evolve as new
competencies are developed within the plant and the organization as a whole. A foreign
factories’s value may be derived from low-cost production, as well as proximity to markets
and access to technical expertise. While the discussion is centered on individual facto-
ries, some network-wide properties - logistics costs and protection against regulation and
exchange-rate uncertainty - factor into the analysis. A more recent framework, proposed by
Kouvelis and Munson (2004), takes a process-oriented view of the network design, reflective
of the tightly integrated structures that have come to define global supply chains. The
manufacturing process is divided into sub-assemblies, which may each be distributed across
multiple geographies.
The integrated view of global supply chains, as a single facility network whose design
can be optimized, lends itself naturally to analytical and computational investigation. A
seminal work in the application of mathematical programming to facility network problems
is the model of Cohen and Lee (1989). The authors optimize material flows through sourc-
ing, production, and distribution across geographies. A mixed-integer linear programming
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approach models both the choice of facilities to open, and selection of optimal processing
rates. The model of Kouvelis et al. (2010) extends previous mathematical programming
approaches to capture some of the key drivers of location decisions, in the form of regional
trade agreements, subsidized financing, and tax incentives from governments eager to spur
investment.
We will suggest computational techniques for approaching larger scale competitive mod-
els, but the focus in this article is on strategic insight extracted from a stylized example of a
global network. In this respect, our work is closest to that of Lu and Van Mieghem (2009),
Dong et al. (2010), and Allon and Van Mieghem (2010). Lu and Van Mieghem (2009) study
the role of uncertainty in offshoring decisions. Capacity investments are made prior to the
realization of uncertainty market sizes. The authors find that, in contrast to a deterministic
setting, it may be optimal to centralize production in the more costly onshore market to
minimize the costs of ex-post transshipment. We employ a network structure similar to that
used there, although prices in their paper are exogenous and fixed. Dong et al. (2010) study
a capacity investment model with ex-post transhipment, while incorporating price-sensitive
demand and the ability also to adjust prices after observing market uncertainty. Responsive
pricing is found to limit sensitivity to asymmetries in cost and market size. Allon and Van
Mieghem (2010) use a queuing analysis to asses the benefit of responsiveness that comes
from incorporating a near-shoring capability into an offshore production strategy.
Each of the papers in this last group is important for infusing notions of production
flexibility into the network design problem. We build on this literature by modeling the
additional element of competition, but remain within the context of the flexible network
design problem.
3.2.2 Production Flexibility
Beyond those papers dealing explicitly with facility location, there is a broader literature on
production flexibility, with which we share some common themes. The early literature de-
veloped in the 1980’s with the advent of computer-controlled flexible and manufacturer sys-
tems, and moreover, an admission at the time that American manufacturers were struggling
to compete with their more nimble Japanese counterparts. The survey by Gerwin (1993)
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chronicles the thinking of the time, which emphasized flexibility as a strategic weapon,
allowing one to enter, or threaten to enter, new markets quickly.
Fine and Freund (1990) developed a two-stage model in which a monopolist chooses
investment levels in n dedicated technologies, and one fully flexible technology, prior to
learning their true revenue function. The flexible technology is beneficial in handling the
variability, but this benefit is balanced against additional costs. Another approach, adopted
by Fine and Pappu (1990) and Roller and Tombak (1990) was to justify flexibility not
through variability, but purely as a competitive weapon. Here, the value is found to be
more dubious. Fine and Pappu presented the investment decision as a prisoner’s dilemma,
highlighting cases where neither competitor uses its flexible technology, but both are com-
pelled to invest in flexibility as a deterrent. Roller and Tombak study two-stage games
where the a technology choice is followed by Cournot competition. Here also, the invest-
ment game was characterized as a prisoner’s dilemma, leading to the conclusion that firms
can be better off without the option to invest in flexibility.
An idea that is closely related to flexibility is that of postponement. In a single prod-
uct, stochastic environment, Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) look at various postponement
strategies, characterized by the ordering and time-separation of capacity, quantity, and pric-
ing decisions. In terms of this timing, we study models with upfront capacity investment,
and further postponement of pricing, since the Cournot game dictates that commitments
are made to production quantities before pricing. This type of model is developed further
by Chod and Rudi (2005) who extend the Van Mieghem and Dada setup into a two-product
setting.
Closest to our research are papers that work within the Chod and Rudi setup, or sim-
ilar, but now incorporate competition, as was done by Roller and Tombak (1990) for the
deterministic setting. The competitive model in Goyal and Netessine (2007) simultaneously
models the benefit of flexibility under uncertainty and the strategic weakness that comes
from flexibility under competition. The authors describe a tradeoff underlying the firm’s
technology choice, depending largely on the degree of variability. A similar phenomenon
is described by Anand and Girotra (2007) in the context of “delayed differentiation”. The
firms we study face a similar tradeoff, but may also consider a broader set of actions, such
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as the ability to shape costs by choosing the location of their investment, and to impose
various levels of process flexibility, consistent with a hybrid network design.
Given this broader focus, it is worth linking with some additional research on process
flexibility. Seminal work is this area was done by Jordan and Graves (1995), who show
that a process can achieve nearly all the flexibility that comes with fully flexible machines
(producing all variants) through, for example, a chain of dual-purpose machines. This has
been followed with similar results in a number of settings, such as that of Graves and Tom-
lin (2003) and Bassamboo et al. (2010). When selecting capacity levels endogenously, the
newsvendor network approach provides a general methodology for designing an optimally
flexible network. This framework, detailed in Van Mieghem and Rudi (2002), involves a
set of upper-level network capacity decisions, followed by a constrained resource allocation
problem to be solved after uncertainty is resolved. The problem we present is a competitive
variant of a newsvendor network problem, since multiple firms allocate resources simulta-
neously, following the initial investment phase.
3.2.3 Multi-market Oligopoly
Another area of work that is related to ours is the literature on multi-market oligopoly.
This research, including a significant literature involving variational inequality models, is
concerned with characterization and computation of equilibrium outcomes for firms that
compete across multiple, interconnected markets. We draw a distinction between our work
and the papers discussed here, owing to our central focus on capacity investment decisions.
In particular, we are interested in settings where there is a temporal separation between
investment decisions and decisions on production and pricing, so that the equilibria we con-
sider play out only in a second-stage of the problem. For this reason, our results bear more
resemblance qualitatively to those of the previous two sections, even where that literature
may not involve competition.
Nevertheless, we share much with this literature in terms of our technical approach. The
book by Okuguchi and Szidarovsky (1990) studies oligopoly in a number of quite general
settings. In particular, the analysis of multi-product linear Cournot games can be extended
to the setting of our lower-level production game. Another series of papers, notably Miller
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et al. (1992) and Miller et al. (1995), use sensitivity analysis of variational inequalities to
study competitive facility location problems specifically. An example in Miller et al. (1995)
illustrates the impact of competitor responses on location decisions, comparing computed
solutions against those of a firm who ignores competition. Additionally, Harker (1986)
discusses models of spatial competition, with competition for market demands as well as
transportation resources, that relate to our problem setting.
3.3 Model
We study a model of capacity investment for a firm competing in both a domestic market
and a foreign market. The firm decides the location and capacity of production facilities,
which are subsequently used in production for one or both of these markets. We look at
the problem of selecting resource capacities from the perspective of a single firm, subject to
the fixed capacity decisions of a competitor. After the capacities are selected, both firms
compete in a Cournot fashion by simultaneously selecting product quantities to offer in each
market, subject to their respective resource constraints. The model reflects the differences
in timing among investment and production decisions. Investments in capacity are typically
made in advance of more specific production decisions, such as the allocation of resources
between product types and transshipment between regional markets.
The decision structure we have outlined is similar to that employed in the newsvendor
networks of Van Mieghem and Rudi (2002). The firm invests in capacities prior to the
resolution of uncertainty, and then selects production quantities, subjects to capacity con-
straints, in a second stage. Dong et al. (2010) extend the model to the case of price-sensitive
demand, and allow responsive ex-post pricing. The major distinction between our model
and these setups is the introduction of competition in the ex-post portion of the model. We
consider several alternative network structures, all of which fit generally into a model with
four resources (see Figure 3.1), as employed in Lu and Van Mieghem (2009). We present
the notation for this model, and subsequently specialize by placing exogenous restrictions
on the use of particular resources.
For each firm i ∈ {1, 2}, define:
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Figure 3.1: Network structure for two firms (i ∈ {1, 2}) with decision variables Ki, qi, and xi.
• resource capacities: Ki ∈ R4+,
• activities: xi ∈ R4+,
• production quantities: qi ∈ R2+,
• marginal production costs: ci ∈ R4+.
For firm 1, capacities are selected subject to capacity costs CK ∈ R4+. Production costs are
decomposed into:
• offshore production costs: cP ∈ R+,
• production cost differential: ∆P ∈ R+,
• transportation costs: cT ∈ R+,
so that c1 consists of:
c11 := cP + ∆P , c12 := cP , c13 := cP + ∆P + cT c14 := cP + cT . (3.1)
For firm 2, K2 and c2 are fixed exogenously.
We assume a linear price function in each market m ∈ {1, 2}. We define:
• market “size” vector: α ∈ R2+,
so that the expected market price is E[pm] = αm − q1m − q2m.
Finally, we allow uncertainty in both prices and production costs through the additive
shifters:
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• price shifter: ε ∈ R2+, with ε ∼ Fp(ε) and E[ε] = 0,
• cost shifter: ω ∈ R4+, with ω ∼ Fc(ω) and E[ω] = 0,
for general joint probability distributions Fp and Fc respectively. We allow for a single cost
shifter to interact with both firms’ production costs, with the assumption that these terms
represent industry wide patterns in input and transportation costs.
The network design problem we consider for firm 1 is:
Π∗ = max
K1∈R4+
E[π1(K1, ε, ω)]− C ′KK1 (3.2)
S K1 = 0.
where firms simultaneously solve:
πi(K1, ε, ω) = max
qi∈R2+, xi∈R4+
q′i (α− q1 − q2 + ε)− x′i (ci + ω) (3.3)
subject to: Axi ≤ Ki
Rxi = qi.




1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0





 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0


and S allows for structure to be imposed exogenously on the network. The matrix A maps
production activities xi to the quantities of resource capacity that they require, and the
matrix R maps each activity to a specific product output.
Within this general form, we will use the matrix S to reflect alternative production
strategies, regarding the location and potential pooling of production (see Figure 3.2). For
a market-focused (MF) production strategy, we require Ki1 = Ki3 and Ki2 = Ki4, so in
order to serve both markets, the firm must invest in both of facilities 1 and 2. For a
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centralized production strategy at location l ∈ {1, 2}, we require Ki,−l = 0, so that all
production occurs at facility l. When production is centralized, we can further distinguish
between a centralized-flexible (CF) strategy and a centralized-dedicated (CD) strategy. For
CF, the condition Ki3 = Ki4 = Kil assures that any portion of the production at facility
l can be used in either market. For CD, the condition Ki3 + Ki4 = Kil requires that all
production is earmarked for a specific market. Because capacity in a centralized setting is
characterized by a single element of Ki, we will sometimes abuse notation by referring to
this element, actually Kil, as simply Ki.
Figure 3.2: Network configurations for the MF, CF-1 and CF-2 strategies.
For any finite choice of K1, the resulting production game in (2) yields an equilibrium,
with a unique choice of q = {qi}i∈{1,2}. This follows from reformulating (2) as an equivalent
variational inequality problem, as is done for the multi-market Cournot game in Okuguchi
and Szidarovsky (1990).
Proposition 9. For any K1, an equilibrium exists in the production game. The equilibrium
is unique by q, and the second-stage profit function π1(K1, ε, ω) is well-defined.
The result in Proposition 9 applies to somewhat more general demand systems than the
one we can consider. In particular, substitutions between products can be allowed by
introducing a slope matrix β, so that the price vector p is determined by p = α−β(q1 +q2).
The result will hold when β is positive definite. For the remainder, we ignore substitutions,
choosing instead to focus on geographically separated markets for a single good. The more
general model will be useful in extending our results to a multi-product setting.
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3.3.1 Analysis of Production Game
In this section, we will look at the competitive quantity-setting game, subject to fixed
capacities for both firms. We consider both the CF and MF configurations for firm 1, while
firm 2 employs a CF configuration in both settings. Thus, we characterize the (CF,CF) and
(MF,CF) strategy profiles.
For both the CF and MF market configurations, xi is uniquely determined by qi, so we
choose to deal with qi directly. Accordingly, the notation of costs is reduced to a 2-vector
c̄i, so that total production and transportation costs for firm i are
∑
m∈{1,2} qimc̄im. The
makeup of c̄i is then as follows:
c̄i|CF, l=1 = (ci1, ci3), c̄i|CF, l=2 = (ci4, ci2), c̄i|MF = (ci1, ci2) (3.4)
Accordingly, we will reduce notation for cost shifters ω to a 2-vector ω̄. Later on, we will
want to consider the causes of ω̄ explicitly, but unless noted otherwise, we can restrict
all stochastic effects to ε alone. This simplifies notation and can be done without loss of
generality by considering εm to effect the margin pm − c̄im. The objective πi is then equal
to q′i(α− q1 − q2 + ε).
The following assumption simplifies our analysis by eliminating those cases where the
firm chooses not to serve one market. This is justified by observing that before investing
in capacity to serve a market, a firm will typically have at least a minimal amount of
information necessary to ensure a positive production quantity.
Assumption 1. All firms produce positive quantities for both the domestic and foreign
market. That is, q11, q12, q21, and q22 are positive for all realizations of ε and ω.
This is essentially an assumption on the symmetry of marginal production costs, providing
a lower bound on the size of profit margins with respect to the production cost differential.
It will be helpful to define the quantities (for notational purposes only):
qMim =
αm − cim + εm
2
, qCim =
αm − 2cim + c−i,m + εm
3
, (3.5)
which refer, respectively, to the monopoly and Cournot equilibrium quantities that would
result if capacities are ignored. Note that while these terms are independent of any of the
decisions that we model, they do depend on knowledge of a specific realization of ε.
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For a given K, and ε, the production game allows a closed-form solution, with the
appropriate expressions depending on whether each firm’s capacity constraint is binding at
equilibrium. To account for all possible types of equilibria, the results are presented for
regions: Ω1 (neither firm at capacity), Ω2 (firm 1 only at capacity), Ω3 (firm 2 only at
capacity), Ω4 (both firms at capacity). We partition the domain of ε by the region of the
resulting equilibrium.
Proposition 10. The outcomes of the production game for a (CF,CF) strategy profile are
as shown in Table 3.1.








2m − K14 +
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Region Conditions on ε
Ω1 (ε1 + ε2) ≤ 3(K1 − E[qC11]− E[qC12])
(ε1 + ε2) ≤ 3(K2 − E[qC21]− E[qC22])
Ω2 (ε1 + ε2) ≥ 3(K1 − E[qC11]− E[qC12])
(ε1 + ε2) ≤ 2(K2 − E[qM21 ]− E[qM22 ]) + K1
Ω3 (ε1 + ε2) ≤ 2(K1 − E[qM11 ]− E[qM12 ]) + K2
(ε1 + ε2) ≥ 3(K2 − E[qC21]− E[qC22])
Ω4 (ε1 + ε2) ≥ 3(K1 − E[qC11]− E[qC12])
(ε1 + ε2) ≥ 3(K2 − E[qC21]− E[qC22])
Table 3.1: Characterization of the (CF,CF) production game.
We note that for any choice of K1, either P (Ω1) = 0 or P (Ω2) = 0. If K1 + (c̄11 + c̄12)
≥ (≤) K2 + (c̄21 + c̄22), then firm 1 (firm 2) produces to capacity only when both firms do.
For an MF strategy, the partition of Ω2 is refined to consist of Ω2.1 (K11 is tight), Ω2.2
(K12 is tight), and Ω2.3 (both K11 and K12 are tight). The same applies to Ω4.
Proposition 11. The outcomes of the production game for a (MF,CF) strategy profile are
as follows in Table 3.2.




[q1m(K, ε)(αm + εm − c̄1m − q1m(K, ε)− q2m(K, ε))]Ω=Ωn
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Region Conditions on ε
Ω1 ε1 ≤ 3(K11 − E[qC11])
ε2 ≤ 3(K12 − E[qC12])
(ε1 + ε2) ≤ 3(K2 − E[qC21]− E[qC22])
Ω2.1 ε1 ≥ 3(K11 − E[qC11])
ε2 ≤ 3(K12 − E[qC12])
( ε12 +
ε2)
3 ≤ K2 − E[qM21 ] + K112 − E[qC22]
Ω2.2 ε1 ≤ 3(K11 − E[qC11])
ε2 ≥ 3(K12 − E[qC12])
( ε13 +
ε2)
2 ≤ K2 − E[qM22 ] + K122 − E[qC21]
Ω2.3 ε1 ≥ 3(K11 − E[qC11])
ε2 ≥ 3(K12 − E[qC12])
(ε1 + ε2) ≤ 2(K2 − E[qM21 ]− E[qM22 ]) + K11 + K12
Ω3 ε1 ≤ 2(K11 − E[qM11 ]) + K22
ε2 ≤ 2(K12 − E[qM12 ]) + K22
(ε1 + ε2) ≥ 3(K2 − E[qC21]− E[qC22])
Ω4.1 ε1 ≥ 3(K11 − E[qC11])
(ε1 + 3ε2) ≤ 7K12 − (4qM12 + 3qC12 + 2qM21 −K11 − 2K2)
(ε1 + ε2) ≥ 3(K2 − E[qC21]− E[qC22])
Ω4.2 (3ε1 + ε2) ≤ 7K11 − (4qM11 + 3qC11 + 2qM22 −K12 − 2K2)
ε2 ≥ 3(K12 − E[qC12])
(ε1 + ε2) ≥ 3(K2 − E[qC21]− E[qC22])
Ω4.3 ε1 ≥ 3(K11 − E[qC11])
ε2 ≥ 3(K12 − E[qC12])
(ε1 + ε2) ≥ 3(K2 − E[qC21]− E[qC22])
Table 3.2: Characterization of the (MF,CF) production game.
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π(K1, ε)|Ω=Ωn dF (ε) (3.6)
whose form will depend on the nature of uncertainty in demand. To simplify going forward,
we employ the clearance assumption. This is used by Goyal and Netessine (2007), who
justify it on the grounds of pre-commitments to produce that exist in certain industries.
This is one possible justification, but more generally, we are interested in cases where the
capacity constraints bite. In these cases, even if holdback is possible, at the optimal level
of investment, there will be a very low probability of it being invoked. Thus, the clearance
assumption will not effect our analysis of the optimal network configuration substantially.
Assumption 2. Both firms produce to capacity. That is Axi = Ki.
Assumption 2 simplifies the analysis by restricting results to region Ω4 in the (CF,CF)
case, and Ω4.3 in the (MF,CF) case. We will examine the effects of this assumption by
comparing with a restriction to region Ω1, and through numerical study of the unrestricted
problem. In contrast to case of clearance, the restriction to Ω1 is justified in cases where
capacity is inexpensive in comparison to marginal costs of inputs and production, and so
capacity is unlikely to bind at the optimal capacity. Assumption 2 remains in force unless
noted otherwise.
3.4 Optimal Investments
We now focus on industries that can be modeled by Assumption 2. This simplification
enables a closed-form solution of the optimal capacity investments, which can then be used
to compare the performance of alternative network configurations.
We begin with the optimal investments for the (CF,CF) strategy profile. The location
of firm 2 is known, but is of interest only through its effect on c̄2, which is known and will
remain fixed throughout. Similarly, we describe the investment decision for firm 1 in terms
of a fixed c̄1, which will be linked subsequently to a choice of location for firm 1’s centralized
production facility. Finally, we assume CK = (cK , cK , 0, 0). The optimal investments and
profits follow.
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Proposition 12. For the (CF,CF) strategy profile, the optimal investment for firm 1 is:
KCF1 = E[q
M






The total expected profits that result are:
Π∗CF =
(E[qM11 ] + E[q
M






The form of (3.7) and (3.8) reveals an underlying separation between the aggregate
capacity investment and the allocation of production to specific markets. The investment
level KCF1 is independent of the competitor’s productions costs. In setting this investment
level, competition is felt only through the aggregate capacity K2. The profits in (3.8)




2 term that incorporates the relative size, and competitiveness, of the two
markets. As used here, the Cournot quantities, qC1m, give a competition-adjusted measure
of the two market sizes. The second profit term then indicates that the firm benefits
from asymmetry in the market sizes. Holding the aggregate market size constant, it is most
profitable to control a single, large market than to split production equitably across two. As
long as production is centralized, this property will be seen to motivate a natural dispersion
of firm locations, as each firm seeks to define a highly profitable “home” market.
Next, and again making use of exogenous costs c̄1, we look at the case where capacity
is committed to markets in advance as in the (MF,CF) strategy. In this case, the optimal
outcomes are as follows in the proposition.














21 ]− E[qM22 ]
2
(3.9)
The total expected profits that result are:
Π∗MF =
(E[qM11 ] + E[q
M









In the MF case, capacity investments are specified for the individual market. So, in
contrast to the results in Proposition 12, we see that competitor costs enter into (3.10)
through the qM2 terms. However, we note that the aggregate investment, given here by
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KMF11 +K
MF
12 , remains in precisely the same form as for the CF case. Thus, overall capacity
investment remains independent of competitor costs, regardless of the choice of production
location or centralization decision.




12 ]− K22 −cK . This







+ E2[qC1 − qC2 ]/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ex-Ante Allocation








+ E2[qC1 − qC2 ]/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ex-Ante Allocation
+ E2[qC1 − qC2 ]/16︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of Commitment
− cKo (3.12)
Here we have divided profits according to the forces driving each portion1. In both settings
there is a profit component that depends on the size of the optimal aggregate investment.
The additional terms then reflect on how effectively a firm with that particular market
structure is able to allocate resources to the markets that are most profitable.
For the CF case, we have divided the remaining profits into ex-ante and ex-post allo-
cation terms. While all allocation in the CF case is committed only after resolving market
uncertainty, the ex-ante term is indicative if the average quantities that the firm commits to
each market in the CF setting. This portion of profits could be achieved without using any
flexibility. The last term, the value of ex-post allocation, then reflects the additional profits
that are achieved by delaying the allocation decision to the production stage. This term is
proportional to the variance in the asymmetry between the markets. Here, greater variance
creates more opportunities to shift resources ex-post into a more attractive market.
On the other hand, with an MF structure, all capacity is committed to markets at the
investment stage. With no ability to reallocate, variation in profit margins is “averaged
out” of the expected profit function. There is, however, additional value to the MF firm
that comes through a strategic first-mover advantage. By committing capacity to individual
markets in an earlier stage, the MF firm takes up a stronger position, and is able to achieve
a more favorable ex-ante allocation of resources. The resulting profit appears in 3.12 as the
1Note that the terms K∗1 , q
C
1 , and q
C
2 , while defined equivalently in both settings, will vary according to
differences in c̄1 between the CF and MF cases. The respective costs, c̄i|CF, l and c̄i|MF are defined in (3.4).
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value of commitment. The final term cKo reflects some economies of scale by assigning an
additional cost to building and operating facilities in two distinct locations.
The various profit drivers just defined are at the heart of the network design decisions
that we now discuss.
3.4.1 Location Decision
We now focus on the centralized production configuration, and analyze the firm’s decision
to locate production in either the domestic (l = 1), or foreign (l = 2) market. We use
the expected profits obtained in (3.8), and plug in for the costs c̄1|l=l̂ associated with each
potential location l̂. The relative profits will then depend critically on the magnitude of the
individual components that make up overall marginal production cost; i.e. the cost savings
∆P from offshore production and the transportation cost cT for transshipment between
markets.
To define the impact of ∆P and cT , we will first need to summarize the relevant market
characteristics. We capture the impact of consumer demand and the competitive landscape
through two factors:
• λ1 := K∗1 |c1=(cP ,cP ), a measure of the aggregate market size (note that the overall
investment level, a proxy here for market size, is the same with both CF and MF
strategies, modulo location-specific costs).
• δ1 := E[qC11|c1=(cP ,cP )] − E[qC12|c1=(cP ,cP )], a measure of the (competition-adjusted)
market size differential.
Describing the market as such, the difference in profits between onshore and offshore pro-
duction can be written as:














We represent the optimal location decision by a threshold ∆̄ for the production cost differ-
ential, calculated so that the optimal strategy for locating a centralized production facility
is to locate onshore (l = 1) when ∆P is less than ∆̄.
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Proposition 14. For a (CF,CF) strategy profile, firm 1 locates production in market 1 for

















Assuming that δ1 is positive (i.e. the onshore market is more attractive, otherwise it is
always optimal to locate offshore), the threshold is increasing in cT . This is intuitive, as a
large transportation cost makes it difficult for an offshore firm to serve it’s target market.
The effect is enhanced as δ1 increases and so the threshold increases in δ1 as well. On the
other hand, the threshold is decreasing in λ1. The insight here is that as overall production
increases, the impact of production costs savings from locating offshore will factor more
heavily.
As presented, none of the terms appearing in (3.14) depend on the variance of ε. This
is the case when the distribution of ε is not itself allowed to depend on the location choice.
Indeed, if the distribution of ε is fixed, then the ex-post allocation value is the same for
either production location. Such behavior is sure to arise when the impact of cost shifters,
ω, is negligible, leaving ε to act only on prices. Some interesting behavior arises when
relaxing this restriction to allow for location-specific cost shifters. For example, if both
firms are subjected to the same fluctuations in transportation costs, and firm 2 is similarly
located in one of the two markets considered, then we replace δ1 with (δ1 + I σ
2
3 ), where
I = 1 when firm 2 locates offshore, and I = −1 when firm 2 locates onshore. In this case,
variability in costs motivates a location opposite that of the competing firm.
3.4.2 Centralization of Production
We now examine the conditions under which either a centralized or market-focused strategy
emerges as the optimal network configuration. To gain intuition regarding the optimal
decision, we will need to distinguish between several effects that in concert account for the
differences in outcome between the CF and MF strategies.
We begin with location held fixed, isolating the profit difference that results purely from
the distinction between dedicated and flexible capacity. This distinction was illustrated
in the equations (3.8) and (3.10), in which a tradeoff is established between the value
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of early commitment in the MF setting and of ex-post production allocation in the CF
setting. Here we express the net value of dedicated capacity in terms of cT , ∆P , and
market characteristics. The effect, which depends on the location considered for centralized
production, is then:
VDED|l=1 = (Π∗CD|l=1 + cKo)−Π∗CF |l=1 =








VDED|l=2 = (Π∗CD|l=2 + cKo)−Π∗CF |l=2 =








As expected, the value decreases with both the degree of variability and the fixed cost of
operating a second facility. The value of commitment increases with the degree of asymme-
try between markets. Assuming δ1 > (2/3)cT > 0, the effective asymmetry increases with
cT for an onshore firm, while it decreases in cT for a firm located in the foreign market.
The second effect to consider in choosing network structure is the localization value
inherent in a system with two production facilities. The MF setup allows for both markets
to be served without incurring transportation costs, which generates additional revenue
and cost savings associated with the MF strategy. This is strictly an advantage when
comparing to onshore centralization. When compared to offshore centralization, advantages
are mitigated by the production cost savings, ∆P , that the MF firm gives up in its domestic
production facility.
Fixing again the location of centralized production, this value of localization is:
VLOC |l=1 = Π∗MF −Π∗CD|l=1 =
(∆P + cT )
8
[4λ1 − 6δ1 − 3cT −∆P ] (3.17)
VLOC |l=2 = Π∗MF −Π∗CD|l=2 =
(∆P − cT )
8
[−4λ1 − 6δ1 + 3(∆P + cT )] (3.18)
The onshore term VLOC |l=1 will generally be positive and increasing in the amount of tran-
shipment to the foreign market that is expected when centralizing onshore. The directional
relationships in VLOC |l=2 depend ultimately on the sign of (∆P − cT ), which determines the
network structure that can most efficiently serve the onshore market.
Combining these effects, and the threshold from Proposition 14, yields a full character-
ization of the optimal network configuration, in terms of ∆P and cK0 .
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Proposition 15. If ∆P < ∆̄ it is optimal to localize production for cK0 < c̄ON :=
VDED|l=1 + VLOC |l=1, and to centralize production in the domestic market otherwise. If
∆P > ∆̄ it is optimal to localize production for cK0 < c̄OFF := VLOC |l=2 + VCOM |l=2, and
to centralize production in the foreign market otherwise.
In terms of the decision to centralize, we note that spatial aspect of the problem adds a
dimension to the decision that does not factor into related decisions about production flexi-
bility that occur within the context of a fixed location. One consideration is the localization
value defined above to reflect changes in cost structure. In addition, we consider that in
comparison to the MF firm, a firm choosing to “centralize” may still choose its optimal lo-
cation endogenously. This shrinks the optimality region for dedicated capacity below what
either c̄ON or c̄OFF suggest, since the dedicated profits must exceed those of both centralized
locations to justify the decentralized approach.
Figure (3.4) presents a stylized rendering of the decision space defined in Proposition 14.
Note that when variability is large enough (and negatively correlated between markets), it
may be the case that c̄ON and c̄OFF intersect below the ∆P axis, indicating that centraliza-
tion is preferred even when there are no economies of scale in using fewer facilities. In the
remainder of the paper, we discuss factors affecting the shape of these optimality regions,
defined by the three thresholds c̄ON , c̄OFF , and ∆̄P .
Figure 3.3: Optimal network configurations, determined by production cost differential and facility setup
cost.
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3.5 Impact of Competition
We have so far described the basic thresholds determining optimal network configurations,
and addressed their sensitivity to underlying market characteristics. We will now charac-
terize the way that competition may impact these thresholds, and by extension, influence
the optimal choice of network configuration. There are three different types of effects that
need to be considered when competition is introduced into market. These are, respectively:
• introduction of additional production capacity for supplying global markets in aggre-
gate;
• skewing of relative market profitability due to asymmetry in competitor’s cost struc-
ture;
• competitive influence on product allocation/transshipment (i.e., the distinction be-
tween the equilibrium and monopoly allocation of resources)
In some instances, these forces are aligned, making it simple to understand the impact
of additional competition. Often, however, these forces will conflict, with the dominant
force depending on the particulars of a firm’s market position. As such, care is required in
drawing broad conclusions about the effect of competition on network design.
In this section, we characterize the sensitivity of location and centralization choices to
each of the these three effects. The third effect, that of the equilibrium allocation, can be
considered a “market-neutral” effect of adding competition, in the sense that the measures
of aggregate (λ) and relative (δ) profitability are held constant. The other two effects
allow a more nuanced consideration of competition by accounting for the resulting changes
to indicators of aggregate and relative market profitability. A full view should integrate
these effects. For instance, while purely allocation-based effects will encourage an offshore
location for centralized production, there is tension from the increase in aggregate industry
capacity that can result from the entrance of a large competitor. In the face of such a
large competitor, the dominant effect may be that which encourages an onshore facility;
i.e. it may be best to cultivate a competitive advantage in a key market at the expense of
head-to-head competition on a broader global scale.
CHAPTER 3. FACILITY NET. DESIGN WITH EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES 75
ON → OFF MF → ON MF → OFF†
(∆̄) (c̄ON ) (c̄OFF )
Aggregate Capacity: ⇑ ⇓ ∆P > cT : ⇑
K2 ∆P < cT : ⇓
Cost Differential: ⇓ m ∆P > cT : m
(c22 − c21) ∆P < cT : ⇓
Competitive ⇓ ⇑ ∆P > cT : ⇑
Allocation* ∆P < cT : m
*compared to monopoly with same λ1, δ1
†assumes qC1 |OFF > qC2 |OFF
Table 3.3: Impact of competition on network configuration thresholds.
3.5.1 Competitor’s Aggregate Capacity
In terms of the threshold values - ∆̄, c̄|ON , and c̄|OFF - introduced prior, the impact of a
competitor’s aggregate capacity is felt through the aggregate investment term, λ1. Recall
from (7), and the definition of λ1, that in increase in K2 leads to a decrease in λ1.
For the location threshold ∆̄, Table 3.3 indicates that λ1 and δ1 have opposing effects.
When the aggregate term dominates, offshore investment becomes optimal for a wide range
of ∆P . When the asymmetry term dominates, the opposite holds. The net result is that
we find ∆̄ to increase with K2.
More generally, we find that a larger aggregate investment on the part of firm 1 motivates
a configuration with the lowest combined production cost, defined as the sum of the costs
involved in serving the onshore and the offshore market. As a result, the centralization
threshold when ∆P < ∆̄, c̄|ON , is decreasing in K2. For ∆P > ∆̄, we must divide the
analysis into two cases, as the network structure having the lowest combined production
costs is dependent on the relative size of the transportation and production cost differentials
∆P and cT .
3.5.2 Competitor’s Cost Differential
We next look at the competitor cost differential c̄22 − c̄21, which measures the size of the
(possibly negative) cost advantage that firm 2 has in serving the onshore market. Here
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the impact on the location threshold is felt through the δ1 term, rather than through the
aggregate term, λ1. The overall impact is to encourage firm 1 to locate where the costs are
larger for firm 2. To see this, recall the convexity of the profit function with respect to the
vector of competition-adjusted market sizes. This property dictates that firms can profit
more when they are differentiated so that each dominates a particular market than they
can when competing on equal footing in each.
The impact of cost differentials on the centralization threshold is more complicated. Re-
calling Proposition 15, we see that δ1 appears in one term representing location advantages,
and a second term related to the value of pre-commitment in a competitive setting. When
these two effects are at odds, we can see either effect dominate, and so both outcomes are
possible.
The “localization effect” is such that a larger cost differential motivates firm 1 to assume
the network structure from which the onshore market can be served most cheaply. The
resulting effects are to decrease c̄ON , decrease c̄OFF for ∆P > cT , and increase c̄OFF for
∆P < cT .
The commitment effect is included to account for those additional profits that can be
achieved from a market-focused approach, owing to the ability of firm 1 to pre-commit its
desired production allocation. This benefit is largest when there is a substantial asymmetry
between markets, since by locking in a large production quantity in the more attractive
onshore market, the firm discourages competitors and helps to insure itself a large share
of these profitable sales. Thus, the commitment effect related to an increase in δ1 is to
raise both centralization thresholds, c̄ON and c̄OFF , enlarging the optimal region for the
MF configuration.
3.5.3 Competitive Influence on Allocation
The effects of adding competition (note that similar effects apply when a competitor’s
dedicated capacity is replaced with a flexible setup) are also multifaceted. To illustrate, we
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+ E2[qM1 − qM2 ]/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ex-Ante Allocation








+ E2[qM1 − qM2 ]/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ex-Ante Allocation
− cKo , (3.20)
to those of a competitive firm, displayed previously in (3.11) and (3.12).
The first effect that we note relates to the switch between qCm and q
M
m in the allocation





1 − qM2 ) + c22−c213 . The c22−c213 term represents the impact of competitor’s costs,
discussed in the previous subsection. However the second effect of competition is a rescaling
of (qM1 − qM2 ) so that firm 1’s profit margins factor less into the allocation terms under
competition. In either setting, competitive or monopoly, firm 1 can increase its profits by
locating closer to the more attractive (we assume this is onshore) market, thus producing
more asymmetric profit margins. However, competition diminishes this effect. As gains
from allocation are dependent on market asymmetries, this implies that this “allocation
effect” of adding competition is to shift thresholds in the directions opposing those of the
“localization effect”, which was discussed above for an increase in δ. That is, since the
addition of competition makes it more difficult for the firm to achieve its best allocation
of production, the firm under competition invests as it would for a more symmetric pair of
markets.
There is a second effect on the allocation that is again related to the commitment
value of the market-focused approach. Regardless of the value of δ, there is a non-negative
commitment value which increases all centralization thresholds when competition is added.
When ∆P < cT , this effect will go opposite the first for c̄OFF , and so the net effect remains
undetermined.
3.6 Numerical Results
In the above, we have simplified certain aspects of the network design problem to facilitate a
closed-form analysis. The following numerical study will look at what happens when some
of these restrictions are relaxed. The results put our assumptions into perspective, and
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provide some additional insight on how firms may plan for uncertainty with their network
design.
3.6.1 Location without Clearance
Throughout Sections 4 and 5, we have held Assumption 2 in force, guaranteeing that the
solution of the production game falls in region Ω4 of tables (3.1) and (3.2). The results
above are thus best-suited for the case where investments are costly enough that neither
firm is able to hold much spare capacity.
To relax this assumption, we begin by taking as counterpoint the location threshold
in cases where marginal production costs dominate investments costs, so that both firms
essentially produce as if unconstrained. This corresponds to the area denoted as region Ω1
in figures (3.1) and (3.2).
Under this alternative assumption, the difference in profits between onshore and offshore
production is:




















The threshold on costs differences for locating centralized production, ∆̄|Ω1 , is defined here
by the following proposition:
Proposition 16. For a (CF,CF) strategy profile, firm 1 locates production in market 1 for






E[qC11|l=2 + qC12|l=2 − cK ]−
√








With the exception of sensitivity to K2, which no longer factors into the threshold, it
can be seen that the sensitivity results for this threshold are directionally the same as those
in the first column of Table 3.3. The high level conclusions garnered in Section 4 thus
appear to be robust to the ratio of investment and production costs.
Of course, for decisions made under uncertainty, we cannot expect the ex-post solution
to the production game to fall into any single region for all scenarios. Rather, the capacity
level will be chosen endogenously by firm, with regards to its cost profile so as to maximize
CHAPTER 3. FACILITY NET. DESIGN WITH EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES 79
expected profits. We analyze this decision numerically for a set of problem instances, while
adjusting the competitor capacity, K2, and the capacity investment cost cK to induce a
range of optimal policies with regards to the chosen probability of having constraints bind
ex-post.
The parameters employed are α = (50, 40), c2 = (5, 5), cT = 4, and cP = 2. These
were chosen to satisfy Assumption 1 while allowing for significant gaps in both marginal
production costs and potential revenues between the two markets. For example, in an un-
constrained setting with production located offshore, the Cournot outcomes lead to prices
in the domestic market that are 30% above those in the foreign market. In this case, trans-
portation costs for firm 1 are 20% of per-unit expected revenues for sales in the domestic
market, and account for 86% of the revenue difference between the markets (onshore pro-
duction would involve a larger revenue difference, with the size dependent on ∆P ). We
employed 30 demand scenarios, which were generated by simulated draws from a uniform
distribution over the range [.8α, 1.2α]. Demand shocks were perfectly positively correlated
between the two markets. The results are displayed in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Thresholds (∆̄P ) for location decision, graphed by capacity cost (cK). Shown for K2 =
{10, 20, 30, 40}. (Solid lines show actual numerical threshold, dashes show Ω4 threshold, dots show Ω1
threshold)
It is seen that with cK = 0, the actual threshold is exactly as for the approximation in
Ω1. Meanwhile, the calculated threshold continues to move closer to that of region Ω4 as we
adjust cK upwards. Finally, we note that the actual threshold matches that of Ω4 exactly
for the case of low competitor capacity, K2 = 10. In this paper, we are most interested in
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the case of high-cost capacity industries, so Assumption 2 is likely to be appropriate for
most cases. When this is combined with tight capacity industry-wide, the assumption of
clearance will be quite accurate.
3.6.2 Hybrid Network Configuration
For this numerical analysis, we return to the most general form of our network model,
achieved by setting S = 0. The firm is free to invest in all four of the production locations,
and to make use of transhipment in either direction between markets. In this setting,
the firm installs a desired level of flexibility by investing in excess downstream capacity.
This generalizes the previously considered set of options, in which only the extremes of
fully centralized or dedicated production were considered. Following Lu and Van Mieghem
(2009), we call this setup the hybrid network, as it allows elements of both localized and
centralized production to exist in the chosen network structure.
To motivate investment in a flexible structure, we simulate a model with demand uncer-
tainty. In particular, we consider two scenarios, corresponding to shocks in the onshore and
offshore markets, respectively. We assume for simplicity that shocks in the two markets are
perfectly negatively correlated. There is no uncertainty regarding costs. The competitor
network is fixed to an offshore configuration with centralized capacity K2.
Figure 3.5: Difference in profits (as percentage of hybrid network profits) for a) market focused, b) onshore
centralized, and c) offshore centralized production networks.
In all tests, we employ the parameters α = (50, 40), c2 = (5, 5), cP = 2 (all as in Section
3.6.1), ∆P = .5, and K2 = 20. Demand shocks in market m are of the size .2(αm). We then
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observe the resulting profits as cT and CK are varied. For CK , we place nontrivial cost on
downstream production capacity by assuming a capacity cost vector CK = (cK , cK , cK , cK).
The parameter cK is then varied between tests among cK = {0, 1 . . . , 5}, and the sequence
repeated for each of cT = {0, 1 . . . , 5}. We assume no setup cost cKo , although it is clear
that such a cost would favor centralization, and with it a larger investment in downstream,
relative to upstream, capacity.
Within the parameter space described, we compute optimal investments and profits
for the full hybrid network, as well as for the market-focused and centralized production
networks. Finally, we contrast these competitive models against their equivalent monopoly
setups. The parameters in the monopoly case are adjusted to maintain the values of λ1
and δ1 as seen under competition. This approach allows us to observe the “allocation” and
“commitment” effects of competition as discussed in Section 3.5.3.
The hybrid network can be expected to outperform each of the restricted network struc-
tures. Figure 3.5 indicates the additional profits earned through the hybrid configuration
with respect to the market-focused, onshore centralized, and offshore centralized networks.
For the market-focused network, this difference can be interpreted as the value of tranship-
ment, whereas for the centralized networks, the difference represents the value of localizing.
The effect of transportation costs is clear in each graph. Transhipment value is seen to
decrease with cT , while the value of localizing increases with cT , reflecting a rise in the cost
of serving the more distant market. For small enough cT (cT = 0 is simulated here), even
the hybrid firm chooses to locate all production in the offshore market, and the difference
Π∗HY B −Π∗CF |l=2, shown in Figure 3.5c, is zero.
With regards to cK , we note that there is a visible inflection point for each set of results,
falling at a value between cK = 0 and cK = 2, depending on the particular value of cT .
Looking at Figure 3.5a, we see that when capacity cheap, the hybrid firm maximizes profits
by installing ample dedicated capacity in each market, thus employing a de facto market-
focused production network. With exception of the cT = 0 case, all firms employ this
strategy at cK = 0. The key point here is that with cheap capacity, the firm is willing to
invest enough capacity in each market to handle the high-demand scenario, without the
need to take advantage of any capacity pooling. The inflection point we mention is the
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point at which the hybrid firm begins to employ some pooling (resulting in total upstream
capacity smaller then total downstream capacity), in order to achieve a higher utilization of
capacity. From this point, the gap between Π∗HY B and Π
∗
MF widens with cK , as the optimal
configuration contains an increasing degree of centralization.
The same inflection point is seen in Figures 3.5b and 3.5c as well. In both cases, the
profit gap is decreasing in cK for smaller values. Since in this region, the hybrid firm chooses
localization over any risk pooling, the centralized firms enjoy the benefit of higher capacity
utilization, the importance of which is increasing in cK . Once the hybrid firm begins
pooling, this advantage is negated. The difference curves for the onshore firm flatten out,
while the offshore firm now finds itself at a larger disadvantage as capacity costs increase.
We attribute this change in direction to the same effects described previously in Section
3.5.1. Namely, as cK increases, the firm’s aggregate production shrinks, leading to a larger
proportion of production being directed to the onshore market. Consistent with the findings
in Table 3.3, the localization value is increasing in cT , and applies to all cases shown with
cT > ∆P . The curve for cT = 0 remains flat at zero.
Figure 3.6: Difference in profits (as percentage of hybrid network profits) between onshore centralized and
offshore centralized production for a) a competitive firm, and b) a monopoly firm. The difference between
the competitive and monopoly results is displayed in c).
The charts in Figure 3.6 compare the onshore centralized and offshore centralized net-
works directly. Note that the hybrid configuration figures into this analysis only as a tool
for normalization. The difference, Π∗CF |l=1 − Π∗CF |l=2, is displayed in Figure 3.6a, for an
increasing sequence of cT . For small cT , the offshore location is preferable, due to the lower
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Figure 3.7: Percentage excess downstream capacity investment for a) a competitive firm, and b) a monopoly
firm. The difference between the competitive and monopoly results is displayed in c).
cost of production. For larger cT , proximity to the domestic customers becomes critical, so
that onshore production becomes more profitable. Below a critical level of cT , large capacity
costs motivate an offshore location, while the opposite holds at larger cT .
Figures 3.6b and 3.6c provide a comparison to the case of a monopoly firm. The results
for the monopoly firm are directionally similar to those of the competitive firm, but we
observe that the differences between locations are more dramatic; the preferred location,
onshore or offshore, is preferred by a larger margin for the monopoly firm. We attribute this
to the “allocation effect” discussed in Section 3.5.3. To summarize, when locating onshore,
higher cT makes the markets appear less symmetric, and the monopoly firm is better able
to benefit from these circumstances. When locating offshore, higher cT makes the markets
look more symmetric, and so less profitable. However, this condition has less affect on the
competitive firm, since competition has already equalized the markets to some extent. We
find the threshold for location choice, while given here in terms of cT , exhibits a competitive
effect consistent with that shown for ∆̄ in Table 3.3. For each curve displayed, competition
pushes this threshold higher, thus expanding the region where offshore centralization is
chosen.
Figure 3.7 looks at an additional metric, indicating the degree of flexibility in the hybrid
firm’s optimal network structure. We measure flexibility by the ratio of downstream to
upstream capacity. With uncertainty arising on the demand side, the hybrid firm responds
with investment in excess downstream capacity, allowing for ex-post allocation of production
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between markets. The ratio:
FLEX =
(K3 + K4)
(K1 + K2) + (K3 + K4)
(3.23)
determines the extent of this flexibility.
In Figure 3.7a, we see that this metric largely mirrors the transhipment value of Figure
3.5a in its dependence on cK and cT . For the monopoly firm, the same relationships appear
to hold, but we observe in Figure 3.5b that the curves for cT ≥ 1 are shifted right, indicating
that less flexibility is employed for the same value of cK . The difference is dramatic for
those values of cK where the monopoly firm chooses a market-focused approach, i.e. zero
flexibility, but the firm with competition has crossed the threshold to where pooling becomes
optimal. As cK increases to where the firm pools capacity in both settings, the differences
level out, but the competitive firm remains the more flexible of the two. This pattern is not
observed with small cT , where both firms choose to centralize production offshore. In this
case, competition leads to less flexibility in the network structure. While this result, for the
low cT case, accords directionally with that of the centralization threshold in Table 3.3, the
explanations must differ since both competitive and monopoly firm locate all production
offshore. We simply observe in this case that the quantities provided to the two markets
differ more widely for the monopoly firm than the competing firm, and so more flexibility
is required in the network configuration.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
To summarize, we have presented a model of capacity investment by a firm that anticipate
the actions of its competitors. The competitive interactions are represented by a lower-
level game of constrained multi-market Cournot competition. We characterize the optimal
capacity investments, and develop thresholds that describe the conditions under which the
firm should invest in a domestic facility, a foreign facility, or dedicated facilities in both
markets.
We detail the various effects that competition can have on the optimal choice of network
configuration. This is shown to decompose into three distinct effects, which at times can act
counter to each other. The result is that the effect of competition is difficult to summarize
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in a one-size-fits all proposition. Rather, the impact can be highly specific to a firm’s
particular strengths and likely market niche. Our work suggests that as firms around the
globe rethink the design of their global networks; abandoning standard offshoring practices
for more customized approaches, it is unlikely to lead all firms down the same path. In fact,
competitive pressure is likely to push firms down divergent paths. For some, the answer
may be near-shoring and a more focused approach, while others will expand their global
reach towards increasingly integrated global networks.
There are a number of interesting ways in which this work can be extended. One idea
that was touched on only briefly was the scenario where the location of firms can play a role
in determining correlations between each firm’s random cost shifters. We gave the example
of transportation cost shocks, but there are a number of other location-specific costs shocks,
e.g. those relating to currency values and input prices, that may be worth studying in more
detail. We have also noted that firms in our formulation prefer asymmetric markets, with
negative correlations. One may wonder how our results will differ for a risk-averse firm that
prefers more level profits. In particular, such preferences may incent firms to cluster, thus
ensuring that any random shocks effect them equally. Lastly, we are involved in parallel
work to evaluate efficient methods of solving these capacity investment problems on a large
scale.
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Chapter 4
Identifying Competitor Sets in the
Hotel Industry
4.1 Introduction
In volatile industries, such as that for hotel travel, benchmarking operating performance
is a critical challenge. The standard metric of hotel operating efficiency, Revenue Per
Available Room (RevPAR), is sensitive to a number of environmental factors (e.g., economic
conditions, gasoline prices, regional events, etc.) that obscure its usefulness as a performance
indicator when viewed on an absolute scale. For this reason, hotel operators rely heavily
on their “competitor set” - the set of hotels viewed as close competitors - as a tool for
self-evaluation. Surprisingly, despite the emphasis placed on these groupings, there is often
little scientific rigor employed in constructing competitor sets.
To address the problem of evaluating and constructing competitor sets in an objective
manner, we develop an econometric model that predicts how changes in a hotel’s character-
istics, and those of its competitors, affect the hotel’s market share. In the process, we are
able to identify those competitors to whose characteristics a hotel’s market share is most
sensitive. As is often done to make such models parsimonious, we model the demand for
a hotel as a discrete choice in which customers choose among alternatives on the basis of
their vector of characteristics. In the present context, this choice-based approach leads to
an appealing notion of “competitors” as those hotels that share a significant fraction of
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their potential customers.
To accurately represent demand in the hotel industry, we present a model in which:
(i) customer choices depend on a set of observed hotel characteristics.
(ii) distinct latent classes of customers are identified, with preferences that vary across
classes.
(iii) demand for hotels is tied to specific landmarks and event locations within a city.
(iv) the composition of demand, by both location and customer class, is changing over
time.
The model, as it is defined in this chapter, is then tested using daily occupancy and price
data obtained from a set of 21 hotels in the Washington D.C. market over the summer of
2010. In addition, a daily account of events in the study area is used to track changes
in location-specific demand. Finally, our model allows for the integration of detailed in-
formation regarding hotel characteristics. In this respect, the hotel industry is well-suited
to empirical study. Whereas, in general, customer choice can be highly subjective, several
important elements of hotel choice (e.g., location, room size, etc.) are readily quantifiable.
Furthermore, the widespread use of internet channels for both booking and rating hotel
experiences has aided in the collection of data on more subjective measures, such as brand
preference. The contents of our data set are discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.1.
Given the high dimensionality of the set of characteristics that define a hotel and the
large number of potential competitors, an econometric model that captures competitive in-
teractions could include hundreds of parameters (or even thousands), which make it difficult
to estimate with limited data. As such, our model imposes, depending on the segment to
which a customer belongs, a probabilistic structure on the variation of customer valuations.
A customer’s discrete decision then follows a distribution, which can be parameterized by
the average utility assigned by segment to a stay in each hotel. In turn, these average
valuations depend, in a manner that can be estimated, on a vector of product character-
istics, which are observed in our data set. In this way, the hotel substitution pattern, a
phenomenon inherently on the order of the number of combinations of hotels, can be in-
ferred from the effects of hotel characteristics on a given hotel’s average valuation. This
reduces the estimation problem to one whose dimensionality depends on just the number
of relevant characteristics. There are several well-known utility models in the econometrics
literature that are amenable to this general form; most notable is the multinomial logit
model (McFadden 1974) in which, given valuations vj for each hotel j in the choice set J ,
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To successfully estimate the parameters of any choice model, it is critical that the
underlying data capture a sufficient degree of variation in the observed data. In general, the
approach for estimating choice models is to tease out relationships by linking fluctuations in
market share to fluctuations in observed data; in this case the characteristics of hotels being
considered. However, in the hotel market, we believe that variation in hotel characteristics
is secondary to variation in the makeup of the customer pool that occurs both seasonally
and in accordance with the schedule of events in proximity to the hotel. Hence, a slightly
different logic governs our estimation approach: as segment sizes vary, fluctuations in market
share highlight the relative differences across segments in how customers rank the various
hotel attributes.
In this respect, an important element of our approach is the ability to partition demand
into distinct customer segments, each with its own criteria for assigning value to a hotel
stay, and to track the respective sizes of these segments across time periods. Segmentation
of customers is often employed to improve model fit in the presence of heterogeneity. When
constructing a choice model, segments can be defined either through a descriptive process
that groups customers with similar attributes, or defined during estimation in a manner
that groups customers with similar profiles of response to product characteristics. In this
latter case, since segments may not be easily observed a priori, we refer to the segments
as latent classes (see, e.g., Kamakura and Russell (1989)). It is possible to estimate both
the preference parameters and segment size for each of these latent classes simultaneously,
even if working with aggregate purchase data. This is the approach taken by, for example,
Besanko et al. (2003) in their study of price discrimination in the ketchup market.
We are aided in this estimation by the natural variation in locational preferences that
occurs over time in a city’s hotel market. To exploit this feature in estimation, latent
classes of customer type are further broken down by location. The number of travelers
desiring a particular location can be expected to correlate with events nearby, and so we
can sharpen our segmentation by making class sizes depend functionally on event types and
sizes, as well as seasonal and day-of-the-week effects. By tying our segmentation to both
customer type and location, an additional dimension of variability is uncovered. The mix of
customers changes through time at each location, with consequences that differ according
to each hotel’s unique site. Observing demand shifts at this level of specificity is crucial
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to understanding hotel substitutions, and thus to creating competitor sets. In contrast to
Besanko et al. (2003), who incorporate, along with the relevant product characteristics, a
model of supply behavior and variation in factor costs, identification in our model relies on
variation in segment proportions and we formulate moment conditions that include data on
location-specific events.
The following stylized examples provide intuition on how latent classes of hotel customers
may be identified in the presence of location-specific events. The first uses hotel location
alone to infer class membership of customers:
Hotel A and Hotel B are similar hotels in terms of characteristics and located at the same distance
from the major tourist attractions at location X. Hotel B is also located next to location Y, a large
conference venue. When no conferences are ongoing, Hotels A and B experience similar occupancy
patterns, with increases on weekends and during holidays. We attribute this demand to tourists
drawn to location X. Then, during conferences, Hotel B experiences an additional surge, of say 50
rooms, in demand that is not seen by Hotel A. This additional 50 rooms is attributed to a second
latent class, the conference attendees, who may exhibit a different set of preferences than is seen
from tourists.
In the next example, we compare hotels in the same location, but with different character-
istics, for which events provide information about customer preferences:
Hotel B and Hotel C are both located next to the conference venue at location Y. Hotel B provides
superior amenities, but also charges a higher price than Hotel C. When no conferences are ongoing,
each sees higher occupancy during peak tourist times, with occupancy at Hotel C consistently
about 30% lower than that of Hotel B. Then, during conferences, both hotels experience a surge in
demand, with the surge at Hotel C large enough that its occupancy exceeds that of Hotel B. As this
additional demand consists of conference attendees, we conclude that this class of customers cares
less for amenities, and is more price sensitive, relative to the class of tourists. This is exhibited by
the choice of Hotel C over Hotel B in a relatively larger proportion.
The examples highlight two ways in which the presence of events helps in identifying segment
behavior. Certainly, our full model is more complex in that differences in location and
various hotel characteristics appear simultaneously and we must untangle the effects of
a much larger number of hotels and customer segments. In this case, the mathematical
structure we impose allows us to estimate the model parameters algorithmically. A more
detailed look at the proposed model structure and estimation procedure follows below.
Following a review of literature, we proceed in Section 4.3 with a description of the
model. Section 4.4 then discusses the Washington D.C. study and analyzes the resulting
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competitor sets. Section 4.5 presents an extension to account for customer spillover, and
we conclude in Section 4.6.
4.2 Literature Review
The competitor sets that we construct are based on a discrete choice model of hotel se-
lection. We thus review relevant articles on discrete choice modeling from the marketing,
econometrics, and operations management literatures. Occupancy data for a broad enough
set of competitors could be obtained only in aggregate, captured daily by hotel and not
through individual orders, and so we focus on those studies in which segment structure is
inferred from aggregate sales data.
A method for estimating random coefficients (mixed) logit preferences through aggregate
sales data was introduced in Berry et al. (1995). Through an example in the U.S. auto
industry, the authors demonstrate that customer heterogeneity can in fact be inferred from
firm-level data without observing individual customer orders. Estimation is performed
using a method of moments procedure. The market share functions, in this case integrals
over a continuous customer type distribution, are inverted numerically using a contraction
mapping approach to obtain average product valuations. A similar method is employed by
Nevo (2001) in studying the market for breakfast cereals. In this case, a product-level fixed
effect is introduced to control for brand preferences, and so avoid endogeneity problems.
We employ such controls as well, although future iterations may well eliminate this need
through the use of detailed hotel ranking data.
In contrast to the above studies, we model customers heterogeneity through discrete
latent segments, rather than a continuous distribution. A precedent for latent-segment
inference using aggregate data is Zenor and Srivastava (1993), who use an expectation-
maximization approach to estimate segment structure and within-segment choice pref-
erences simultaneously. The authors compare results against a single-segment customer
model, and highlight the advantages of modeling latent segments. We will provide a similar
discussion in the context of competitor sets. In another study, Besanko et al. (2003) employ
a method of moments approach, similar to that of Berry et al. (1995), but adapted to handle
discrete segments. Interestingly, Bodapati and Gupta (2004) compare the effectiveness of
estimating discrete latent segments with and without customer-level sales data. Their find-
ings are that estimation with aggregate data, while possible, brings a much larger burden
in terms of the amount of variability needed to observe. In the case of Besanko et al. (2003)
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additional variability was captured through a supply side model, which introduces shifts
in supply-side costs terms into the modeling framework. Our work takes a complemen-
tary course. We link our customer segments to market events, which introduce additional
variability on the demand side.
Another important feature of our work is our modeling of location as an element of
choice, and as one whose impact varies across customers. Venkataraman and Kadiyali
(2005) model hotel demand in Austin, Texas, with hotels categorized by their distance from
two “idea points” located downtown and at the airport. Employing a generalized nested
logit framework, the authors conclude that hotel preferences mix both price and distance
as factors, with a premium placed on proximity to the two idea points. Our location model
uses a similar notion of distance from idealized demand points. We allow these demand
points to differ across segments to introduce heterogeneity into our location preferences.
Furthermore, our location preferences are not static, as segment sizes are allowed to vary
through time. Outside of the travel industry, Davis (2006) models competition among
geographically dispersed movie theaters. Census tract data is used here to model the dis-
tribution of customers geographically, with customers preferring movie theaters closer to
their homes. For our study, we cannot directly observe idealized demand points in this way,
but we use event data to infer demographics. We also model additional complexity through
demographics that vary over time.
Section 4.5 addresses additional difficulties in estimation that arise from the impact of
binding capacity constraints. Vulcano et al. (2008) provide a detailed discussion of the
demand censoring that can result under such conditions, and a summary of approaches
used previously to “unconstrain” sales observations in a retail setting. A problem that
arises when modeling customer spillover with aggregate data is that the order of individual
customer arrivals, and thus the set of available choices seen by each, is not known to the
researcher. In the case of Vulcano et al. (2008), this difficulty is dealt with by assuming
small enough epochs that the choice set can remain constant throughout. Given data on
the choices available at each epoch, it is possible to recover what is most likely to be each
customer’s ideal purchase choice, while accounting for the impact of spillover. The authors
propose an expectation-maximization method to recover the uncensored multinomial logit
preferences. The problem of periodic inventory review, where unobserved stockouts may
alter the choice set during a review period, is studied by Musalem et al. (2010), who propose
a Bayesian estimation procedure. The authors jointly estimate customer preferences and
product availability through a Markov chain Monte Carlo method that includes simulation
CHAPTER 4. IDENTIFYING COMP. SETS IN THE HOTEL INDUSTRY 92
of the sequence of customer arrivals. In our setting, the large number of customer arrivals
we must model for each period, i.e. a full day’s worth of travelers to the market, make
it difficult to extend this type of approach. Instead, we implement a heuristic rationing
approach that is easily built into our least squares estimation procedure. We have planned
future work to explore alternative estimators, in conjunction with an explicit, customer-level
model of spillover. So far, our heuristic results appear to give us a reasonable correction of
model estimates without too much computational overheard.
The key to our competitor analysis is the ability to identify heterogeneity in customer
preferences. Traditionally, this is incorporated through either discrete latent segments or a
random coefficients model following a continuous mixing distribution (see Green and Hen-
sher (2003) for a discussion of the relative merits of these approaches, as well as Fosgerau
and Hess (2008) and Train (2008) for hybrid, semi-parametric approaches). An alternative
method is to model the dependence of preferences on latent variables, often with a psy-
chometric interpretation that may influence the choice process (see, e.g., Elrod and Keane
(1995)). Ashok et al. (2002) and Ben-Akiva et al. (2002) present methods through which
observable indicators (e.g., survey responses) are used in the estimation of these latent vari-
ables. Thus, where we use event data to uncover heterogeneity through our segment-mix
process, the authors integrate additional inputs that can influence preferences directly. Also
of interest are hidden markov models ((Bartolucci et al. 2009)) which model unobserved
heterogeneity that evolves as a temporal process. Lastly, recent work on noncompensatory
choice models, such as the constrained multinomial logit model of Martinez et al (2005),
can accommodate variation between customers in the choice set that receives consideration.
4.3 Hotel Choice Model
We estimate our model using hotel occupancy data to describe purchasing, without ob-
serving any customer-level information. The discrete choice model is inherently a model
of individual decision-making, but we can extrapolate market-level purchasing behavior as
is done in, e.g, Berry et al. (1995). We define a set C of customer types (e.g., business,
leisure), and a set L of locations, so that each customer i belongs to a latent class cl, indi-
cating a type c ∈ C and preference for a location l ∈ L. Let J represent the set of hotels for
which we have data. In addition to the study hotels, there is an “outside option”, hotel 0,
representing those customers who opt to stay at a hotel outside of the set J . Hotel data is
collected for each time period t in the study horizon T . Each time period could be taken as
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small as a single day, or possibly limited to two periods for each week, differentiating only
by weekends and weekdays.
4.3.1 Notation
Sales of hotel rooms are captured for each hotel j and time t by the occupancy:
• sjt; number of rooms filled at time t.
Because s0t cannot be observed directly, we require knowledge of:
• Mt; market-level occupancy at time t,
or an approximation thereof. Customers choosing the outside option hotel are then set to:
s0t = Mt −
∑
j∈J sjt.
Customer choices depend on hotel characteristics, which are contained in a vector xjt
for each hotel j in set J at time t. Examples of items to include in the vector xjt include:
• average rate for a standard room at the hotel;
• number of rooms in the hotel;
• average size of a room at the hotel;
• compiled scores for features such as: food and beverage, guest services, meeting space, ameni-
ties, brand strength, and web presence.
Our data set also includes a set L of locations representing destinations in the city that are
likely to attract demand, in the sense that customers weigh proximity to the location in
their choice of hotel. In our model, each customer has a preference for a specific location l,
and factors the distance from location l to each hotel j into its decisions. We account for
this by collecting:
• Dljt; the distance from location l to hotel j,
for each hotel-location pair. In general, location l can reference a specific landmark, or
possibly an aggregate distance score that accounts for the distance to several attractive
destinations. This allows us to differentiate between those customers with a strong pref-
erence for a specific site, and those who weigh location heavily but may have more varied
travel plans.
In addition, we keep track of events that take place during the study period, and model
the impact these events have on the makeup of the customer pool. One component of our
event data concerns “calendar events” (e.g. weekend, holiday, etc.), that are inherent to
the time period in question. These are represented by:
• It; set of dummy variables for calendar events.
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The other component contains “special events” (e.g. conventions, concerts, etc.), which
vary in size and, importantly, are tied to specific locations. We group these into event
categories, and track them with the vector:
• ylt; number/size of events at location l for various event categories.
Considering our lack of customer-level data, we rely on event data in describing the customer
pool at time t. Specifically, our estimate Nclt for the size of the corresponding latent class
at time t is assumed to follow:
Nclt(α, ω) = αclIt + ωcylt (4.2)
for some parameter vectors, αcl and ωc (we have assumed additivity here, but other forms
may be used; e.g., Nclt = eαclIt+ωcylt to capture events with multiplicative effects). The
class-size process is then calibrated by estimating α and ω along with the choice model.
4.3.2 Utility Model
Our utility model presents customer decisions in terms of the observed data, x, D, I, and y,
described above. The utility that customer i derives from a stay in hotel j at time t takes
the form:
uicljt = ξjt + βcxjt + γcDljt + εicljt (4.3)
where cl is the latent class of customer i. The parameters βc and γc reflect the importance
that customers of type c place on the various hotel characteristics and on location, respec-
tively. To exploit the existence of customer types when estimating, preferences here have
been restricted to vary only at the customer type level, rather than at the level of each
latent class cl. We note that C can be defined with a unique mapping into L to ensure that
no generality is lost through this restriction.
The remaining terms, ξjt and εicljt, represent variance in utility that cannot be linked to
the observed characteristics. By including ξjt, we acknowledge that customers value certain
hotel characteristics that we cannot capture in data. This could include elements of prestige,
or of the hotel experience itself, that are difficult to quantify. The effect then shows up in our
model as product-level utility shocks. The last term, εicljt, represents variance in individual
customers’ tastes. This term has a mean of zero, so that vcljt = ξjt + βcxjt + γcDljt can be
thought of as the average utility of the hotel for any member of customer i’s latent class, and
εicljt contains the variation around this mean for individual customers. The shocks, εicljt, are
considered to be independently and identically distributed across customers, products, and
time periods (although heterogeneity in variance can be achieved through normalization).
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Customers choose the single hotel that provides them with the largest utility. Given
the segment-level product valuations in v, the distribution of customer choices within the
segment is determined by the distribution of εicljt. In particular, by assuming that εicljt
follows an extreme-value distribution, i.e. has a density function f(ε) = e−e−ε , we obtain
the multinomial logit choice probabilities. That is, the probability of a class cl customer
purchasing from j, dependent on the unknown parameters ξ, β, and γ is:






where vcl0t has been normalized to 1 without loss of generality. Predicted occupancies are
then calculated as:





Nclt(ω, α)Pcljt(ξ, β, γ). (4.5)
The choice model now provides a framework to calibrate the unobserved parameters so that
m matches the observed shares.
4.3.3 Computation
Denote the full set of unknowns by θ = {ξ, β, γ, α, ω}, and the observed data by Z =
{s, x, D, I, y}. Our estimation procedure is simply to minimize the norm of predicted error




More generally, one could employ a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach
by minimizing the norm ‖G(θ, Z)‖ of a vector G(θ, Z) of moment functions. For an
approach along the lines of Berry et al. (1995) and Besanko et al. (2003), we could en-
force orthogonality of unobserved demand shocks, ξ, from the observed characteristics; i.e.,
E[ξjt|x,D, I, y] = 0.
Our least squares approach is attractive for its simplicity. We find this feature advan-
tageous in Section 4.5 when incorporating a heuristic rationing policy into our estimation
procedure. An advantage that GMM holds is the ability to instrument for prices when they
are found to correlate with ξ. While it is clear that hotels alter their pricing in response
to factors that increase their demand, we have controlled for many of these through the
events in our segment-size process. Regarding the unobserved heterogeneity among hotels,
we have obtained reasonable price elasticities with our current approach, and so have not
made correlation with these effects a primary concern.
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4.3.4 Identifying Competitors
To create competitor sets, we must first extract from our model a metric that measures the
intensity of competition between a pair of hotels. We call this metric, Sjht; the similarity
score assigned to hotel h, for a focal hotel j, at a given time t. In a general sense, this metric
is related to a distance metric, such as ‖xjt − xht‖, that directly measures the similarity of
hotel characteristics. However, this naive metric has the drawback that all characteristics
are weighted equally, and it is not clear a priori how this weighting should be adjusted
otherwise.
We thus suggest a segment-by-segment approach that measures, for any focal hotel j,
how strongly each competitor appeals to the same segments as j. To compute, we first rank
hotels h 6= j by the proportion of market share, other than that taken by j, they receive
from each customer class. For customer class cl, this proportion is exactly Pclht/(1−Pcljt).
To measure overall similarity of hotels, our approach is to weight these proportions by the
conditional probability that a customer of hotel j belongs to class cl. These conditional
probabilities are computed by:
Pr{i ∈ cl | i purchases from j a time t} = (NcltPcljt)/mjt. (4.7)







mjt(1− Pcljt) . (4.8)
Finally, to create choice-based competitor sets, hotels are ranked in order of Sjht, and those
with at least some minimum score are counted as hotel j’s key competitors. This analysis
can be done using a representative time period, or by averaging similarity scores across a
chosen time horizon.
The score presented in (4.8) has an additional interpretation as a broad measure of hotel
substitutions. It is the proportion of hotel j’s market share that is predicted to move to
hotel h if j exits the market. With the empirical study in the next section, we will attempt
to provide greater insight into the way that these scores reflect on the competitive landscape
of a particular market.
4.4 Washington D.C. Study
A study was conducted to generate representative competitor sets, based on occupancy
and customer data collected in the Washington D.C. market from the summer of 2010.
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Hotel occupancy data was collected from 21 hotels, all within Washington D.C. itself (we
did not consider nearby locations that may compete to some extent with the hotels in the
city). This represents roughly one third of the overall market; a sample that is substantial
enough to recover segment information and customer preferences. For full competitor sets,
we will want to extend to a broader selection of hotels. This requires only that we obtain
characteristic (i.e. price) data for the missing hotels. Without occupancy data for remaining
hotels, we believe it is reasonable to train the model on our sample hotels and then apply
the calculated customer preferences across the broader set. We now discuss precisely the
data obtained, including the process for defining customer segments from event data, and
review the results of our estimation. In section 4.3.4, we apply the resulting choice model
to generate competitor choice-based sets for the Washington D.C. market.
4.4.1 Overview of Data
To begin, we must define the sets C, L, J , and T . For customer types C, we employed a
split between business (B) and leisure (L) customers; i.e., C = {B, L}. To achieve a further
segmentation by location, the city was divided into three regions, each likely to host a
distinct profile of events. Recall that location, in this context refers to the customer’s ideal
location of stay, so that prospective hotels are judged by their proximity to the customer’s
location, l. For this analysis, we used the designations of Central D.C. (DC), Convention
Center (CC), and Foggy Bottom / Georgetown (FB); i.e., L = {DC,CC,FG}. The
set J contains our 21 study hotels, as well as an option for no purchase from the set.
Occupancy data was collected at a daily level, then aggregated up to the level of 31 half-
weeks. Each week in the study period consists of two half-weeks, from Friday through
Sunday and Monday through Thursday nights, respectively. In the case of holiday weekends,
we include Monday night in the weekend period as well. The indicators Iwkdyt and I
wknd
t
were introduced to distinguish weekday and weekend half-weeks, respectively.
Occupancy data, sjt, consists of daily hotel occupancy figures that have been aggregated
to the half-week level. We also introduce prices pjt, for which we have used the daily average
revenue obtained per occupied room during the half-week t. Each hotel is described only
by its price series and its location. The location itself is stationary and is considered only
as it relates to the three distance measures, DDC,j , DCC,j , DFB,j , which link the hotel to
each of our potential demand anchors.
In this case, the use of hotel occupancy, rather than customer-level data, allowed for the
inclusion of a larger set of competitors in the study. Under such circumstances, where a
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choice must be made between finer granularity and broader coverage, we favor our method
for competitor set analysis, since competitive interactions are represented directly, and a
picture of customer behavior can indeed be constructed through careful use of event-related
data.
Event data was collected through two sources, corresponding roughly to business and
leisure events. The business events we are aware of are those taking place at the D.C.
Convention Center during the study period. For these, we have the event location, event
date, and an estimate of the number of people in attendance. We use attendance figures,
subject to a multiplier, to indicate the effect on demand from the corresponding event. For
leisure events, the approach is slightly different. Data was compiled from multiple web-based
event schedules, containing dates and location for entertainment, sporting, and cultural
events in the D.C. area. In this case we measure the “event size” by the concentration, in
terms of number of events, on a particular day in a particular location. Time series data
from these sources was combined to construct the event data y, containing a matrix of event
sizes, indexed by type and location, for each half-week t.
4.4.2 Segmentation and Model Definition
Customer segments are specified at the customer type-location level. Of the six possible
types in C × L, we restrict two to contain no customers, so that customers divide into four
segments:
(c, l) ∈ {(B,DC), (L,DC), (B, CC), (L,FB)}.
Note that the segments modeled are actually latent groupings, so that their true makeup
arises out of the estimation procedure itself. Accordingly, the study design does not include
the definition of customer segments themselves. Rather, it is the way in which we segment
events prior to estimation that in turn dictates the type of customer segmentation we will
ultimately obtain. While uncategorized event data can help to identify temporal patterns
in the aggregate market size, we introduce the additional dimensionality needed to uncover
trends in the segment makeup.
The segmentation of events was done along both the event-type and demand-location
dimensions. The first step was a split between business and leisure events, as discussed
above. We then grouped events further by their location, designating event locations as
DC, CC, or FB. Boundaries were drawn for each area, and an anchor point designated
for the purpose of assigning distances. All events within the boundaries contribute demand
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towards the corresponding anchor points. Distances Dlj are then computed from each
anchor point to each study hotel to determine choices for customers of location segment l.
The areas we designate are convenient for dividing the city geographically, with DC
encompassing the areas surrounding the National Mall, and extending East into the Capitol
Hill and Central D.C. areas, while FB begins with the area around George Washington
University, just to the West of Downtown, and extending North and West into the more
residential parts of the city. Moreover, the character of events is somewhat unique to
each area, with leisure activities in the FG area more likely to center on the universities,
parks, and smaller venues in the area than on the major tourist attractions found within
the boundaries of DC. We reflect this distinction by allowing three event types: business
events at the Convention Center (conv), leisure events in Central D.C. (dc), and leisure
events in Foggy Bottom/Georgetown (fog). In general, event types need not correspond to
locations as they do here. Instead, a matrix yt contains event data that is indexed by both
location and type. In the current specification, off-diagonal terms of yt are all zeros.
We can now present the precise choice model that we take to the data. For customers
in segment (c, l), average product valuations follow from:
vcljt = βpc pjt + γcDlj + ξj , (4.9)
with scalar parameters βpc and γc for each customer type, along with the hotel fixed effects
ξ (note that we restrict ξj to be stationary). Segment sizes at time t are defined by the
system:












NB,CC,t = αB,CC + ωconvB y
conv
t ,





with parameter vectors αcl and ωc to estimate for each customer segment and type, respec-
tively. We have restricted ωc to zeros in the first expression, αwkndcl to zero in all but the
second expression, and αwkdycl to zero in all but the first expression. The resulting system
of 34 parameters and 682 data observations was estimated using the procedure described
in Section 4.3.3.
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4.4.3 Computational Results
The results of the study are provided in Table 4.1. The choice parameters β and γ are
all significant, indicating a negative impact of both price and distance for all customers.
The estimates indicate that business customers are more sensitive to price than are leisure
customers. Leisure customers, in turn, are found to put a greater emphasis on their hotel’s
location. With the exception of ξ18, all hotels have significant intercept terms.
The differences in β and γ between customer types are also significant. Regarding this
distinction in preferences, we do note that our focus is on hotels within the relatively small
area of Washington D.C. itself. Within this area, data indicates that leisure customers
tend to value a close proximity to attractions. This is especially likely when considering
that more price-sensitive leisure customers may ultimately choose cheaper hotels in the
surrounding areas; probably more frequently than do business customers. In this context,
our type L may be most representative of higher-end leisure customers, who are most willing
to pay for proximity to attractions. Relative to these customers, business customers may
be content with a hotel offering a modest proximity to their desired location, at which point
corporate discounts and travel program affiliations are allowed to dominate the final choice
of hotel. In Section 4.5, we consider that hotel capacity constraints may also exert some
hidden influence over these parameters’ values.
Of most interest is our ability to identify segments. Namely, we obtain estimates for





NL,DC,t = 11.1Iwkndt ,
NB,CC,t = 4.2 + .82yconvt ,
NL,FB,t = 3.5 + .28y
fog
t . (4.11)
Not all parameters in (4.10) exhibited significant effects. Instead, we found that customer
patterns in Central D.C. are explained adequately by a strict weekday/weekend shuttling
of business and leisure customers. Any variations between specific weeks or weekends is
thus found to correlate sufficiently well with events at the Convention Center and in Foggy
Bottom. Furthermore, the fact that constants αB,DC and αL,DC do not figure significantly,
indicates that weekday/weekend customers in Central D.C. exhibit preferences close to those
of Convention Center/Foggy Bottom customers, respectively, so that it was not necessary
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Parameter Estimate Std Err
βpB -0.91 0.01
βpL -0.29 0.02
Parameter Estimate Std Err
γB -0.98 0.05
γL -2.84 0.09





































Table 4.1: Parameter estimates and standard errors for Washington D.C study.
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to model DC customers as a mixture of the two groups.
Lastly, we address the variability in the customer mix that is driven by Convention
Center and Foggy Bottom events. Both parameters, ωconvB and ω
fog
L , are significant, and
the temporal variance in yconvt and y
fog
t is such that, while weekend/weekday effects clearly
dominate, there are noticeable second-order variations in the mix of customer types from
week to week. This is particularly so in the mid-to-late summer season, which is marked
by both elevated leisure travel and the presence of some large conventions that shift demo-
graphics towards business customers. These patterns are demonstrated in figures 4.1a and
4.1b.
Figure 4.1: Segment mix over the study period.
4.4.3.1 Segment Restrictions
By assigning a location and specific sets of relevant events to each of our segments, we play a
nontrivial role in determining the resulting segment structure. We believe such specifications
are necessary to an extent to allow for model identification. To better understand the impact
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of these assumptions, we tested the model restrictions that result from our exogenously
imposed mapping of latent classes to customer types. In the model described above, two
restrictions are necessary to link parameters from the two business and two leisure classes,
respectively. For comparison, we tested the model in which these restrictions were removed
so that each class contains individual values of β and γ. We also tested the model where
all classes are linked to a single customer type.
The sum of squared residuals in our estimation was found to decrease by 9% when
the single-class restriction is removed and to decrease by a further 3% when our two-class
restriction is removed. F-tests revealed that both restrictions have a statistically significant
impact on the model. However, we did find in removing the two-class restriction that p-
values of some individual parameters did increase. In particular, preference estimates for
the (L,DC) latent class were no longer estimated significantly. As such, it does seem that
there is benefit, at least in efficiency, of allowing for customer type restrictions across latent
classes. While the F-test does indicate there is value in allowing for additional customer
types beyond what we have defined, it may be the case that more personalized data, perhaps
on sub-types of events, is needed to estimate the full set of preferences. With our current
inputs, we chose to stop with two customer types to avoid potential over-fitting.
Ultimately, the number of types that may be identified will be determined by the di-
mensionality of the event data used. Future work should look at additional pre-processing
that can be done with this data or seek to identify additional sources.
4.4.4 Competitor Set Analysis
The results of section 4.4.3 were used to construct competitor sets for the 21 hotels in our
study. To create competitor sets, we first calculate the |J | by |J | matrix of similarity
scores, using the form given in (4.8), and averaging over the time horizon to obtain a single
score, S̄jh, for each hotel pair. For each hotel j, we then select five competitors with the
highest similarity scores to fill out the hotel’s competitor set.
Descriptive statistics are helpful in evaluating the utility of the resulting sets. In par-
ticular, we are interested in the extent to which our choice-based competitor sets agree
with naive competitor sets based solely on geography or price. Furthermore, to support our
use of latent customer segments, we demonstrate the differences between our competitor
sets and the choice-based competitor sets that result from a single-segment model of hotel
choice.
A first metric to consider is the correlation between hotel similarity scores and the
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(a) Segmented customer model.
(b) Single-segment model.
Figure 4.2: Similarity scores S̄jh, scaled by 100. Row j contains scores for focal hotel j. Both axes sorted by
average price to illustrate correlation with hotel similarity.
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(a) Segmented customer model.
(b) Single-segment model.
Figure 4.3: Similarity scores S̄jh, scaled by 100. Row j contains scores for focal hotel j. h axis sorted by
temporal price correlation with focal hotel to illustrate impact on hotel similarity.
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differences in the average price of a room between competing hotels. Figure 4.2a provides a
visual representation of this correlation. The matrix presented was created by sorting the
hotels on each axis by their average price per room. If average price is a strong predictor of
similarity, we then expect to see the highest similarity scores clustered around the diagonal.
The shaded cells mark the columns of hotels that make up the competitor set for the hotel
on each row. Again, these shaded cells should be clustered around the diagonal to indicate
a strong correlation.
The figures suggest that price is a relatively weak indicator of similarity. In fact, we do
find that there is a small negative correlation, with a coefficient of -0.05, between similarity
scores and price differences in our segment model. Figure 4.2b diagrams the same correla-
tions for a single-segment choice model. Without segmentation, each hotel has essentially
the same competitor set, containing the hotels with the largest overall market share. With
this model, we find a positive overall correlation of 0.07. So, while the impact of price is
relatively small, we observe that modeling customer segments allows for a better grouping
of hotels in terms of price. Besides measuring average price, we recognize that hotel prices
can vary significantly from day to day. Hotels offering a similar average price may offer
their best rates at different times, and so potentially target different customers. To capture
this aspect of pricing, we measure the temporal correlation in prices offered between pairs
of hotels. After calculating this metric for each hotels, we found a correlation with hotel
similarity scores of 0.35. This compares to a correlation of 0.32 in the single-segment model.
Figure 4.3 demonstrates these correlations. Each row is sorted by the degree of temporal
correlation with that focal hotel, so that a strong relationship is indicated by large scores
to the left of the diagram.
A stronger correlation is found between similarity scores and hotel locations. In particu-
lar, we look at each hotel’s distance from the D.C. Convention Center, and find a correlation
of -0.55 between similarity scores and differences in this distance. This compares to a cor-
relation of 0.04 for the same metrics in the single-segment model. Figure 4.4a illustrates
this strong relationship. The hotels are largely classified into a group that is near the con-
vention center, and a group that is further away. With only a few exceptions, each hotel’s
competitor set is contained within it’s location grouping. This is a striking contrast to the
static competitor sets of Figure 4.4b.
It appears that the competitor sets resulting from the model of section 4.4.3 are pre-
dominantly location-based, with similarities in pricing helping to sort out second-order
relationships. The choice-based approach is able to account for both factors in an inte-
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(a) Segmented customer model.
(b) Single-segment model.
Figure 4.4: Similarity scores S̄jh, scaled by 100. Row j contains scores for focal hotel j. Both axes sorted by
distance from D.C. Convention Center to illustrate correlation with hotel similarity.
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grated way, and provides a tool to identify those few cases where location is not crucial
factor that we would otherwise expect. The makeup of these competitor sets is summarized
in Table 4.4. The table compares each hotel with its competitor set members, using the
various metrics discussed here. In the next section, we adjust our estimation procedure to
account for the impact of binding capacity constraints. As a result, our competitor sets will
be refined to place some additional weighting on price, rather than on location.
4.5 Estimation with Binding Capacity Constraints
In this section, we address an extension of our estimation procedure that will account
explicitly for the impact of binding capacity constraints on observed occupancies. In the
hotel industry, it is common for demand to exceed the available supply of rooms on busy
travel days. This implies some possible censoring of demand observations in cases where
a hotel’s occupancy reaches it’s capacity. In such cases, the quantity of rooms demanded
at the day’s price may actually exceed the number of rooms booked. Moreover, customers
who cannot book a room at there preferred hotel may end up booking at an alternative
hotel, thus inflating the observed demand for this competitor.
We are interested in understanding the extent to which these phenomena have influenced
our estimates. There is clearly potential for censoring, as nearly a quarter of our hotels
operate with average daily utilizations above 90%. Furthermore, we find that occupancy
meets capacity in 9% percent of the data points used in our study. We note, however, that
such statistics may overstate the true extent of censoring in our data set. Through revenue
management and dynamic pricing, hotels will often attempt to price so that demand will
just meet, rather than surpass, their capacity limits. If done well, this can mitigate, or
eliminate, the overflow problem discussed above. There is some evidence of this behavior
in our data, as the average price of hotel correlates with total occupancy in the market by
a factor of .25.
To capture customer overflow, the parameters of our choice model were estimated again
by applying a modified procedure to the data used in Section 4.4. We again apply a least
squares estimation approach, but now employ, for given parameters θ, an iterative procedure
to obtain Pcljt(ξ, β, γ) and mjt(ξ, β, γ, ω, α), for the capacitated problem. We then choose
model parameters to match the resulting output with observed shares. The procedure for
generating capacitated market share estimates is as follows:
1. Compute segment sizes and product valuations as in unconstrained case (for selected
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day t).
2. For each customer segment, compute that day’s unconstrained demand for rooms from
each hotel.
• If demand for hotel is below available capacity, assign all rooms demanded.
• If demand exceeds available capacity, allocate rooms to segments in proportion
to the quantity demanded.
3. Adjust segment size and remaining capacities to reflect allocations.
4. If any rooms or customers remain unallocated, return to step 2 and repeat with
restricted choice set. Iterate until market clears.
The results obtained with this estimation procedure are presented in Table 4.2. There
are some notable differences from the initial results presented in Table 4.1. The preference
parameters, which previously indicated that leisure customers weight distance over price
much more so than do business customers, now suggest this to a much lesser extent. Price
sensitivities βpB and β
p
L are now roughly equivalent, while the gap between γB and γL has
shrunk in both absolute percentage terms. We attribute this to the fact that on weekdays,
both models allocate a number of business customers to hotels in the Foggy Bottom area,
away from both Central D.C. and the Convention Center. Whereas in the uncapacitated
model, this behavior is explained through a reduced sensitivity to distance, the capacitated
model appears to label some of these customers as spillover from hotels that are located
more centrally.
In terms of segment makeup, the capacitated model reflects spillover of customers from
Central D.C. into other locations by assigning a larger number of customers to the (B, DC)
and (L, DC) segments. The adjusted model also allows for an even stricter separation of
business and leisure customers into weekday and weekend time periods. To understand this,
we consider that a model with spillover of Central D.C. customers allows for a more accu-
rate representation of these customers’ preferences. In the uncapacitated model, customer
preference must be distorted in order to assign the spillover customers to a DC segment.
This model can then provide a closer fit by attaching some of the spillover customers to
a leisure segment to minimize distortion. This issue is avoided in the capacitated model,
which assigns spillover customers with preferences consistent with their first-choice hotel.
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Parameter Estimate Std Err
βpB -1.82 0.01
βpL -1.90 0.02
Parameter Estimate Std Err
γB -1.49 0.05
γL -2.43 0.09





































Table 4.2: Parameter estimates and standard errors for Washington D.C study with procedure modified for
binding capacity constraints.
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4.5.1 Impact on Competitor Sets
Competitor sets were recomputed to reflect the capacity-adjusted estimation results, with
the resulting sets summarized in Table 4.5. In terms of these competitor sets, the results
from this section do not differ dramatically from the uncapacitated case. We do, however,
see some shifting of similarity scores that suggests a bias in our initial assessment of hotel
competition.
To demonstrate this shift, we again correlated location and price factors with similarity
scores. As before, we see that location is the dominant element that dictates competition.
However, this is no longer true to quite the same extent as when capacity is ignored. Rather,
there is a slight increase in the correlations with both price factors in the capacitated model,
while the impact of location decreases slightly. Tying this back to the model parameters, we
note that, in the updated model, price sensitivity increases (in absolute terms, and relative to
distance sensitivity) for both segments, with the result that hotel-to-hotel differences in price
are magnified. Furthermore, customers’ ideal locations are more heavily concentrated in
Central D.C.. This additional homogeneity makes location somewhat less of a differentiator
when comparing the pool of customers served by each hotel.
The summary in Table 4.5.1 provides a comparison between the single-segment, unca-
pacitated, and capacitated models.






Price (abs. val. of diff.) -0.050 -0.080 0.073
Temporal Price Correlation 0.348 0.367 0.318
CC Distance (abs. val. of diff.) -0.545 -0.504 0.039
Table 4.3: Summary of correlation between overall hotel similarity scores and selected alternative similarity
metrics.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
We present a choice model for hotel customers that can be used to construct competitor sets
in an objective and scientific manner. The inputs to this model are hotel characteristics,
daily hotel occupancy totals, and a listing of demand-impacting events in the market being
studied. A sample study is conducted which creates competitor groupings that are similar
to some degree in price, location, and other characteristics. We believe this is a superior
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method to grouping by any one of these characteristics alone, and our choice model pro-
vides a framework to integrate these factors in a way that is both objective and intuitive.
In general, competitor set identification is a problem with far-reaching management impli-
cations, but for which relatively few analytical techniques exist. We hope that our study
will motivate further research in this area.
Our main insight for competitor set analysis is to base the construction of competitor
sets on a model of customer choice, so that a hotel defines its competitors precisely as those
hotels that attract the same types of customers. We believe this is a natural way to rank
competitors, and that whether or not our model is applied directly, hotels can benefit from
adopting this view of competition in general. To give one example, hotels with access to
certain forms of customer-level data may be able to learn directly about the other hotels
their customers consider through web-browsing history, product reviews, or perhaps even
survey results. When available, such information can be useful in ranking competitors, both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
In actuality, our customer choice model provides a more finely detailed depiction of
competitive interactions than can come from a choice set alone. Accordingly, there is
potential to enhance a competitor set analysis with additional metrics obtained through
our choice model. For instance, if a property is a candidate for re-branding, along with
an updated competitor set to reflect the hotel’s new competitive reality, we are able to
provide the likely impact on market share, price sensitivities, utilization patterns, etc., that
will come from targeting a different customer segment from that location. Along these
same lines, by identifying likely customers, their ideal locations, and sensitivity to distance
from these locations, we are able to separate the value of a particular location from the
location-independent value of a hotel. Such an analysis has the potential to powerfully
impact the property-valuation process. In the case of performance benchmarking, we note
that when the set of hotel characteristics, xjt, is rich enough to control for the meaningful
characteristics of a property, our model goes so far as to provide, through ξjt, an explicit
measure of hotel performance relative to its intrinsic value. Thus, we can not only identify
those hotels to which our target is similar, but provide a built-in metric to measure the
hotel against those close competitors.
We contribute also to the methodology of discrete choice and latent-segment estimation.
In particular, we have introduce a novel technique for identifying latent segments through
a connection to observable market events. We expect that researchers will find useful
analogs to this approach in other industries where segment composition is time-varying
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and correlated with an exogenous and observable process. Seasonal effects come to mind
for a number of industries, but new data sources will make it increasingly possible to track
demand-related events at more granular time scales. To give an example, one could attempt
to link weather conditions with behavior such as power consumption, or any other customer
behaviors that exhibit a varied response across customer segments. Finally, we are interested
in the position of this research within the larger realm of possibility for linking econometric
analysis to new and increasing granular sources of data. The recent explosion of available
customer data, in particular the increased visibility into temporal and geographic patterns,
presents a wealth of new opportunities and challenges for understanding competition. We
hope that out work can play some small role in bringing about a closer integration of data
mining with econometric modeling.






























1 211 171 41 0.93 0.9 0.8 0.04 211 184 28 0.93 0.9 0.9 0.04
2 179 180 2 0.93 0.9 0.8 0.06 179 184 5 0.93 0.9 0.9 0.01
3 194 190 4 0.84 0.4 0.7 0.34 194 184 11 0.83 0.4 0.9 0.53
4 233 178 55 0.91 0.4 0.8 0.37 233 184 50 0.90 0.4 0.9 0.51
5 187 180 7 0.83 0.6 0.8 0.24 187 184 3 0.84 0.6 0.9 0.30
6 200 183 17 0.93 0.5 0.8 0.30 200 177 22 0.91 0.5 1.1 0.63
7 167 187 20 0.91 0.5 0.9 0.40 167 184 17 0.87 0.5 1.1 0.68
8 173 179 6 0.92 0.6 0.9 0.25 173 184 11 0.91 0.6 0.9 0.29
9 169 179 10 0.87 1.5 0.7 0.82 169 184 14 0.88 1.5 0.9 0.61
10 171 180 10 0.94 0.8 0.8 0.08 171 184 13 0.92 0.8 0.9 0.14
11 164 180 17 0.90 0.8 0.8 0.04 164 184 20 0.90 0.8 0.9 0.11
12 181 177 5 0.92 0.8 0.9 0.10 181 181 0 0.90 0.8 1.1 0.31
13 174 176 3 0.91 1.2 1.5 0.30 174 184 10 0.90 1.2 0.9 0.28
14 161 176 15 0.88 1.0 1.2 0.21 161 184 22 0.89 1.0 0.9 0.08
15 198 178 20 0.70 1.4 1.4 0.05 198 184 15 0.68 1.4 0.9 0.45
16 201 171 30 0.86 1.4 1.5 0.10 201 177 24 0.90 1.4 0.9 0.41
17 168 177 9 0.91 1.5 1.4 0.10 168 174 15 0.86 1.5 0.9 0.61
18 176 176 0 0.93 1.6 1.4 0.19 176 184 7 0.84 1.6 0.9 0.69
19 164 178 14 0.90 1.6 1.4 0.16 164 184 19 0.83 1.6 0.9 0.66
20 180 178 2 0.78 1.6 1.4 0.18 180 184 3 0.74 1.6 0.9 0.68
21 172 177 5 0.90 1.4 1.4 0.05 172 184 11 0.82 1.4 0.9 0.49
Average 13.8 0.89 0.21 15.3 0.86 0.40
Table 4.4: Description of hotel competitor sets, including price-based and location-based similarity metrics.
Segmented customer model compared with naive single-segment model.

















1 211 171 41 0.93 0.9 0.8 0.04
2 179 180 2 0.93 0.9 0.8 0.06
3 194 187 8 0.82 0.4 0.7 0.35
4 233 176 57 0.90 0.4 0.8 0.40
5 187 180 7 0.83 0.6 0.8 0.24
6 200 183 17 0.93 0.5 0.8 0.30
7 167 177 10 0.91 0.5 0.9 0.49
8 173 179 6 0.92 0.6 0.9 0.25
9 169 179 10 0.87 1.5 0.7 0.82
10 171 180 10 0.94 0.8 0.8 0.08
11 164 180 17 0.90 0.8 0.8 0.04
12 181 177 5 0.92 0.8 0.9 0.10
13 174 176 3 0.91 1.2 1.5 0.30
14 161 176 15 0.88 1.0 1.2 0.21
15 198 178 20 0.70 1.4 1.4 0.05
16 201 171 30 0.86 1.4 1.5 0.10
17 168 177 9 0.91 1.5 1.4 0.10
18 176 176 0 0.93 1.6 1.4 0.19
19 164 178 14 0.90 1.6 1.4 0.16
20 180 178 2 0.78 1.6 1.4 0.18
21 172 177 5 0.90 1.4 1.4 0.05
Average 13.6 0.88 0.21
Table 4.5: Description of hotel competitor sets, including price-based and location-based similarity metrics.
Results presented are for capacity-adjusted customer model.
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Chapter 5
Real-Time Traffic Estimation using
Data Expansion
5.1 Introduction
Real-time traffic data is readily available in many cities around the world. Real-time data
comes from numerous sources; some of these sources have been available for decades, such
as inductive loops present at traffic signals, and others are more recently prevalent, such
as GPS data from equipped vehicles, and digital video. Increasingly, traffic authorities are
interested in leveraging these types of data for real-time traffic analytics. Real-time traffic
analytics include such capabilities as route guidance and real-time information provision on
the road condition for drivers, as well as tools for network operators to use in improving
traffic flow. All of these new and emerging capabilities require an accurate estimation of
current and near-term (e.g., up to one hour ahead) predicted traffic on the road network.
In order to address these important challenges, a first step is to assess the availability in
real time of traffic data across the road network. In many cases, while the data is available in
principle, it includes many gaps, both spatially and temporally. Gaps in the real-time data
availability present a serious impediment to the effective use of certain applications. For
instance, traffic-dependent route guidance requires estimates of the traffic across the links
of the network. Missing data on parts of the network can lead to route suggestions that are
highly sub-optimal for the current and future traffic levels. The same predicament arises for
network managers who wish to optimize the flow of traffic in real time. If the incoming real-
time data has significant gaps, or any gaps on critical links, operational decisions cannot
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necessarily be made with confidence.
In this chapter, we present a method for estimating traffic volumes across a full-sized
urban road network in real time. Urban networks are typically characterized by:
1. a large number of links and origin-destination pairs, requiring extreme scalability of
any real-time applications.
2. limited data availability in comparison to the more controlled setting of freeway sys-
tems.
3. a multiplicity of viable routes between origin-destination pairs, so that driver routing
decisions may vary substantially according to the current traffic conditions.
Networks of this type present a sizeable challenge for estimating link volumes in real
time. Our focus will be on these specific computational and data availability issues, rather
than a more complete description of traffic conditions that would include other parameters
such as speed, occupancy, and travel time. An estimation procedure, when embedded
in a full infrastructure with data transmission and database latencies, must complete all
calculations in a matter of seconds. Hence, the challenge in this work was to devise a
method that can accurately reproduce missing link volumes with very little computational
overhead in real time.
The data that can be assumed to be available is a set of historical link volumes that
cover some but not all of the network as well as the same type of data as a real-time feed,
stored in a database. An example of the cadence of the real-time feed is that a new set of
average link volumes is available every five minutes. In the cases of interest, a significant
portion of real-time five-minute-average link volumes are missing in the majority of time
periods in which data is collected. Typically, in such cases, the missing link volumes cover
a portion of the network which is simply not equipped with sensors, but there is also some
spatial variation due to faulty network connections or erroneous data that has been filtered
and removed from the real-time data feed. In other words, traffic volumes are available
some of the time on some of the links, but seldom all of the time or on all of the links.
Consequently, statistical techniques for filling in very limited missing data from a feed
of link volumes cannot be used; in the setting in which we are working, the gaps are too
large and too persistent. Rather, data can be estimated via the methods more traditionally
used in traffic planning, such as traffic assignment or simulation. The difference, however,
is that we require those traditional traffic planning approaches to provide estimates in
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real time on ultra-short time scales. When used for planning, these approaches do not
readily incorporate the real-time traffic characteristics, but rather are based on a typical
set of parameters. Typical parameters include origin-destination demands as well as link
cost functions. These parameters tend to reflect well average-case conditions, but may not
reflect as well the real-time attributes of the traffic at any point in time.
Our approach recognizes that critical parameters may vary from their average-case val-
ues, and that real-time data, although limited in our context, provides an important in-
dication of the prevailing conditions. By combining the measured traffic volumes with a
model of driver behavior in equilibrium, we formulate estimates of the missing volumes
that reflect the current conditions, rather than the long-term averages of traffic on these
links. In particular, we hypothesize that current link volumes conform to a static traffic
equilibrium, reflecting an unobserved set of origin-destination demands which may not be
consistent with their long-term averages. In this way we model the dependency of current
conditions on random events that may effect the usage of the traffic network. The equilib-
rium paradigm we adopt incorporates the routing adjustments made by urban drivers on a
day-to-day basis in the face of such events.
While traffic flow is clearly a dynamic phenomenon, and huge strides have been made
in the past decades in the field of dynamic traffic modeling, our work simplifies this aspect
of traffic flow to permit its use on full city-wide urban networks in real time. Although
advances have been made in both computation capacity and algorithm design, we are not
aware of dynamic traffic assignment being used in practice for real-time traffic operations.
As regards traffic simulation and its use in real-time operations, we believe that our method
can provide more accurate results and provide them faster than simulation in a real-time
setting. A significant reason for this is the heavy computational burden that simulation
programs and dynamic traffic equilibrium models demand and the inability to leverage
their full power in real-time operations.
The Data Expansion Algorithm (DEA) presented here consists of two phases: a real-time
estimation phase, and an offline calibration phase. The real-time phase is computationally
lightweight and is parameterized by a set of link-to-link splitting probabilities which indi-
cate the proportions of turns taken by drivers at each intersection. The offline phase uses
the historical collection of real-time feeds to calibrate these parameters in accordance with
the most likely traffic equilibria. This section concludes with a review of relevant literature,
to be followed by an overview of the algorithm in Section 2. In Section 3 we formulate the
real-time estimation problem and the offline calibration problem, and discuss our algorith-
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mic approach. Section 4 presents numerical results obtained using our approach on test
networks. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the merits of our approach as well as
some extensions of our model to incorporate additional information that may be available
for some road networks.
5.1.1 Review of related literature
The problem of expanding link volumes is closely related to that of origin-destination ma-
trix (OD matrix) estimation. If origin-destination demands can be estimated from a partial
set of link volumes, then the full set of link volumes can be computed using a traffic as-
signment model. The static OD matrix estimation problem is often formulated as a bilevel
optimization problem, where the lower level problem enforces equilibrium conditions on de-
mand and link flow estimates, and the upper level minimizes some combination of a distance
metric between estimated and observed link volumes, and the distance from a target set
of demands. Nguyen (1977) was the first to formulate the problem to include equilibrium
conditions. Fisk (1988) put the problem into a bilevel optimization framework. The bilevel
formulation is non-convex, and heuristic approaches to its solution remains an active area
of research (Patriksson 2008, Lundgren and Peterson 2008).
As traditional static estimation approaches work with long-run average volumes, our
motivation is closer to that of dynamic traffic simulation applications (e.g., DYNASMART
and DynaMIT, see Peeta and Ziliaskopolous (2001) for a survey) which combine historical
and real-time information to estimate traffic flow. As in the static OD matrix estimation
problem, these mesoscopic simulators seek to match estimated flows to observed flows, where
estimated flows are constrained to satisfy equilibrium conditions. However, equilibrium
flows are determined, not analytically, but with a micro-simulator that must be solved
iteratively in conjunction with demand estimation (Ben-Akiva et al. 1998). Such a procedure
is unsuitable for the large networks and the ultra-short time frames we consider. For further
background on dynamic traffic assignment methods, see the book by Ran and Boyce (1996).
In a spirit similar to ours, a few authors have proposed simplified models, typically in-
volving a linear relationship between origin-destination demands and link flows, that can be
calibrated using historical data. Cascetta (1984) proposed a least-squares OD matrix esti-
mation problem, where drivers choose routes in fixed proportions. Fixed route proportions
have also been assumed in various Kalman filtering approaches, beginning with Okutani
and Stephanedes (1984). Ashok (1996) applies Kalman filtering to deviations from initial
estimates that are computed offline. In each of these references, the approach is tested
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on freeway networks, where the number of routes is small, and proportions may be fairly
constant. It is unclear how these methods would perform on a large urban network. We
also note that while the Kalman filter approach uses a historical estimate of demands as a
starting point for its real-time estimates, it is not very responsive to significant real-time
changes such as would be seen from an incident. Mahmassani and Zhou (2007) make this
criticism, and replace the commonly used autoregressive model with a polynomial trend
model that is more responsive to current conditions, but continues to assume fixed route
proportions.
Another linearized real-time model is proposed by Tam and Lam (2007, 2011), and
applied in an urban setting in Hong Kong for estimation of travel times. The authors use
an offline simulation component to calibrate a variance-covariance matrix for link travel
times, all measured at a particular instant. This enables a real-time updating step, based
on the deviations of observed travel times from average travel times. El-Esawey and Sayed
(2011) estimate urban link travel times by a weighted average of “neighbor link” travel
times, suggesting an application to probe vehicle, as well as sensor data.
There is also a developing literature on imputation of missing or erroneous sensor data
on freeway links. Fernández-Moctezuma et al. (2009) provide an overview of these meth-
ods, and Zhong and Sharma (2009) conduct testing to compare a number of approaches.
The focus here is on freeway traffic, and typically on temporal gaps in the data, as result
from malfunctioning sensors, which permit the use of time-series methods for imputation.
The discussion in Muralidharan and Horowitz (1993) highlights the need for model-based
approaches to impute volumes for links that are missing from data entirely. A procedure
based on properties of traffic flow between neighboring links is developed. However, as with
other approaches to imputation on freeways, the method is not suited for urban networks
where a significant portion of links are without sensors.
The problem of estimating turning proportions at intersections, as we do in our offline
phase has been studied in the context of a single complex intersection by, for example,
Cremer and Keller (1987). Here, the interpretation of turning proportions is closer to that
of origin-destination demands, since a single turning decision determines a driver’s ultimate
destination. Link-to-link splitting probabilities of our type also figure prominently in some
micro-simulation models; for example, that of Xiao et al. (1993), where probabilities in fact
determine each driver’s simulated route choice.
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5.2 Data Expansion Algorithm Overview
The Data Expansion Algorithm is divided between a very lightweight real-time phase and a
more compute-intensive offline calibration phase. The primary purpose of the offline phase
is to determine the most likely historical link traffic volumes across the network, according to
traffic equilibrium principles. To be useful as a reflection of the real-time traffic, the offline
phase needs to be re-run often. This may be once per day or once per week. Time is handled
discretely, so that each time period involves a run of the offline calibration algorithm. Then,
in real time, the current link volumes are obtained on those links that have no real-time data
available. The connection between the offline and the real-time phases of our algorithm is
a set of what we call splitting probabilities. These are analogous to those parameters used
in some micro-simulation programs: the percent of vehicles at a node which enters each
outgoing link from the node.
Figure 5.1 shows a representative sample of the current link volume data, and a series
of historical estimates taken from the same time period, for some portion of a network.
Note that for most links there are temporal gaps in the series of observations, and each
observation is missing data from some links.
Link ID May 4 May 5 May 6 May 9 May 10 May 11 May 12
0111 37 - 45 - - 71 47
0112 98 106 103 95 110 102 111
0113 12 - - 9 - - 7
0114 0 - 4 0 0 2 0
0115 - 84 - 56 - - -
0116 22 30 29 15 30 31 35
0117 5 20 - 35 7 - -
0118 - - - - - - -
0119 - 178 200 154 - 205 220
0120 70 - 120 150 140 65 72
0121 - - - - - - -












Figure 5.1: Sample of historical and current link volume data with spatial and temporal gaps for a given
time of day.
Figure 5.2 diagrams the way in which the offline and real-time phases interact, and
historical and real-time data are combined, to produce real-time estimates, the vector l̂,
for the current period. To calibrate spitting parameters for the current time period, s,
we use historical observations (l1, l2, etc.) taken from the same time period on prior days
(in the figure, time is divided within days only, although segmenting can be by time and
day of the week as well). By our modeling assumptions, the link volumes in each of these
historical time periods, as well as in the current period, conform to a static equilibrium
assignment of the demand for that day and period. This demand, which is unobserved,
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varies randomly from day to day, but daily demands for the same period follow the same
probability distribution. Within a single day and period, demands, and consequently link
flows, are treated as stationary. Obviously, if link flows are entirely stationary across a time
period, the current flow can, in theory, be estimated only once for the entire time period.
In practice, of course, volumes are estimated each time the real-time feed is updated (for
example, at five minute intervals) to ensure that prior estimates continue to match the
current observations. In any case, the duration for which the current volume estimates
remain useful does not detract from the need to compute current estimates quickly when
they are needed, which is our motivation.







Figure 5.2: DEA framework for combining real-time and historical data, including the historical expanded
(estimated) link flows, l̂H and resulting splitting probabilities p.
For the real-time estimation problem, called (J), we propose a least-squares formulation
with linear equality constraints. Its purpose is to find the most likely set of link volumes
that satisfy the given splitting probabilities, based both on the offline volume estimates as
well as on the real-time link volumes, where they are available. The real-time estimation
problem can be solved efficiently even over large networks with very moderate computational
complexity. It should be noted that while the offline calibration provides a set of splitting
probabilities assumed to be valid over the given time interval, the filled-in link volumes
that result from the real-time phase are not constant over the time interval. Indeed, the
splitting probabilities are applied in the real-time phase every time a new data set arrives to
the system. The real-time problem is solved using the new real-time data and the splitting
probabilities as constraints.
The parameters of that estimation problem are determined through the offline calibra-
tion problem. Our approach to solving the offline calibration problem is to solve, repeatedly,
static traffic assignments over the network, one for each time period, based on recent es-
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timates of the origin-destination demand. In other words, the origin-destination demand
for each time period must be re-estimated, via OD matrix estimation, and then fed into
a static traffic assignment routine. This procedure is run and re-run on a daily or weekly
cadence, once for each pre-determined time period. Because we treat traffic as static, each
time period is handled separately, neglecting any cross-time-period dynamics. The choice
of this approach to the offline calibration phase was made based on number of considera-
tions including computational complexity and availability of data. Other approaches, for
example simulation, could be used as well for the offline calibration algorithm. The offline
calibration problem, called (Q), in our implementation, takes the form of a bilevel program.
The formulation which we develop and present here can be calibrated using only historical
averages of link volumes stored over the previous weeks. Hence, to summarize, the key
considerations are that the offline problem can be solved periodically and that the real-time
problem can be solved over a city network in a matter of seconds.
5.3 Real-Time and Offline Optimization Problems
5.3.1 Network Model
In dealing with historical and real-time data, we divide the day into time periods, with
a day-of-the-week category as well (e.g., 7-8 AM, Mondays). We thus create S day/time
periods, so that each observation falls into a period s ∈ {1 . . . S}. Recall that we treat
each day/time period independently; hence, we need not clutter our notation with period
indices, s. To estimate traffic in the current period, we use the current real-time data and
the set of historical observations falling into the same day/time period. The method and
algorithm then applies in an analogous manner for each day/time period. As such, we
present the model for a single day/time period, with the understanding that in practice, S
different versions of the historical data set, historical estimates, and calibrated parameters
are maintained.
The graph G(N,A) represents our traffic network, with N the set of nodes, and A the
set of links connecting the nodes. Each link i ∈ A is directed from a tail node, tail(i) ∈ N ,
to a head node head(i) ∈ N . For convenience, we also define, for each link i, the sets
AO(i) := {j ∈ A| tail(j) = tail(i)} and AI(i) := {j ∈ A| head(j) = tail(i)} to characterize
the incidence relationships between links.
Let W ⊆ N×N be a set of origin-destination pairs. For each pair w = (orig(w), dest(w)) ∈
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W , there is a demand for travel from orig(w) to dest(w) during the current period. Traffic
enters the network at orig(w), bound for dest(w), at a rate rw. We introduce variability
into our model by allowing this rate to fluctuate randomly from day to day. We then assume
that this random variable is drawn independently from the same probability distribution
whenever the current day/time period is s. In the current period, the full set of travel
demands are contained in the |W |-vector, r, which may be restricted to belong to some
set R ⊆ <|W |. For each link i ∈ A, we also define the incidence sets: WO(i) := {w ∈ W |
orig(w) = tail(i)} and W I(i) := {w ∈ W | dest(w) = tail(i)}.
Drivers choose a path from their origin to their destination. Let P be the set of possible
paths, Pk, through the network. For each w ∈ W we define the set Pw ⊆ P := {Pk ∈ P,
Pk from orig(w) to dest(w)}. The parameter zk is the volume of flow on path k, with the
property
∑
Pk∈Pw zk = rw. In the subsequent sections we will discuss assumptions regarding
driver behavior, leading to additional properties of z.
We relate paths and links through a set of indicator functions. The notation δki takes a
value equal to 1 if link i is contained in path Pk, and 0 otherwise. We denote li as the volume




i zk. Travel time on a link is dependent
on link volume, with actual times determined by a link impedance function, Vi(li). Path





We use the notation l to represent the collection of link volume data in the current
observation. We are only able to observe a subset O of the link volumes, so that l consists
only of li for i ∈ O ⊆ A. The real-time observation problem is to determine volume
estimates, l̂, for all links i ∈ A. The desired output will then be the volume estimates l̂i, on
those links i ∈ A\O without real-time data. An estimate, r̂, of the current demand rate is
also generated as part of the estimation process.
We define the collection, H, of historical data sets and the set O := ⋃n∈{1...|H|}On
containing links for which there is some amount of historical data for day/time period s;
the |H| data sets may represent data from consecutive days, for instance. The historical
link volume observations are then lni , for each link i ∈ On ⊆ A. Implicitly, a distinct
demand vector rn is associated with each historical observation, but these quantities are
not observed; they may only be inferred from the observed historical link volumes.
5.3.2 Real-Time Estimation
The real-time estimation problem assumes the existence of a calibrated set of parameters p
for each day/time period. For each arc i ∈ A, pi contains the weights {pij ; j ∈ AI(i)} and
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an additional parameter pio that relates link i directly to the net travel demand originating
at its tail node. These calibrated parameters define a model such that a flow l in period s










piorv (∀ i ∈ A)
li ≥ 0 (∀ i ∈ A)
r ∈ R. (5.1)
Unless otherwise stated, R contains only nonnegativity constraints for each term rw. We
denote the set of pairs (l, r) satisfying (1) as Λ(p).
The weights are interpreted in terms of propagating of traffic through the network. The
parameter pij is the proportion of the flow on link j that continues onto link i (as such,
weights for link j will satisfy
∑
i|j∈AI(i) pij ≤ 1, with any slack signifying a portion of flow
that remains at the head node). In other words, the real-time estimation problem seeks to
determine a set of volumes that propagate the flow in a manner consistent with network flow
principles, using calibrated weights that act as splitting probabilities. Splitting probabilities
are applied to the net, rather than individual, travel demands to reduce dependence on
historical demand estimates in the calibration procedure. This is clarified in our discussion
of calibration in Section 5.3.3.
The approach presented here involves satisfying flow propagation on the network while
ensuring that the estimated volumes do not stray too far from those that are observed on
the links that have real-time volume observations. That is, we select a flow l̂ from Λ(p) that
minimizes the error,
∑
i∈O(l̂i − li)2. We call this approach data expansion as it expands
known link volumes to the rest of the network via flow propagation.
In general, we make use also of the historical link flow estimate from the most recent
offline phase, denoted l̂H , for the given day/time period to induce more conservative real-
time estimates. We allow for a multi-objective weight to be used to determine the balance
between real-time observations and historically-based volume estimates in our formulation
of the real-time problem. In practice, we choose γ1 much larger than γ2 to place our
focus on closely matching real-time observations, with negligible weight placed on historical
estimates.












(l̂i − l̂Hi )2
)]
(5.2)
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s.t. (l̂, r̂) ∈ Λ(p), (5.3)
where Λ(p) is the feasible set, defined above.
The strict convexity of the objective function ensures a unique link flow estimate. While
r̂ need not be unique, our concern is to estimate link flows rather than origin-destination
demands, so this is not problematic. Furthermore, while J can easily be altered to adopt
a generalized least-squares formulation, we use an ordinary least-squares objective because
our direct concern is the fit of l̂ to the current flow l, rather than any statistical properties
of r̂ as an estimator for the mean rate of demand.
In the numerical portion of the chapter, we have focused on implementing a particular
formulation of this framework. We restrict the set p to weights where all flow into a node
is propagated in the same proportions. Specifically, for any link i, the weights pij take the
same value as pio for all links j ∈ AI(i). For this formulation we streamline notation for the
splitting probabilities to an |A|-vector. Hence, the feasible set Λ̃(p), below, contrasts with
the feasible set Λ(p), above, in that the vector of splitting probabilities is of dimension |A|
below, rather than of dimension |A| ∗ |W |, as above.













 (∀ i ∈ A)
li ≥ 0 (∀ i ∈ A)
rw ≥ 0 (∀ w ∈ W ). (5.4)
We then replace (5.3) in J with the condition (l̂, r̂) ∈ Λ̃(p). This facilitates a simple
calibration procedure for p, which will be discussed below.
Since the real-time estimation problem is a linearly-constrained least-squares problem,
it can be solved efficiently with custom software or commercial packages such as CPLEX
(CPLEX 2009).
5.3.3 Offline Calibration
The purpose of the offline calibration problem is to determine the parameters of the real-
time estimation problem. In particular, the parameters, p, must be computed for each
day/time period, s. Recall that the real-time estimation problem makes use of these pre-
calibrated parameters to enforce a method of propagation of traffic. Clearly, the way in
which traffic is propagated through the road network is a reflection of the paths that are
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chosen by drivers. As such, we are motivated to carry out flow propagation in a way that
most closely mimics equilibrium-based traffic assignment.
To help estimate link volumes, we will employ the assumption that drivers choose short-
est paths as they perceive them. As a result, path flows should satisfy conditions for
Wardrop Equilibrium. In our setting here, we make use of a deterministic definition of
Wardrop Equilibrium. Our approach, however, is quite general and would equally well
accommodate stochastic user equilibrium, or alternatively traffic simulation, in the formu-
lation.
Using our notation, therefore, in the deterministic setting, we require that path flows
satisfy
Pk ∈ Pw, zk > 0 ⇒ ck ≤ ck′ for all Pk′ ∈ Pw. (5.5)
In other words, for any path k in the set of paths serving origin-destination pair, w, if
there is any flow on the path, it must be a shortest path between that pair. Since link
impedance functions depend upon flow, determining which paths are minimum cost paths
requires iteration. This is the typical approach for network equilibrium models. See, for
example, Patriksson (1994), for an overview of models and algorithms for solving traffic
network equilibria.
The traffic equilibrium problem, however, like dynamic traffic assignment or simulation
models, relies upon average-case data and does not readily incorporate real-time data,
nor does it accurately reflect current traffic conditions. Hence, traffic equilibrium models
on their own, be they deterministic or stochastic, are not satisfactory for our purpose of
accurately calibrating parameters for estimating real-time traffic. Therefore, our calibration
approach will involve expanding historical observations to the entire network by computing
the most likely Wardrop equilibria, as determined by the recent link flows that we have
observed under similar circumstances. The relevance of the historical observations used in
calibration is assured through segmentation by day/time period.
For each day/time period, we expand our historical observations to a complete Wardrop
Equilibrium, giving us a full characterization of flow on the network. We will then use the
estimated historical data to calibrate our model of flow propagation. This is the crux of
our approach. We must therefore update the data of the equilibrium model on a regular
or punctual basis (weekly, for example, or daily) so that it closely reflects the situation as
observed on the traffic network.
We denote the historical link flow estimate for a given day/time period by l̂H . The his-
torical estimates themselves are used, as we have seen, as a baseline for real-time estimation,
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and crucially, to calibrate splitting parameters. We would like for historical estimates to
closely match the historical average volumes of flow on each link, while also adhering to the
Wardrop Equilibrium principle. Historical average flows are defined for each day/time pe-
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For a given vector r of demands, the set Z(r) of feasible link flows is given by all flows,




δki zk (∀ i ∈ A)
∑
Pk∈Pw
zk = rw (∀ w ∈ W )
zk ≥ 0 (Pk ∈ Pw). (5.6)
Then, L(r), the set of Wardrop equilibria corresponding to demand r is defined formally
by:
{l ∈ Z(r) :
∑
i∈A
(Vi(li)(l′i − li)) ≥ 0, ∀ l′ ∈ Z(r)}. (5.7)
Equivalently, L(r) consists of those elements of Z(r), for which (5.5) is satisfied. Compu-
tationally, the use of separable incidence functions allows us to find an equilibrium corre-
sponding to the demands r by solving a convex optimization problem (see Beckmann et al.









In the offline phase, we seek for each day/time period a pair (l̂H , r̂H) such that l̂H ∈
L(r̂H) and l̂H is a close match to l̄. The most likely flows can be computed via techniques
of origin-destination matrix estimation. The purpose of typical instances of OD matrix
estimation is to determine from a sample of link flow data a likely origin-destination matrix
that may have produced those observed link flows. The bilevel programming formulation
of the problem is defined as follows: An upper level objective function seeks to minimize
the sum of squared differences between a set of link volume estimates and some observed
link volumes. Typically, it includes a second term in the objective which minimizes the sum
of squared differences between the estimated OD matrix and some a priori OD matrix.
The decision variables are thus the origin-destination demand as well as the estimated link
volumes. The constraints on the problem in the bilevel programming version state that
those link volume parameters should be the solution to a Wardrop equilibrium problem.
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In other words, to simply evaluate the upper level at each iteration in the algorithm, it
is necessary to solve a Wardrop equilibrium problem to determine the values of the link
volumes, l, corresponding to a chosen vector, r, of origin-destination demands.
Hence, the offline calibration problem involves solving a bilevel OD matrix estimation
problem, Q, for every day/time period, s, as a function of observed link volumes. This
problem is solved every time the offline calibration problem is solved (weekly or once per
day for the set of time periods). Naturally, warm starts should be used, in which the
previous OD matrix for the given day/time period is used as a starting point. The previous
historical link flow estimate may also be used for the a priori link flow l̄A, or else it may
be assumed that some means are available to posit an initial guess at these quantities.
Typically ζ1 is chosen much larger than ζ2 so that the influence of such crude estimates is
minimal, and historical estimates l̂H are chosen to closely match l̄, which is collected from
sensor data.
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r̂H ∈ R. (5.10)
There are several heuristic approaches that can be used to solve the OD matrix estimation
problem, including a gradient-based approach presented in Patriksson (2004) and developed
further in Josefsson and Patriksson (2007). Based on a sensitivity analysis of the bilevel
program having a lower level defined by the separable, discrete traffic assignment problem,
the authors refine older approaches and provide a rigorous model that can be used to derive
gradients (or subgradients) of the bilevel program. While the authors provide an instance
of their sensitivity analysis to use in a descent method for solving network design, it can
be readily adapted to OD matrix estimation when the problem takes the form of a bilevel
program. A recent work by Lu (2008) presents a different way of obtaining gradients that
can also be used in a descent algorithm for the OD matrix estimation problem presented
here.
We have chosen to use a descent algorithm framework obtained by solving for subgra-
dients of the implicit upper-level objective of the bilevel program, similar to that suggested
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by Josefsson and Patriksson (2007) in the context of the network design problem. That is,
we formulate the sensitivity problem to obtain a subgradient of the link flow mapping with














where Z ′(r, l̂H , r̂H) is defined as is Z(r), but with the non-negativity conditions relaxed so
that only paths Pk for which r̂H induces zero traffic are required to have a non-negative
flow (it is noted by Josefsson and Patriksson (2007) that Z ′(r, l̂H , r̂H) does not depend on
the specific choice of path flow for r̂H). The solution to the above flow problem represents
the w’th element of the Jacobian matrix, ∇r l̂H .
It is a well-known fact that the solution to the bilevel OD matrix estimation is not unique.
Two remarks, however, are in order. The primary observation is that the uniqueness of the
origin-destination demands is not needed by our approach. Indeed, our concern in the
offline phase is to first and foremost determine a set of likely splitting probabilities for a
given day/time period. The set of volumes that induced those probabilities are also used,
but primarily as a stabilization term on the real-time estimation problem. Similarly, the
non-uniqueness of the path flows in the Wardrop equilibrium does not change the result we
seek, which is in terms of the total link flows; it is well known that the latter are unique
for the separable Wardrop equilibrium model. The second remark is that, although the
uniqueness of origin-destination demands is not required and cannot be guaranteed in any
case, it is often the case that the solution to the bilevel program is locally unique (Dempe
2002); therefore, starting from a good a priori OD matrix (such as the previous week’s
or previous day’s matrix) for each day/time period, should provide a reasonable level of
confidence in the stability of the result.
The final steps in the data expansion algorithm are to determine the likely link volumes
for the given day/time period from the updated OD matrix, and then to compute the
splitting probabilities that those volumes induce. The latter are computed uniquely from
the relative size of the outgoing link volume estimates:






 ; (∀ i ∈ A). (5.12)
This approach has the attractive of property of depending entirely on the link volume
estimates. In particular, if historical flows are known (or can be estimated to a high degree
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of certainty), than we are left with a single corresponding choice of p. This is advantageous
when compared with route-splitting parameters, whose calibration depends on historical
demand estimates and are thus more likely to depend on a priori OD matrix estimates.
Flow conservation ensures that p can be expressed equivalently as












 ; (∀ i ∈ A), (5.13)
indicating that (5.4) is satisfied by l̂H ,r̂H , and p. This interpretation of splitting probabili-
ties, in terms of the incoming flows and net demand at the tail node, defines a linear system
Λ̃(p) that estimates of l and r are assumed to solve. Using these splitting probabilities as
parameters, the real-time traffic estimation problem can be solved very efficiently; indeed,
they are expressed as linear constraints to the least-squares estimation problem.
5.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we test and evaluate our approach for real-time traffic estimation on test
networks taken from the Berlin, Germany regional road network. These networks are among
those presented and used in Jahn et al. (2005). The network descriptions and the origin-
destination matrices can be obtained from the website of Hillel Bar-Gera at (Bar-Gera 2011).
The quality of DEA traffic estimates is tested on the Friedrichshain road network, which
has 224 nodes, 523 links, and 23 demand zones, resulting in 506 non-zero origin-destination
pairs (not all node combinations have a positive demand associated with them). The results
presented here are based on a collection of simulated traffic flows, representing a range of
traffic variability and information availability conditions (details on data generation follow
below). Analysis of DEA’s in-the-field performance is left for future study.
5.4.1 Generation of random data sets
In order to test DEA on data resembling that which is available in a live traffic data setting,
we use a traffic assignment code and modify the given origin-destination matrix to generate
a randomly-varying set of link flows. In particular, we simulate variation in link flows
resulting from day-to-day variations in travel demand. Note that since we do not consider
the impact of one time period on another in this version of the DEA, the test data that is
generated represents a single time period over multiple instances, or days.
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The original origin-destination matrix found at (Bar-Gera 2011) is therefore a baseline.
The origin-destination flows that we employ in our experiments are derived from that matrix
via a number of random modifications. Then, the link flows obtained from each of the
randomly-modified demand tables pass again through a random filter so as to suppress
varying amounts of those link flows. In that manner, we test how well DEA can fill in
missing link flows as the proportion of missing data increases and as the variation in the
flows themselves varies.
The first set of randomizations, therefore, are in terms of the demands. We apply mod-
ification independently to each origin-destination pair, and all demand modifications are
independent across days. For each modification, we take the mean, µ, of our demand distri-
bution from the given origin-destination table, and add to this a zero-mean perturbation,
ε, with a standard deviation σ. For each experiment, we specify a degree of modification
that dictates a fixed ratio σ/µ for all modifications. We present results both for a low-to-
moderate (20%) degree of modification and for a high (40%) degree.
Furthermore, we employ two approaches to generating random perturbations. In the
first approach, we generate a perturbation:
ε ∼ N(0, σ).
Additionally, a second approach is introduced to ensure robustness of our experiments. In
contrast to the normal distribution, which is peaked at µ and symmetric about its mean,
here we simulate a two-point distribution, of the form:
ε = −x, w.p. 3/4; ε = 3x, w.p. 1/4;
where x is chosen to produce the desired standard deviation, σ. This models variation in
the form of periodic “shocks” to travel demands. Given ε, the modified demand is then set
to max{0, µ + ε} (for normal ε we note that this cutoff increases the actual means of our
demand distributions slightly above those in the original data set).
The link flows generated by the set of randomly-perturbed demands serve as input
into the second set of randomizations, which suppress a percentage of them. We call this
percentage, ρ, the degree of suppression, and for each set of modified link flows, we test
DEA over increasing degrees of suppression to simulate situations in which more and more
historical and real-time data is missing. To do so in a systematic way, the modified volume
on each link is made available to the algorithm with a probability 1−ρ (the same probability
is applied to both the historical and the real-time simulated data). We then vary that from
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ρ = 0.1, meaning 90% of the data is available on average, to ρ = 0.9, or 10% data availability.
Note that suppression is applied randomly and independently for each link. In other words,
available data is equally likely to be anywhere in the network, rather than concentrated
in certain areas. This is a conservative approach to suppression, that is likely to penalize
rather than help the DEA performance. In reality, one would expect that more heavily used
parts of the network have more data available.
5.4.2 Computational Results: Summary
The Berlin regional test networks provide a check for both the performance and the scala-
bility of our algorithm. For the latter, we found that the least-squares problem for real-time
estimation completed in seconds on even the largest of the test networks, and is thus suit-
able for inclusion in real-time applications on urban networks. In particular, our test set
included the Berlin road network with 12,981 nodes, 28,376 links, and 865 zones, resulting
in 46,689 non-zero origin-destination pairs, which is representative in size of the networks
considered in applications of DEA. Observed computation times for the real-time phase
were under 10 seconds for this test network. To give an order of magnitude of computation
times for the offline phase, the computation time for the Friedrichshain network is on the
order of minutes for each day/time period offline calibration problem, whereas the compu-
tation time for the same routines on the full-size Berlin urban network is on the order of
hours.
In terms of performance, we use the Friedrichshain network to evaluate two aspects of the
traffic estimation method: the ability of the method to predict accurately the traffic volumes
on the network, and the level of coverage of missing values that can be obtained. While
coverage level is somewhat less interesting in the context of simulated data, in practice it
is an important metric since computing accuracy of all the estimated values is not possible.
The focus here is primarily on the accuracy of the resulting estimates, but we illustrate the
coverage for one set of tests and find it to be excellent.
As explained above, we examine the robustness of the DEA estimates with respect to
the degree of randomness present in the demand distribution and the proportion of links
for which the actual volumes can be observed. This last factor, the degree of random data
suppression, turns out to be critical for the accuracy of real-time estimates. We find that
the equilibrium-based OD matrix estimation procedure gives very accurate estimates with
even a small percentage (< 10%) of the link volume data available. As a result, in most
cases, the DEA offline estimates, l̂H , provide a reasonable first approximation of missing
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link flows. In a sense, the robustness of the OD matrix estimation procedure overcomes the
problem of gaps in the historical data, so that discrepancies between the unobserved link
volumes in the current period and the offline estimates of those flows is primarily due to
random fluctuations in demand. Above a critical level of data availability, the DEA real-
time estimates provide an effective means to address this remaining source of error. We
have observed that to benefit from real-time data in our estimates, in general, a minimum of
about 50− 60% of link flows typically must be observed in the current period. When more
than 60% of link flows are observed, the error reduction provided by the DEA real-time
estimation phase can be quite significant. As will be seen below, the value of performing
estimation in real time increases as the demand distribution becomes more variable.
5.4.3 Computational Results: Details
The details of our testing framework are as follows: in each test run we generate 20 sets
of historical link flows and a current set of link flows by computing an equilibrium traffic
assignment of each day’s randomly modified demand. In each test run, the true historical
and current link flows are generated, and then suppression is applied at a range of degrees.
For each suppression level, the DEA offline algorithm uses the historical observations to
compute a set of splitting probabilities. These are then used in the DEA real-time phase
to expand the current observation. Finally, this estimate is compared with the true current
link volume to evaluate performance. The results below represent the average of ten such
simulated runs.
We first look at normally distributed ε, then look at two-point ε. All are done assuming
no a priori information about the OD matrix. In the last part, we briefly discuss the
performance when more a priori information is available.
5.4.3.1 Normally distributed perturbations
We will analyze the case where modified demands are normally distributed around the mean.
As we use no a priori information for this case, the results can be considered conservative.
The first metric we consider is the percentage of error in individual link volume estimates.





Figures 5.3 and 5.4 present a breakdown of real-time link volume estimates by ARE for
those links whose current values are suppressed.
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s) DEA Realtime Estimates (40% links observed)
DEA Realtime Estimates (80% links observed)
Figure 5.3: Histogram of numbers of links by error (ARE) level when degree of demand modification is low
to moderate (20%) and modification uses normally distributed perturbations.
Figure 5.3 has 20% demand modification for both historical and current data samples,
which we consider to be a low to moderate amount of variability in the input data. The
figure charts a setting with relatively high data suppression (40% of link flows observed) as
well as a setting with little suppression (80% of link flows observed). For both suppression
levels, error in the vast majority of expanded volumes is very low. With high suppression,
41% of the suppressed links are estimated within 5% of their true value, and 77% of estimates
are within 20% of the true value. With low suppression, 54% of the suppressed links are
estimated within 5% of their true value, and 87% of estimates are within 20% of the true
value. Figure 5.4 has an increased degree of demand modification at 40%. Predictably, this
leads to higher error in link volume estimates, but the error remains low on most links. The
largest group of links remains by far those with error less than 5%.
In both figures, the effect of suppressed data is evident. We note that these histograms
include only those links where data is suppressed. The improvement in performance for
the low suppression case thus reflects that DEA models driver behavior more closely from
this additional data. Because we adjust suppression in historical and current observations
simultaneously, the improved performance is a product both of improved calibration of
splitting parameters, and a larger input to the real-time procedure. At the 40% suppression
level, one concern is the number of links with ARE of greater than 50%. We note that many
of these links have relatively small volumes (although greater than a specified tolerance),
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s) DEA Realtime Estimates (40% links observed)
DEA Realtime Estimates (80% links observed)
Figure 5.4: Histogram of numbers of links by error (ARE) level when degree of demand modification is high
(40%) and modification uses normally distributed perturbations.
so they will have less of an effect when we evaluate the aggregate fit of our estimates.
Furthermore, the error in these smaller link estimates is less troublesome for conducting
analytics in practice.
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 look at an aggregate measure of estimation error, and thus provide
a better means for comparison across levels of data suppression, as well as for compari-
son between estimation methods. In particular, we compare the performance of real-time
estimates with that of the historical estimates l̂H computed by DEA in the offline phase.
Lastly, we include as a reference point an “idealized” estimate computed by performing
equilibrium-based OD matrix estimation using the current observed link volumes. This is
idealized in the sense that OD matrix estimation is not a feasible estimation approach in
an actual real-time setting. As stated at the top of this section, this solution procedure can
take hours to run to completion in a full urban traffic network.
The metric we use for comparison is root mean square error (RMSE). To normalize
for the size and variability of link flows, we divide the RMSE by the root sum of squared
link volumes (or equivalently, the RMSE for an estimate of zero flow). We thus define the













CHAPTER 5. REAL-TIME TRAFFIC ESTIMATION USING DATA EXPANSION 136
































Figure 5.5: Comparison of estimation error (PRMSE) in the expanded volumes as the proportion of observed
link volumes increases. Includes DEA offline, DEA real-time, and “idealized” estimates. Degree of demand
modification is low to moderate (20%) and modification uses normally distributed perturbations.
































Figure 5.6: Comparison of estimation error (PRMSE) in the expanded volumes as the proportion of observed
link volumes increases. Includes DEA offline, DEA real-time, and “idealized” estimates. Degree of demand
modification is high (40%) and modification uses normally distributed perturbations.
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Figures 5.5 and 5.6 track this error metric for each estimation method as the percentage
of links with observed data increases. Note that the denominator is the sum of the non-
observed link flows, so that number decreases as the degree of suppression decreases. Since
we test at a finite set of suppression levels, only the points on the graph have significance
and are associated with the labeled percentages of observed data. The performance of
OD Matrix Estimation is evaluated on a smaller test set containing three of the ten initial
iterations. This is justified by the relatively small variance in the PRMSE for this approach.
Figure 5.5 looks at simulations with 20% demand modification. Here the PRMSE for
the real-time estimates ranges from 13.4% with 40% of link flows observed to 5.2% with 80%
of link flows observed. The critical value at which real-time estimation becomes beneficial
is at 60% of links flows observed. The error of real-time estimates reaches 86% of the error
of offline estimates when 80% of links are observed. As expected, OD matrix estimation
achieves considerably lower error than both of the other methods. The PRMSE for the
idealized estimates is only 2.1%, even with only 40% of the link volumes observed.
In Figure 5.6, which looks at 40% demand modification, we again observe that the im-
portance of incorporating real-time data is increased when a higher degree of variability is
considered. In this case, when 60% of link flows are observed, the error for real-time esti-
mates is just 92% of the error for offline estimates. With 80% of links volumes observed, this
ratio falls to 80%, indicating a substantial improvement in performance from implementing
real-time DEA under conditions of high variability, when a relatively large portion of link
volumes are observed.
In addition to data accuracy, data coverage is another metric of importance for this
type of real-time traffic estimation, in which our goal is to fill in missing data. Figures 5.7
and 5.8 illustrate data coverage for 20% and 40% modification, respectively, across a range
of suppression levels. Our definition of coverage is the ability of the method to assign a
non-zero flow to any link that should have a non-zero flow in the true data set. We measure
this by the percentage of suppressed links carrying non-zero flow for which a non-zero flow
is correctly assigned by the real-time DEA estimates. Recall that the true data values are
not known by the method since we apply both data modification and data suppression to
the historical as well as the current data samples.
Both figures indicate that the coverage achieved by DEA is excellent. For both modi-
fication settings, coverage is above 90% when 20% or more of the links flows are observed,
and reaches 99% when 30% or more of the link volumes are observed.
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5.4.3.2 Demand-shock perturbations
While the above examples are telling, it is useful to test the dependence of these results
on the type of random perturbations used to modify demand. In particular, as splitting
probabilities are calibrated using estimates of average link flows, we seek to test DEA with
a distribution that, unlike the normal distribution, has little mass close to its mean. To
test whether the normal distribution unfairly favors our approach, we generate a set of
perturbed data from an asymmetric two-point distribution, as described in Section 5.4.1.
The Figures 5.9 through 5.12 follow the structure of the previous set, but refer to this
alternative method of demand modification.
Our testing shows that estimation error for the corresponding levels of σ are actually
smaller than with the normal distribution. Even when data suppression is high (40 % of
link flows observed), 58% of links are estimated within 5% of their true value (and 94% of
links are within 20%) for a moderate degree of modification, and 40% of links are estimated
within 5% for a high degree of modification. In terms of PRMSE, the error when data
suppression is high is only 5.1% for moderate modification, and 10% for high modification.
In comparison to DEA’s historical estimates, the real-time phase becomes beneficial at a
similar level of 50-60% data availability. The reduction in error from real-time estimation
is 11% for moderate modification, and 17% for high modification. Both values are slightly
less than with the normal distribution.
In comparing Figures 5.9 and 5.10 to Figures 5.3 and 5.4, it is evident that the improve-
ment in estimation performance from suppressing a smaller percentage of link volumes is
considerably smaller when we use the two-point distribution. In combination with the over-
all reduction in estimation error, this suggests that a smaller percentage of link volumes is
needed for estimation with this distribution, so that the value of observations beyond the
initial 40% is not as large. Interestingly, we also observe that the PRMSE curve for the
DEA offline estimates is nearly flat in both Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12. Thus, the quality
of offline estimates used in calibration does not improve significantly as suppression is re-
duced. The improvement that we see as the percentage of links observed increases appears
to come entirely from the real-time procedure. While the overall improvement that results
is small in comparison to that of Section 5.4.3.1, the performance of real-time estimates
relative to offline estimates follows a similar trend with both types of demand modification
that we tested.
Most importantly, we observe that the results obtained in Section 5.4.3.1 are not unfairly
influenced by our choice of distribution. The small error levels observed in this section
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Figure 5.7: Data coverage percentage on suppressed
links with non-zero flow when degree of demand mod-
ification is low to moderate (20%) and modification
uses normally distributed perturbations.





























Figure 5.8: Data coverage percentage on suppressed
links with non-zero flow when degree of demand mod-
ification is high (40%) and modification uses normally
distributed perturbations.
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s) DEA Realtime Estimates (40% links observed)
DEA Realtime Estimates (80% links observed)
Figure 5.9: Histogram of numbers of links by error (ARE) level when degree of demand modification is low
to moderate (20%) and modification uses demand-shock perturbations.































s) DEA Realtime Estimates (40% links observed)
DEA Realtime Estimates (80% links observed)
Figure 5.10: Histogram of numbers of links by error (ARE) level when degree of demand modification is
high (40%) and modification uses demand-shock perturbations.
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indicate that performance of DEA is robust to bimodal and asymmetrically distributed
demand perturbations.
5.4.3.3 A priori demand information
In the tests described so far, we have used conservative assumptions regarding a priori
knowledge of the OD matrix. As the availability of this information may vary in practice,
it is useful to consider the effect that a priori information has on DEA performance. To
this end, we have conducted a series of tests in which knowledge of mean travel demands
is assumed. Normally distributed demand perturbations are used, so that simulations are
performed as in Section 5.4.3.1, with the sole difference being that the offline algorithm is
initialized using the average OD matrix. Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show that, in general, the
observations from these tests remain similar, although overall estimation error is reduced.
From a threshold of 50% to 60% of links observed, the DEA realtime procedure is beneficial
in comparison to use of the offline estimates for the traffic flows. Similarly, the idealized
approach of running OD matrix estimation in real-time outperforms both DEA estimates
by a large margin.
Overall, the estimation error is reduced when a priori information is used. Because
the real-time information and estimation procedure itself is not changed, this reflects im-
proved performance of the offline estimation, and thus a more refined calibration of the
splitting parameters. The effect of a priori information is most significant when the degree
of suppression is high. For example, at 40% modification and 40% of links observed, the
PRMSE with a priori information is 12.1%, compared to 18.6% without. However, as more
real-time data is made available, the performance equals out and results for the two settings
become comparable. With 80% of links observed, the PRMSE levels are 7.7% and 8.7%,
respectively.
The benefit of real-time DEA relative to offline estimates is smaller when a priori infor-
mation is used. With 80% links observed, the real-time DEA error with a priori information
is 89% of offline estimation error for a moderate degree of modification, and 83% of offline
error when degree of modification is high (this compares to 86% and 80%, respectively).
Thus, while a priori information improves calibration, and so reduces real-time DEA error,
we see that the real-time algorithm compensates partially so that real-time performance
degrades less than offline performance when a priori information is withheld.
CHAPTER 5. REAL-TIME TRAFFIC ESTIMATION USING DATA EXPANSION 142





























Figure 5.11: Comparison of estimation error (PRMSE) in the expanded volumes as the proportion of observed
link volumes increases. Includes DEA offline, DEA real-time, and “idealized” estimates. Degree of demand
modification is low to moderate (20%) and modification uses demand-shock perturbations.





























Figure 5.12: Comparison of estimation error (PRMSE) in the expanded volumes as the proportion of observed
link volumes increases. Includes DEA offline, DEA real-time, and “idealized” estimates. Degree of demand
modification is high (40%) and modification uses demand-shock perturbations.
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Figure 5.13: Comparison of estimation error (PRMSE) in the expanded volumes as the proportion of observed
link volumes increases. Includes DEA offline, DEA real-time, and “idealized” estimates, all using a priori
demand information. Degree of demand modification is low to moderate (20%) and modification uses
normally distributed perturbations.
































Figure 5.14: Comparison of estimation error (PRMSE) in the expanded volumes as the proportion of ob-
served link volumes increases. Includes DEA offline, DEA real-time, and “idealized” estimates, all using a
priori demand information. Degree of demand modification is high (40%) and modification uses normally
distributed perturbations.
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5.5 Conclusions
We presented a method for traffic estimation via an approach that we call the Data Ex-
pansion Algorithm, or DEA. The goal of the method is to fill in missing values in real-time
traffic volumes. This is important for enabling real-time traffic data to be used in many
new and emerging traffic applications. Indeed, in practice, real-time data on the network
flows is often missing, both spatially, with gaps on some links, as well as temporally, with
gaps at some points in time. Such gaps in the real-time traffic data render difficult the
use of analytic tools such as those for real-time route guidance and network control. We
sought a method that would meet those objectives while being computationally lightweight
enough to run in real time. Realizing that much of the computational overhead comes from
reading and writing to database, the method itself needs to run in a matter of seconds on
a city-wide traffic network.
The method we developed works in two phases. The offline phase involves the resolution
of a set of bilevel programs for a number of pre-determined time periods. The online phase of
our method is designed to be fast and scalable so that it can be run in real time and makes
use of the parameters computed in the offline phase along with real-time data on traffic
flows. DEA was tested here on a network from Germany and shows strong results, both in
terms of accuracy as well as in terms of coverage of the missing values on the network. Our
results rely on simulated test data which, while representative of conditions in cities where
DEA has been implemented, may be imperfect in some respects. Notably, the testing here
has assumed that the current flow satisfies static traffic equilibrium conditions, whereas in
practice this is likely not to hold exactly. Still, that our method can closely estimate such
a traffic assignment with computational requirements so far below that of standard OD
matrix estimation procedures is encouraging.
One observation from numerical testing is that the DEA offline estimates perform rel-
atively well, particularly in cases where less than 60% of link volumes are observed. It is
intuitive that in settings where link flows are not all that variable, or where very little real-
time data is available, the best recourse is to base our current estimates on historical data.
While we are pleased that our historical estimates perform well, despite the gaps in histori-
cal data, it is precisely those cases of high variability, where historical data has less bearing
on the present conditions, that we are most concerned with. In this respect, future work
on real-time estimation should seek to lower the 60% data threshold we have observed for
performance of the real-time component. We are also interested in understanding whether
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this, or a similar threshold, persists in practical applications. For instance, one aspect of
data suppression that did not factor into our testing is the strategic placement of traffic
sensors. When data is taken from certain critical links, rather than a random selection, it
is likely that the data requirements in terms of proportion of links observed will be lower.
Our numerical tests also indicate that equilibrium-based OD matrix estimation, using
only real-time data, produces extremely accurate estimates and requires only a small pro-
portion of data. This indicates substantial potential to improve estimates by explicitly
modeling equilibria in real time, if only the computational difficulties can be overcome.
The performance of real-time DEA demonstrates that under some conditions, it is indeed
possible to improve on offline estimates without a high degree of computational overhead.
The idealized estimates that we provide through OD matrix estimation indicate that there
remains a good deal more “value” in real-time data, and should motivate future work on
efficient estimation procedures.
Within the two-phase framework we present, there are a number of variations to the
specific approach we have implemented. Depending on the details of the problem setting,
it may be possible to achieve a closer approximation to equilibrium-based OD matrix es-
timation. For instance, let f(p, l) be a measure of the distance (squared norm) between
a link flow l and the closest approximation to that flow from the set Λ(p). The current
implementation fits the splitting probabilities, p, to the average historical flows, l̄, in ef-
fect minimizing f(p, l̄). Alternately, we can expand each historical observation ln to a full
estimate l̂n, and choose p to minimize the sum of f(p, l̂n) over our history. While, given
a long enough history with enough coverage, l̄i is a close approximation to the expected
flow, E[li], this observation-based approach aims directly at minimizing the expectation
of f(p, l). The current calibration method, in which historical observations are averaged,
was chosen to ensure a large set of link observations is available as input to the offline OD
matrix estimation procedure. Given the robust performance that we have observed for that
procedure, it may be worth expanding offline data at a finer granularity.
The approach has been developed to work with volume data, which is most commonly
available for urban networks. If speed is the available metric, then a conversion to volumes is
possible only when impedance functions are known and constant. A more interesting setting
is that of non-recurrent congestion and the effect of traffic incidents. The current approach
addresses non-stationary demand and/or impedance functions through segmentation; i.e.
training on past periods in which conditions were similar. Speed data, even if partially
available, could be advantageous in identifying the prevailing congestion state, allowing
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the appropriate set of impedance functions, and corresponding splitting probabilities, to
be chosen in real-time. Lastly, this work could be extended to use different assignment
algorithms, some of which may allow predicted flows to touch more sensor points by inducing
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Appendix A
Proofs of Results in Chapter 2
A.1 Robustness of Equilibria in Markup Price Functions
We restrict the set of possible price functions that producers may use to the set of markup
price functions, wherein a scalar multiple is applied to the producer’s cost function. A
crucial question regarding this modeling assumption is whether the equilibria we model are
indeed price function equilibria in a more general sense. In the following, we answer that
question in the affirmative.
Theorem 8. Assume that each producer i ∈ A bids a markup price function of the form
pi(xi) = αiui(xi) for an αi > 0 of their choice. If these are at equilibrium in the space of
markup price functions, then they are at equilibrium in the space of all non-decreasing price
functions.
Proof. We need to show for any producer a ∈ AG, that pa(·) is a best response, among all
non-decreasing price functions, to the price functions chosen by the other producers. To do
this, we hold the price function pi(·) fixed for i 6= a, and focus on the producer a. With
all other functions fixed, we will show that for the entire set of supply functions such that
the price that a charges in equilibrium is p, there is a unique value of xa that producer a
will produce in equilibrium. As this value depends only on p, we denote it by the mapping
γ(p). We will see that γ(p) is a decreasing function defined on the domain [0, p̄], where p̄ is
the price such that γ(p) = 0. For p > p̄, producer a does not produce in any equilibrium.
To define γ(·), consider the sequence ν(a) of submarkets within which a is nested. We
will show that for any g ∈ ν(a), xg is a strictly increasing function of xa. Note that for any
submarket g′ not containing a, all producers have chosen markup price functions, and thus
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the price in g′ is fixed to some continuous, strictly increasing function pg′(xg′). Now, consider
any parallel submarket g ∈ ν(a). Then g = P (ψa(g), g′), where g′ = g \ ψa(g). Assume
that both xψa(g) and pψa(g) are determined uniquely by xa, with xψa(g) strictly increasing,
and pψa(g) non-decreasing in xa. Then pg = pψa(g) and since pg′ = pψa(g), and pg′(xg′) is
strictly increasing, xg = xψa(g) +xg′ = xψa(g) +p
−1
g′ (pψa(g)). Thus, pg is nondecreasing in xa,
and xg is strictly increasing in xa, with both determined uniquely. For a series submarket
g ∈ ν(a), we have g = S(ψa(g), g′), where g′ = g \ ψa(g). We apply the same assumptions
on xψa(g) and pψa(g). Here, xg = xg′ = xψa(g) and pg = pψa(g)(xψa(g)) + pg′(xψa(g)). Again,
pg is nondecreasing in xa, and xg is strictly increasing in xa, with both determined uniquely.
Finally, we observe that pa is fixed to p, and xa is trivially considered a strictly increasing
function of xa, allowing us to begin induction with g = ψ−1a (a).
We conclude by induction on the submarket tree that xG is strictly increasing in xa.
Now, because xG = 1, there is only a single value of xa that is consistent with our chosen
p. We call this value γ(p). Furthermore, if ψ−1a (a) is parallel, then xψ−1a (a) increases strictly
with p, for any fixed xa. If ψ−1a (a) is a series submarket, then pψ−1a (a) increases strictly in
p, and consequently xψ−2a (a) increases strictly in p, for an fixed xa. In either case, a larger
p leads to a larger xg for some g in νa, and this shift propagates up the submarket tree, so
that xG increases strictly in p for any xa. As a result, γ(p) is strictly decreasing in p, for
p < p̄.
Excluding the redundant choices p > p̄, it is evident that the set {(p, γ(p)) : p ∈ [0, p̄]}
contains all price-quantity pairs that producer a can possibly achieve in an equilibrium.
Furthermore, the equilibrium outcome of any nondecreasing price function chosen by a is
determined only by the point at which the function’s inverse crosses the graph of γ(p).
Therefore, each of these pairs is achieved by all non-decreasing price functions that cross





and then selecting any price function that goes through the optimal price-quantity pair.
Because the shape of the price function is irrelevant, there is always a markup price function,
p∗a(xa) that is a best response. Since pa(·) is the best choice among markup price functions,
it must be that pa(·) is equal to p∗a(·), and so pa(·) is a best response in the larger set as
well. ¤
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A.2 Inefficiency Bound
Let ~α be the unique markup equilibrium for an arbitrary 3-edge-connected market structure.
Let the scalar ᾱ be the upper bound on markups for that market, which is guaranteed to









2 = RG ≤ ᾱRG|~w=~c = ᾱC(xOPT),






Here we take ᾱ, the upper bound on producer markups, to represent maxa{αa}, making the
inequality as tight as possible. For this bound to be meaningful, we would like to express, or
at least bound, ᾱ as a function of the model primitives. To do this, we introduce the term
σa, which is an indicator of producer a’s market power. We define σa := (Rªa|~w=~c)/ca. We
then define σ := maxa{σa}, as a measure of asymmetries in the network as a whole.
From (2.8), αa = 2 + Rªa/ca ≤ 2 + σᾱ, This implies that ᾱ ≤ 2 + σᾱ, from which we




1− σ . (A.3)
We cannot use this bound for σ ≥ 1. Clearly, it is not tight for σ close to 1 as well,
as the right-hand side blows up for σ approaching 1 from below. If the market is very
competitive, then σ will be close to zero, at which point the bound approaches 1. When
general series-parallel markets are considered, σ can be typically made large by introducing
additional vertical competition though link subdivisions. Some structural restrictions are
thus necessary to guarantee any level of efficiency.
We note that slackness is introduced in our bound by the maximum in the definition
of σ. This is necessary due to the possible asymmetry of our market structure. When
producers compete horizontally in a single market, this analysis can produce a much tighter
bound, due to the fact that the degree of competition faced by each of the producers is
closely linked in that type of setting Correa et al. (2008). Other structural symmetries can
be imposed to produce a similar effect.
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A.3 Existence and Uniqueness Proofs from Section 2.3.2 (in-
cludes supporting definitions)
The approach in this section is to characterize submarkets based on their connectivity, by
defining the submarket type T (g), and based on properties of their local equilibria, by
defining the submarket type E(g). Two lemmas, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, are introduced
to establish an equivalence between these two characterizations. This provides the under-
lying relationship between connectivity and equilibrium properties needed for the results
presented in Section 2.3.2. Proof of these results is given once the necessary preliminaries
have been established.
Definition [Connectivity Properties]. We can express connectivity in terms of the
operations S(·) and P (·). Let the connectivity of a submarket g be denoted Q(g). The
vertical connectivity, V (g), is the maximum connectivity of any market containing g. It
is the number of edge removals needed to disconnect g into three sections. The following
properties define Q(g) and V (g):
V (a) = ∞, Q(a) = 1 for all a
V (S(G)) = min{ min
g′,g′′∈G,g′ 6=g′′






V (P (G)) = min
g′∈G
{V (g′)}
Q(P (G)) = min{
∑
g′∈G
{Q(g′)}, V (P (G))}.
We are concerned, in particular, with three classes of submarkets, characterized by the
notation T (g). If V (g) < 3, which cannot be the case for a submarket of a 3-connected
market, we say T (g) = 0. Among markets with V (g) ≥ 3, we distinguish between those,
type 1 submarkets, for which Q(g) = 1, and those, type 2 submarkets, for which Q(g) ≥ 2.
Any individual producer constitutes a type 1 submarket. Then T (g) develops as:
T (S(G)) = 0 if min
g′,g′′∈G,g′ 6=g′′




T (P (G)) = 0 if min
g′∈G
{T (g′)} = 0
= 2 otherwise.
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Definition [Boundedness Properties]. For a submarket g such that ~wg(Rªg) exists,
we say that g is ρ-bounded if there exists ρ < 1, and constants K1 and K2 such that:
φg(Rªg) ≤ K1 + K2Rρªg for all Rªg < ∞.
Similarly, g is 1-bounded if there exists ρ < 1, and constants K1 and K2 such that:
φg(Rªg) ≤ K1 + K2Rρªg + Rªg for all Rªg < ∞.
Definition [Local Equilibrium Properties]. We can characterize submarkets in terms of
the existence and boundedness of their local equilibria by introducing the following submarket
types, represented by E(g):
E(g) = 0 ⇔ ~wg|ªg(Rªg) does not exist for Rªg ∈ (0,∞]
E(g) = 1 ⇔ ~wg|ªg(Rªg) exists and is unique forRªg < ∞,
φg(Rªg) is continuously differentiable, with φ′g(Rªg) <
φg(Rªg)
Rªg
for Rªg < ∞,
and g is 1-bounded, with φg(Rªg)Rªg > 1 .
E(g) = 2 ⇔ ~wg|ªg(Rªg) exists and is unique forRªg < ∞,
φg(Rªg) is continuously differentiable, with φ′g(Rªg) <
φg(Rªg)
Rªg
for Rªg < ∞,
and g is ρ-bounded.
Note that the conditions for E(g) = 1 and E(g) = 2 assure that φg(Rªg)/Rªg is strictly
decreasing in Rªg.
Lemma 2. The type, E(S(G)), of a series composition is defined inductively as:
E(S(G)) = 0 if min
g′,g′′∈G,g′ 6=g′′




Proof. Let g = S(G). For the first statement, the result is immediate when ming′∈G{E(g′)} =
0, since no equilibrium can exist on g if no local equilibria exist on some component.
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Furthermore, if there are components g′ and g′′ with E(g′) = 1 and E(g′′) = 1, then
φg′(Rªg′|ªg) > Rªg′|ªg > Rg′′|ªg and φg′′(Rªg′′|ªg) > Rªg′′|ªg > Rg′|ªg, so no equilibrium
can exist.
For the second statement, we assume that E(g′) ∈ {1, 2} for all g′ ∈ G, and E(g′) = 1
for at most one component market. Then we must show that E(g) is equal to the smallest
type among its component markets, be it type 1 or type 2. All other components markets
are type 2, and beginning with the market of smallest type, we can add the other markets
to the composition sequentially (rather than as a single composition of perhaps more than
2 components), so that it is sufficient to show E(S(g′, g′′)) = E(g′) when E(g′) ∈ {1, 2} and
E(g′′) = 2. Let Rªg be equal to a fixed finite multiplier, r.
Existence. For series composition, Rªg′|ªg = r + Rg′′|ªg and Rªg′′|ªg = r + Rg′|ªg.
Since local equilibria exist for g′ and g′′ when Rªg′|ªg and Rªg′′|ªg are finite, respectively,
~wg|ªg(r) fails to exist only if both Rg′|ªg and Rg′′|ªg are unbounded. At a local equi-
librium for g, Rg′|ªg is a fixed point of hg′|ªg : hg′|ªg(R) → φg′(r + φg′′(r + R)), where
hg′|ªg(0) > 0 and hg′|ªg(·) is continuous. Then, h′g′|ªg(R) = φ′g′(r+φg′′(r+R))φ′g′′(r+R) <
[φg′(r + φg′′(r + R))/(r + φg′′(r + R))][φg′′(r + R)/(r + R)]. Looking at this upper bound,
the first fraction is bounded above by φg′(r + φg′′(r))/(r + φg′′(r)), and the second fraction
approaches 0 for large R since g′′ is ρ-bounded. Thus, there is some finite point R̂, such
that h′g′|ªg(R̂) < 1 − ε for ε ∈ (0, 1). A fixed point of hg′|ªg must exist and be less than
R̂/(1− ε).
Uniqueness. Furthermore, h′g′|ªg(R) < 1 at and to the right of any fixed point, so that
the fixed point must be unique. The uniqueness of Rg′|ªg implies the uniqueness of Rg′′|ªg
and ~wg|ªg(r) because both ~wg′|ªg′(Rªg′) and ~wg′′|ªg′′(Rªg′′) are unique by assumption.
C1 response. Both φg′|ªg(·) and φg′′|ªg(·) are continuous, since hg′|ªg(Rg′|ªg) varies con-
tinuously with the parameter r. The derivatives, φ′g′|ªg(·) and φ′g′′|ªg(·) can be expressed
in terms of the continuous functions φ′g′(·) and φ′g′′(·). Let δg′ = φ′g′(r + φg′′|ªg(r)) and
δg′′ = φ′g′′(r + φg′|ªg(r)). We observe that φ
′





δg′′ [1 + φ′g′|ªg(r)]. Solving this system gives:
φ′g′|ªg(r) = δg′(1 + δg′′)(1− δg′δg′′)−1 (A.4)
and the symmetric expression for φ′g′′|ªg(r). Note that when ~wg|ªg(r) exists, δg′δg′′ <
[φg′(r+φg′′|ªg(r))/(r+φg′′|ªg(r))][φg′′(r+φg′|ªg(r))/(r+φg′|ªg(r))] = [Rg′|ªg/(r+Rg′′|ªg)][Rg′′|ªg/(r+
Rg′|ªg)] < 1. Finally, we combine to get φ′g(r) = φ′g′|ªg(r)+φ
′
g′′|ªg(r), which is single-valued
and continuous in r.
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Bounded derivative. By assumption, φ′g′|ªg(r) < φg′|ªg(r)/r and φ
′
g′′|ªg(r) < φg′′|ªg(r)/r.
Then φ′g(r) = φ′g′|ªg(r) + φ
′
g′′|ªg(r) < φg(r)/r.
Bounded response. By assumption, Rg′|ªg = φg′(Rªg′|ªg) ≤ K1+K2Rρªg′|ªg +Rªg′|ªg =
K1 + K2(r + Rg′′|ªg)ρ + r + Rg′′|ªg and Rg′′|ªg = φg′′(Rªg′′|ªg) ≤ K3 + K4Rqªg′′|ªg =
K3 + K4(r + Rg′|ªg)q for some choice of constants. Thus:
Rg′′|ªg ≤ K3 + K4rq + K4Rqg′|ªg ≤ (K3 + K4Kq1) + (K4 + K4Kq2 + K4)rq + (K4Kq2 + K4)Rqg′′|ªg





OR Rg′′|ªg ≤ 2 [(K3 + K4Kq1) + (K4 + K4Kq2 + K4)rq].








and K ′4 := 2(K4 + K4K
q
2 + K4).
If E(g′) = 1, then Rg′|ªg ≤ K1 + K2(r + Rg′′|ªg)ρ + r + Rg′′|ªg ≤ K ′1 + K ′2rρ̄ + r where
K ′1 := K1 + K2(K
′
3)
ρ + K ′3, K
′
2 := K2 + K2(K
′
4)
ρ + K ′4, and ρ̄ = max{ρ, q}. If E(g′) = 2,
then Rg′|ªg ≤ K1 + K2(r + Rg′′|ªg)ρ ≤ K ′′1 + K ′′2 rρ̄ where K ′′1 := K1 + K2(K ′3)ρ and
K ′′2 := K2 + K2(K
′
4)
ρ. Since φg(r) = Rg′|ªg + Rg′′|ªg, g is 1-bounded if and only if g′ is
1-bounded, and g is ρ-bounded if and only if g′ is ρ-bounded.
Lastly, If E(g′) = 1, then φg(r)/r > φg′|ªg(r)/r = φg′(r+φg′′|ªg(r))/r > φg′(r+φg′′|ªg(r))/(r+
φg′′|ªg(r)) > 1. ¤
Lemma 3. The type, E(P (G)), of a parallel composition is defined inductively as:




Proof. The first statement follows immediately since no equilibrium can exist on P (G) if no
local equilibria exist on some component. For the second statement, let g = P (G). Because
E(g) = 1 is a weaker assumption than E(g) = 2, and composition can be done sequentially,
it is sufficient that E(P (G)) = 2 when G = {g′, g′′} with E(g′) = 1 and E(g′′) = 1. Let Rªg
be equal to a fixed finite multiplier, r.
Existence. For parallel composition, Rªg′|ªg and Rªg′′|ªg are bounded above by r. Then,
local equilibria exist for both g′ and g′′ corresponding to any pair Rg′|ªg, Rªg′′|ªg with
Rg′|ªg = φg′(Rªg′|ªg) and Rg′′|ªg = φg′′(Rªg′′|ªg). Equivalently, Rg′|ªg must be a fixed
point of hg′|ªg : hg′|ªg(R) → φg′([1/φg′′([1/R + 1/r]−1) + 1/r]−1), where hg′|ªg(0) > 0 and
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hg′|ªg(·) is continuous. Seeing as Rg′|ªg ∈ [0, φg′(r)], such a fixed point must exist, by
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
Uniqueness. Furthermore, see that ∂φg′([1/R + 1/r]−1)/∂R = φ′g′([1/R + 1/r]
−1)[r/(r +
R)]2 < Ug′(R), where Ug′(R) := φg′([1/R + 1/r]−1)[r/(r + R)]R−1, and the analogous
bound, Ug′′(R) holds for g′′. Then h′g′|ªg(R) < Ug′(φg′′([1/R + 1/r]
−1))Ug′′(R), which
is decreasing in R, and for a fixed point Rg′|ªg with Rg′′|ªg = φg′′([1/Rg′|ªg + 1/r]−1),
h′g′|ªg(Rg′|ªg) < Ug′(Rg′′|ªg)Ug′′(Rg′|ªg) = [r/(r + Rg′′|ªg)][r/(r + Rg′|ªg)] < 1. Then
h′g′|ªg(R) < 1 at and to the right of any fixed point, so that the fixed point must be
unique. The uniqueness of Rg′|ªg implies the uniqueness of Rg′′|ªg and ~wg|ªg(r) because
both ~wg′|ªg′(Rªg′) and ~wg′′|ªg′′(Rªg′′) are unique by assumption.
C1 response. Both φg′|ªg(·) and φg′′|ªg(·) are continuous, since hg′|ªg(Rg′|ªg) varies con-
tinuously with the parameter r. The derivatives, φ′g′|ªg(·) and φ′g′′|ªg(·) can be expressed in
terms of the continuous functions φ′g′(·) and φ′g′′(·). Let δg′ = φ′g′([1/φg′′|ªg(r)+1/r]−1) and
δg′′ = φ′g′′([1/φg′|ªg(r)+1/r]



































g′′|ªg(r)] which is single-valued and continuous in r.
Bounded derivative. By assumption, φ′g′|ªg(r) < φg′|ªg(r)/r and φ
′
g′′|ªg(r) < φg′′|ªg(r)/r.











)−ρ + (1/r + 1/Rg′′|ªg
)−1 and Rg′′|ªg = φg′′(Rªg′′|ªg) ≤ K3 +
K4R
q
ªg′′ + Rªg′′|ªg = K3 + K4
(
1/r + 1/Rg′|ªg
)−q + (1/r + 1/Rg′|ªg
)−1. Thus, letting
K̄1 := max{K1,K3}, K̄ ′2 := max{K2, K4}, ρ̄ := max{ρ, q} and R̄ = max{Rg′|ªg, Rg′′|ªg},
we get:
R̄ ≤ K̄1 + K̄2
(
1/r + 1/R̄
)−ρ̄ + (1/r + 1/R̄)−1
Or equivalently:
R̄2 ≤ K̄1R̄ + K̄1r + K̄2R̄rρ̄ + K̄2R̄ρ̄r
From here we consider two cases. First, if R̄ <
√
r, then φg(r) ≤ 12R̄ < 12r
1
2 so g is
ρ-bounded. Otherwise, R̄ρ̄r ≤ R̄ρ̄r(R̄r− 12 )(1−ρ̄) = R̄r 1+ρ̄2 , so that R̄2 ≤ K̄1R̄ + K̄1r +
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2K̄2R̄r
1+ρ̄
2 . This implies R̄ ≤ R∗ where (R∗)2 − (K̄1 + 2K̄2r
1+ρ̄












2 )2 + 4K̄1r
)














2 , so g is ρ-bounded. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4. We first note that V (g) ≥ 3 if and only if T (g) ∈ {1, 2}. The proof
proceeds by showing that E(g) = T (g) for all submarkets g. The results of the Proposition
hold for g such that E(g) ∈ {1, 2}, so this equivalence will be sufficient. First, observe that
E(a) = T (a) for all producers a. In particular, T (a) = 1 for all a ∈ AG. Furthermore, a
unique local equilibrium wa = 2ca + Rªa clearly exists, and φa(Rªa) = 2ca + Rªa satisfies
all conditions for E(a) = 1. Having shown this, we can then extend the equivalence to all
submarkets g ⊆ G by induction on the submarket tree, using Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 for
series and parallel compositions, respectively. ¤
Corollary 2. Let g be any submarket of a 3-edge-connected market G. If Q(g) ≥ 2, then
φg(Rªg)/Rªg → 0 as Rªg →∞.
Proof. It follows by induction, using Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 that E(g′) = T (g′) for all
submarkets g′ ⊆ G. It must be that V (g) ≥ 3, so that T (g) = 2. It follows from the
definition of E(·) that g is ρ-bounded. The corollary then follows. ¤
Corollary 3. Let gF be a submarket of G such that V (GªgF ) ≥ 3. Then for any submarket
g such that either g ⊆ GªgF or gF ⊆ g, the response function φg|gF (·) satisfies φ′g|gF (RgF ) <
φg|gF (RgF )/(RgF ). Consequently, φg|gF (RgF )/RgF is decreasing in RgF .
Proof. It follows by induction, using Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 that E(g′) = T (g′) for all
submarkets g′ ⊆ G. It follows from the definition of E(·) that φ′g′(Rªg′) < φg′(Rªg′)/Rªg′ .
Now, let g be composed of two components submarkets gI and gO, and hold RgI fixed to
induce RgO|gI = φgO|gI (RgI ) and Rªg|gI = φªg|gI (RgI ). From (A.4) and (A.5), φ
′
gO|gI (RgI ) <
RgO|gI /RgI when g is series or parallel, respectively. Here, φ
′
gI |gI (RgI ) = 1 = RgI /RgI . It
follows that φ′g|gI (RgI ) < φg|gI (RgI )/(RgI ). For gF nested deeper within g,
φ′g|gF (RgF ) = φ
′
g|ψgF (g)(RψgF (g)|gF )φ
′
ψgF (g)|ψ2gF (g)
(Rψ2gF (g)|gF ) · · ·φ
′
ψ−1(gF )|gF (RgF )
< (Rg|gF /RψgF (g)|gF ) · · · (Rψ−1(gF )|gF /RgF )
= φg|gF (RgF )/(RgF ).
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Then, for g ⊆ Gª gF , disjoint from gF ,





< (Rg|gF /Rªg|gF )(Rªg|gF /RgF )
= φg|gF (RgF )/(RgF ).
¤
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider a markup equilibrium given by a fixed point of the
function Φ̃. If the underlying graph is not 3-edge-connected, then by definition there ex-
ists a pair of links, a and b, such that removing a and b disconnects the graph. In the
case where removal of a single edge a disconnects the graph, then Rªa = ∞, so the relation
Φa(~w−a) = 2+Rªa/ca, ensures there can be no fixed point. If the graph is 2-edge-connected,
there is a cut consisting of two producers a and b. When removing these two links, the graph
is divided into sections, g and g′. (One or both of these may be empty. In the latter case a
and b are a duopoly). The substitute network for producer a is S(g, b, g′), so that producer
b itself defines a cut in Gªa, and the reverse holds for Gªb. Then, Rªa = Rg + wb + Rg′
and Rªb = Rg + wa + Rg′ , so that any equilibrium must satisfy wa > Rªa ≥ wb and
wb > Rªb ≥ wa. This is a contradiction, so no equilibrium can exist for a graph that is not
3-edge-connected.
If the network is 3-edge-connected then Q(Gª a) ≥ 2 for all a ∈ AG. Now, making use of
Corollary 2 and Corollary 3, φ′ªa(wa) → 0 as wa →∞ for any producer a. The best response
for producer a in equilibrium is a fixed point of the mapping ha : ha(wa) → φa(φªa(wa)).
ha(0) > 0 and ha(·) is continuous. Because φ′a(Rªa) = 1, there is some finite point ŵ,
such that h′a(ŵ) < 1 − ε for ε ∈ (0, 1). The unique fixed point of h must exist and be
less than ŵ/(1 − ε). Thus wa is bounded by a constant for each producer a. By setting
w̄ = maxa∈AG wa we can restrict ~w to the compact region
∏
a∈AG [2ca, w̄]. By Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem, a markup equilibrium exists. ¤
Proposition 17. For each producer a, the log of producer profit function, log(πa(wa, ~w−a)),
has increasing differences in (wa, ~w−a).
Proof. The log profit function is log(πa(wa, ~w−a)) = log(wa − ca) + 2 log(xa(~w)). Then,
∂ log(πa(~w))/∂wa = 1/(wa− ca) + 2(∂xa/∂wa)/(xa(~w)) = 1/(wa− ca)− 1/(wa + Rªa). For
any producer b 6= a, Rªa is increasing in wb, so that ∂2 log(πa(~w))/(∂wa∂wb) > 0. ¤
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Proof of Theorem 2. For any producer a, wa is a fixed point of the mapping ha : ha(wa) →
φa(φªa(wa)). Then, h′a(wa) = φ′a(φªa(wa))φ′ªa(wa) < [φa(φªa(wa))/φªa(wa)][φªa(wa)/wa].
Both fractions in the upper bound are decreasing in wa, and their product is equal to 1 at
a fixed point of ha(·). Thus, h′a(wa) < 1 at, and to the right of, any fixed point. Therefore,
ha(wa) = wa can be satisfied by at most one point. Since this holds for all a ∈ AG, ~w is
unique when it exists. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3. The theorem follows directly from Proposition 4. ¤
A.4 Other Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. As C(x) is convex, and using the first-order conditions, xOPT
is the unique assignment for which there exists a consumption assignment fOPT with






for all Bi, Bj ∈ B such that fOPTi > 0. Recalling Equation (2.4), we see that when all
producers use the same markup, the condition in (A.6) is necessary for xNE . It follows that
xOPT = ~x(k~c) for any scalar k > 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. We will extend this property inductively to all submarkets,
including individual producers, beginning with the full market G. Because demand is
inelastic, xG = 1. The factor µG = 1, and for any finite RG, the property (2.7) holds since
RªG = ∞. Now for a submarket g′, we assume that (2.7) holds for g = ψ−1(g′). If g is
composed in series, then g = S(g′, g′′) where g′′ = g \ g′. Then Rg = Rg′ + Rg′′ and Rªg′ =
Rg′′ +Rªg. Since g is series, we adjust the scaling factor so that µg′ = µgRªg/(Rªg +Rg′′).
Since xg′(~w) = xg(~w):
xg′(~w) = µg [1 + Rg/Rªg]
−1 = µg
[











If g is composed in parallel, then g = P (g′, g′′) where g′′ = g \ g′. Then Rg = [1/Rg′ +
1/Rg′′ ]−1 and Rªg′ = [1/Rªg +1/Rg′′ ]−1. Since g is parallel, µg′ is exactly µg and xg′(~w) =






























The result holds by induction on the submarket tree. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. Having shown from the second-stage game that xa(~w) =
µa [Rªa/(wa + Rªa)], in the first stage, producer a chooses wa ≥ 1 that maximizes πa(wa, ~w−a).




Evidently, the profit-maximizing markup is interior in (ca,∞). From the first-order op-
timality conditions, [xa(~w)]
2 + 2(wa − ca) [xa(~w)] [∂xa(~w)/∂wa] = 0, and thus wa = ca −
1
2 [xa(~w)] [∂xa(~w)/∂wa]
−1. Since Rªa and µa do not depend on wa, it is straightforward
to differentiate xa(~w), getting ∂xa(~w)/∂wa = −xa(~w)/(Rªa + wa). Note that this term is
nonzero for any finite ~w. Substituting into the above we get: wa = ca + 12 (Rªa + wa). ¤
Proof of Theorem 4. To specify from among the sequence {~wj} of equilibria, we rein-
troduce the explicit dependence of Rg(~wg) on ~wg. The equilibrium ~w in G uniquely
satisfies wa = φa(RGªa(~wG\a)) for all a ∈ AG. These conditions can be restated as
wa = φa|g∗(Rg∗(~wg∗)) for all a ∈ AG/g∗ and wb = φb|Gªg∗(RGªg∗(~wG/g∗)) for all b ∈ g∗.
In this vein, we define H : Rn+ → Rn+ such that Ha(~w) = wa−φa|g∗(Rg∗(~wg∗)) for a ∈ AG/g∗
and Hb(~w) = wb − φb|Gªg∗(RGªg∗(~wG/g∗)) for b ∈ g∗. The equilibrium ~w uniquely satisfies
H(~w) = ~0.




g∗)) for all a ∈ AG/g∗




G/g∗)) for all b ∈ g∗, where, in terms of the response func-




φjb|Gªg∗(RGªg∗) := φb|Gªg∗((1/RGªg∗ + 1/R
j
g+
)−1). We define H+ : Rn+1+ → Rn+ such that
H+a (~w, Rg+) := wa − φa|g∗((1/Rg∗(~wg∗) + 1/Rg+)−1) for a ∈ AG/g∗ and H+b (~w, Rg+) :=
wb − φb|Gªg∗((1/RGªg∗(~wG/g∗) + 1/Rg+)−1) for b ∈ g∗, and thus H+(~wj , Rjg+) = 0 for all
j. The continuity of response functions implies that, H+(~wG, R
j
g+
) → H(~w) as j →∞, for
any vector ~w.















The unique solution to H(limj ~w
j
G) = 0 is limj ~w
j
G = ~w. ¤
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Proof of Theorem 5. To specify from among the sequence {~wτ} of equilibria, we rein-
troduce the explicit dependence of Rg(~wg) on ~wg. Let {Rτg+}τ be the infinite sequence of
multipliers induced on G+ ªG when iterating best responses on G+. Taking this sequence




















−1) for all b ∈ Ag∗
This determines an increasing sequence of vectors {~wτG}τ , beginning with ~w0G = ~cG. Looking
at a ∈ AG/g∗ we observe that φa|g∗((1/Rg∗(~wτg∗) + 1/Rτg+)−1) is increasing in both ~wτg∗ and















g∗)) ≤ φa|g∗(Rg∗(~wτg∗)) ≤ φa|g∗(Rg∗(~wg∗)) = wa
The analogous argument holds for b ∈ Ag∗ . Since ~w0 = ~c ≤ ~w, we see by induction that
{~wτG}τ is bounded above by ~w. Because {~wτG}τ is increasing and bounded, it must converge








b|Gªg∗(RGªg∗(w̄G/g∗)) = φb|Gªg∗(RGªg∗(w̄G/g∗)) for all b ∈ A∗g
The unique solution to this system is w̄ = ~w. ¤
Proof of Lemma 1. Let ḡ = ψ−1g (g) be a composition of the submarkets g and g′′. We
will show that an upshift in φg(Rªg) implies upshifts in φḡ(Rªḡ) and in φg′′|ªḡ(Rªḡ). The
result then follows by induction up the submarket tree. φḡ(Rªḡ) is an increasing function
of Rg|ªḡ and Rg′′|ªḡ. If ḡ is series then Rg′′|ªḡ = φg′′|ªḡ(Rªḡ) = φg′′(Rªḡ + Rg|ªḡ), and
Rg|ªḡ is the unique fixed point of hg|ªḡ : hg|ªḡ(R) → φg(Rªḡ + φg′′(Rªḡ + R)). If ḡ is
parallel then Rg′′|ªḡ = φg′′|ªḡ(Rªḡ) = φg′′([1/Rªḡ + 1/Rg|ªḡ]−1), and Rg|ªḡ is the unique
fixed point of hg|ªḡ : hg|ªḡ(R) → φg([1/Rªḡ + 1/φg′′([1/Rªḡ + 1/R]−1)]−1). In either case,
Rg′′|ªḡ is increasing in Rg|ªḡ. Furthermore, the inner function of the composition hg|ªḡ is
unaffected by the shift in φg(·), while the outer function is shifted upwards. Thus, hg|ªḡ(R)
is shifted upwards. The function hg|ªḡ(R) is continuous and hg|ªḡ(0) > 0 so that hg|ªḡ(R)
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intersects with the 45 degree line once and from above. The upwards shift pushes this point
to a larger value of R, thus increasing Rg|ªḡ for any fixed value of Rªḡ. As a result, Rg′′|ªḡ
and φḡ(Rªḡ) increase as well. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. In equilibrium, wa is a fixed point of ha : ha(wa) → φa(φªa(wa)).
Perturbing ca by a small ∆ increases wa by ∆w = 2∆/(1− h′a(wa)) = 2∆/(1− φ′ªa(Rªa)).
By Corollary 3, φ′ªa(Rªa) < R−a/wa = 1 − 2/αa, and so ∆w < αa∆. The effect on αa,
denoted ∆α, satisfies ∆w = ca∆α + αa∆ and so ∆α < 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that xa can be written as
∏
g∈νP (a) Rg/Rψa(g). Each
term Rg/Rψa(g) in this product is equivalently written as Rg\ψa(g)/(Rψa(g) + Rg\ψa(g)). For
any g ∈ νP (a), Rψa(g) increases with ca by Lemma 1. We note that φg\ψa(g)(·) remains
unchanged, and applying Corollary 3, φ′{g\ψa(g)}|ψa(g)(Rψa(g)) < Rg\ψa(g)/Rψa(g), so that
Rg\ψa(g)/Rψa(g) decreases. This is true for each g ∈ νP (a), causing Rg/Rψa(g) to decrease,
and so xa decreases. ¤
Proof of Proposition 7. Recall that xa can be written as
∏
g∈νP (a) Rg/Rψa(g), where
νP (a) = (G1, G2, . . . Gd) is the sequence of parallel submarkets within which producer a





increases with ca by Lemma 1. Applying Lemma 1 and Corollary 3 for each term in the
brackets ensures this product is increasing as well, leaving only R−1ψa(Gd) to decrease with
ca. Now looking at pa = waxa, we need only show that wa/Rψa(Gd) is nondecreasing with
ca. If a has direct competition, i.e. a ∈ ψ(Gd), then this term cancels out of pa. Otherwise,
wa/Rψa(Gd) = wa/Rψ−1a (a) is increasing in ca by Corollary 3. ¤
Proof of Proposition 8. By Lemma 1, RGH increases with the upshift in φGH (·). Consid-
ering that GH ⊆ Rªa and µa = RGH /(RGV +RGH ), Corollary 3 implies an increase in both
µa and xa/µa = Rªa/(Rªa + wa), so that xa increases. Lemma 1 also implies an increase
in wa and wa − ca, so that pa and πa increase as well. ¤
Proposition 18. Using the notation of Figure 2.9, when ca is small enough, an upshift in
φGV (·) decreases the equilibrium market share xa.
Proof. Define a sequence {cja} of efficiency parameters for producer a, and the corresponding
sequence {~wj} of equilibria. To specify from among the sequence {~wj} of equilibria, we
reintroduce the explicit dependence of Rg(~wg) on ~wg. Let {cja} be such that cja → 0 as
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j →∞. We note that the response functions φGV (·), φGH (·), and φGL(·) are unaffected by





Furthermore, the smoothness of response functions, and of φja(Rªa) with respect to c
j
a,
ensures that {~wj} → ~w as j →∞, where ~w is the equilibrium corresponding to φa(Rªa) :=




g)) → φ′g(Rg(~wg)) for g ⊆ G. As a result, letting ∆jx represent
the change in xa(~wj) resulting from a particular upshift in φGV (·), we see that ∆jx → ∆x,
where ∆x is the change in xa when ca = 0. When ca = 0, producer a′s market share
is given by xa(~w) = µa(~w)Rªa(~w)/(Rªa(~w) + wa) = µa(~w)/2. Applying Corollary 3 to
µa(~w) = RGH (~w)/(RGH (~w)+RGV (~w)), we see that xa decreases with a shift in φGV (·), and
that ∆x < 0. So, for ca near enough to zero, producer a loses market share. ¤
Proof of Theorem 6. We first look at the pre-merger response function for gP . Here,
φgP (RªgP ) = [1/wa1|ªgP + 1/wa2|ªgP ]
−1, where:
wa1|ªgP = φa1|ªgP (RªgP ) = φa1(Rªa1|ªgP ) = 2c/θ + [1/RªgP + 1/wa2|ªgP ]
−1
wa2|ªgP = φa2|ªgP (RªgP ) = φa2(Rªa2|ªgP ) = 2c/(1− θ) + [1/RªgP + 1/wa1|ªgP ]−1
We observe that wa1|ªgP < (2c + RªgP )/θ and wa2|ªgP < (2c + RªgP )/(1− θ). Combining
gives φgP (RªgP ) < 2c + RªgP for all RªgP . Of course, when aP is replaced with a single
link with cost c, the response function is φaP (RªaP ) = 2c + RªaP . ¤
Proof of Theorem 7. As always, φaS (RªaS ) = 2c + RªaS . We show that φgS (RªgS ) ≥
φaS (RªaS ) for fixed RªgS = RªaS . Because markups are bounded below by 2, RgP |ªgS ≥
2(1− θV )c. We know that waV |ªgS is equal to 2θV c + RªaS + RgP |ªgS . Thus, φgS (RªgS ) =
RgP |ªgS + waV |ªgS ≥ 2c + RªaS + RgP |ªgS ≥ φaS (RªaS ). For the second statement, see
that as θV decreases, φgP (·) is shifted upwards, while φaV (·) shifts downwards, leading to a
decrease in waV |ªgS , and so in RªgP |ªgS . Similarly, the sensitivity φ
′
gP
(RªgP |ªgS ) increases
(this effect is derived from closed-form expressions of Akgün (2004) for equilibria in an elastic
duopoly). For a fixed value of RªgS , φ
′
gS
(RªgS ) = (1+3φ
′
gP
(RªgP |ªgS ))/(1−φ′gP (RªgP |ªgS )),
and so is also increasing (the sensitivity is derived using equation (A.4), presented in the
appendix). Integrating φ′gS (R) over [0, RªgS ] shows that φgS (RªgS ) increase with a decrease
in θV . ¤
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Appendix B
Proofs of Results in Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 9. To address the second-stage production game, we adopt the
technique of Theorem 3.4.3 in Okuguchi and Szidarovsky (1990) and convert the equilibrium
problem to a quadratic program with the desired properties. Since each firm solves a convex
problem in the second stage, an outcome (q1, x1, q2, x2) is an equilibrium if and only if there
exist multipliers (λ1 ∈ R4+, µ1 ∈ R4+, λ2 ∈ R4+, µ2 ∈ R4+), such that:






 q−i + 2qi
q−i + 2qi

 + µi −A′λi = 0 (i ∈ {1, 2}) (B.1)
xi ⊥ µi, (i ∈ {1, 2})
(Ki − qi1 − qi2) ⊥ λi, (i ∈ {1, 2})
Rxi = qi, (i ∈ {1, 2}).
Now, formulate the following quadratic optimization problem, taking (q1, x1, q2, x2) simul-






q′i (α− qi − q−i2 + ε)− x′i (ci + ω)
]
(B.2)
subject to: Axi ≤ Ki, (i ∈ {1, 2})
Rxi = qi, (i ∈ {1, 2}).
Note that the first order conditions for (B.2) are precisely the conditions in (B.1). Further-
more, since the objective of (B.2) is concave, the conditions are necessary and sufficient,
so the set of equilibria are exactly the set of optimal solutions to (B.2). Since (B.2) is a
quadratic program, with strictly concave objective, the equilibrium is both guaranteed to
exist and unique for any choice of K, ε, and ω. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 10. To construct the production table, we first impose the first
order conditions for the optimization problem in (3.3), simultaneously for both firms 1 and
2. We introduce lagrange multipliers λi for firm i’s capacity constraint. In all regions, the
conditions:
αm + εm − c̄im − q−i,m(K, ε)− 2qim(K, ε) = λi, (m ∈ {1, 2}, i ∈ {1, 2})
(Ki − qi1(K, ε)− qi2(K, ε)) ⊥ λi, (i ∈ {1, 2})
are in force. We then add the conditions:
λ1 = 0, in regions Ω1 and Ω3
λ2 = 0, in regions Ω1 and Ω2
q11(K, ε) + q12(K, ε) = K1, in regions Ω2 and Ω4
q21(K, ε) + q22(K, ε) = K2, in regions Ω3 and Ω4
Solving the resulting systems of equations for each region yields the given production quan-
tities. For conditions on ε, observe that, under Assumption 1, the conditions in (B.3) are
necessary and sufficient to describe a second-stage equilibrium. The equilibrium is then in
Ωj for any ε which admits a solution {q1(K, ε), λ1, q2(K, ε), λ2} that satisfies both (B.3) and
the two additional constraints corresponding to region Ωj . The six equality constraints in
the resulting system are sufficient to define {q1(K, ε), λ1, q2(K, ε), λ2} as displayed in the
production table. After applying the conditions associated with Ωj , we are left with two
inequality constraints that are needed to ensure the complementarity conditions in (B.3) are
satisfied. After plugging in {q1(K, ε), q2(K, ε)} from the production table, these inequalities
provide bounds on those ε that produce an optimum in region Ωj . ¤
Proof of Proposition 11. The procedure here is as in Proposition 11. In this case, K1
and λ1 are 2-vectors. The first order conditions for (3.3) in the (MF,CF) game are:
αm + εm − c̄im − q−i,m(K, ε)− 2qim(K, ε) = λi, (m ∈ {1, 2}, i ∈ {1, 2})
(K1m − q1m(K, ε)) ⊥ λ1m, (m ∈ {1, 2})
(K2 − q21(K, ε)− q22(K, ε)) ⊥ λ2,
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The additional constraints by regions are then:
λ11 = 0, in regions Ω1 and Ω3 and Ω2.2 and Ω4.2
λ12 = 0, in regions Ω1 and Ω3 and Ω2.1 and Ω4.1
λ2 = 0, in regions Ω1 and Ω2
q11(K, ε) = K11, in regions Ω2.1 and Ω2.3 and Ω4.1 and Ω4.3
q12(K, ε) = K12, in regions Ω2.2 and Ω2.3 and Ω4.2 and Ω4.3
q21(K, ε) + q22(K, ε) = K2, in regions Ω3 and Ω4
We can now solve for production quantities and bounds on ε. ¤
Proof of Proposition 12. The assumptions in place indicate that the optimal solu-
tions comes from region Ω4 for all ε. According to Table 3.1, the second-stage pro-
duction quantities are q1m(K, ε) = K12 +
(qC1m−qC1,−m)















After taking expectations, we get that K1 is chosen to maximize E[π(K1, ε)|Ω=Ω4 ] =
(K1)
(
E[qM11 ] + E[q
M







. The function is concave in K1 and
maximized at KCF1 = E[q
M
11 ] + E[q
M
12 ] − K22 − cK . Plugging this into the expected profit
function yields Π∗CF . ¤
Proof of Proposition 13. The assumptions in place indicate that the optimal solutions
comes from region Ω4 for all ε. According to Table 3.2, the second-stage production quanti-




4 . The resulting prof-













All stochastic terms enter linearly, dropping out when expectations are taken. The expected
profit function is separable and concave in K11 and K12. We optimize each investment sep-
arately, yielding the solution in (3.9). Plugging this into the expected profit function yields
Π∗MF . ¤
Proof of Proposition 14. The threshold is obtained by setting the profit differential in
(3.13) to zero, and solving the resulting quadratic equation for ∆p. Note that KCF1 |l=2 =
λ1− cT2 and KCF1 |l=1 = λ1− cT2 −∆P , and that both terms must be positive for Assumption
1 to hold. It is clear from (3.13) that Π∗CF |l=1 − Π∗CF |l=2 > 0 at ∆P = 0. Furthermore,
∂[Π∗CF |l=1−Π∗CF |l=2]
∂∆P
= ∆P + cT2 − λ1 is negative under Assumption 1. It follows that onshore
production is favored for ∆P less than the smaller root of (3.13), and offshore production
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is favored elsewhere in the admissible space of parameters. ¤
Proof of Proposition 15. The proposition follows directly from equations (3.15)-(3.18).
¤
Proof of Proposition 16. The threshold is obtained by setting the profit differential in
(3.21) to zero, and solving the resulting quadratic equation for ∆p. As done for Proposition
14, we note that
∂[Π∗CF |l=1−Π∗CF |l=2]
∂∆P
= KCF1 |l=1, which is negative by Assumption (1). The
threshold ∆̄ must then equal the smaller root of (3.21). ¤
